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HOWARD UNIVERSITY

South Africa's Role in Southern Africa:
A Postapartheid Foreign Policy



A Dissertation
Submitted to the faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

of

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the requirements for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

by

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Washington, D.C.
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
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
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

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

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DEDICATION

To my father, Ahmed Laher, my mother, Fatima Laher, and the loving memory of my sister, Natasha Laher.

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My love and appreciation to my parents for supporting and believing in me through the many years of our separation. I am truly blessed to have such wonderful parents and for that I thank Almighty Allah.

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ABSTRACT

South Africa's Role in Southern Africa: A Postapartheid Foreign Policy

This dissertation, examines the postapartheid role of South Africa in southern Africa. The postapartheid era began on April 10, 1994, with Nelson Mandela's inauguration as the first democratically elected president of South Africa. Given the domineering and antagonistic regional role of the former regime, the new president immediately moved to realign southern African relations.

South Africa's reentry into southern Africa is marked by two distinct, yet related, policy approaches. First, President Mandela is restructuring South Africa's regional role through a broad diplomatic engagement strategy that emphasizes the democratization of the region's state systems. Building on the president's international reputation, this strategy seeks to foster regional stability and cooperation through peaceful negotiation and accommodation of interests.

The second approach, is characterized by South Africa's high profile positioning of the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) as the premier vehicle for multilateral

negotiation on regional development. Though South Africa views the SADC as the conduit to approach formal integration in the future, the policy present emphasis is on sectoral cooperation. Priority is given to sectoral cooperation in the areas of trade, transport, natural resources, health, and migration.

South Africa's two prong regional approach is uniquely redefining regional relations. However, a stagnant economy constrains the extent to which the government can be overly ambitious about its role in regional development. A realistic assessment of the domestic priorities attached to the allocation of state resources necessarily cautions South Africa's evolving regional policy.

South Africa's weak economy and the harsh challenges imposed by a reordered global economy signal that significant regional development will not be easy or timely. In this unforgiving environment, the region remains unavoidably tied to South Africa's economic fortunes in much the same way as it did during the apartheid era. However, it is significant that South Africa is showing the political will to moderate and even change this reality.

Despite South Africa's considerable domestic challenges, it has not become inwardly preoccupied. Instead, South Africa links its developmental priorities to those of the region. This aspect, is what places South

Africa's evolving regional role firmly within a new era of
constructive and, peaceful cooperation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CODESA	Council for a Democratic South Africa
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern African States
DFA	South African Department of Foreign Affairs
DP	Democratic Party
EC	European Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GNU	Government of National Unity
IFP	Inkathata Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITU	Internal Tracing Unit (South Africa)
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MPNP	Multi-Party Negotiating Process
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NP	National Party
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWO	New World Order
OAU	Organization of African Unity

PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PTA	Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Program
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance Movement
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SACU	South African Customs Union
SANDEF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
TBVC	Former 'independent' homelands: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei.
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Popular Front

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

South Africa and the world celebrated the end of apartheid on May 10, 1994, with the inauguration of the first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela. The occasion marked the largest gathering of foreign leaders and dignitaries ever seen in South Africa. President Mandela's ascent to the presidency signaled not only the end of white domination in South Africa but it also emphatically ended the lingering legacy of white domination in Africa. The new president accepted his responsibilities amid African leaders, especially those in the southern African region, who looked toward his administration to embark on bold regional initiatives which would distance it from those of the former apartheid regime.

The first bold regional initiative came on July 21, 1994, day twenty one of the new administration, when President Mandela prominently announced his first official state visit as the leader of the Government of National Unity (GNU). With the attention of the world still fixed on South Africa, President Mandela afforded the honor of his first state visit on the war torn neighboring state of

Mozambique. The decision is remarkable in that the president's state visit coincided with a celebration in London to mark South Africa's reentry into the Commonwealth of Nations. Instead of personally attending the Commonwealth meeting, the president sent his deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, to represent the GNU in London. The decision boldly demonstrated postapartheid South Africa's new priorities in its emerging foreign relations. The emphasis was switched from a historically Euro-centric focus to one centered primarily on Africa. The reversal, brushed away decades of apartheid policies that sought to solidify ties with Europe, the United States (US), and the Antipodes.

The state visit to Mozambique marked postapartheid South Africa's return to the family of African nations. More significantly, the decision to visit a southern African state elevated the relevance of the region as the primary arena for foreign policy engagement. South Africa's regional interests began to take shape as the president wasted no time in uncovering his administration's regional interests. In a gesture meant to permanently end the civil war in Mozambique, South Africa offered President Chissano of the ruling FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) party, logistical support for his country's scheduled October 1994 election. The offer underscored South Africa's concern that Mozambique's first democratic

elections proceed peacefully and, thereby, permanently end the ongoing civil war. In a gesture meant to promote reconciliation, President Mandela also met with the leader of the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO), Afonso Dhlakama, to frankly assert South Africa's interest in moving Mozambique toward the institution of multiparty democracy.¹ In this way, postapartheid South Africa official recognition of Renamo's relevance to the peace process in Mozambique. This theme of reconciliation, as exhibited in the South African experience, has become a central facet of President Mandela's diplomatic engagement strategy in the region.

The Mozambican state visit, also afforded South Africa a regional stage to assert its interest in confining continental cooperation within the institutional contexts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Conference (SADC), and the United Nations (UN). During a forum for science-led development in Africa, President Mandela refused to sign a "research and development charter" because he believed the agreement would be costly and essentially duplicate the work of the OAU, the SADC, and the UN.² Mandela raised his concerns in an

¹ The Star (Johannesburg), August 17, 1994, p.15. Kaizer Nyatumba put together a useful diary of Mandela's first 100 days in office (May 10 - August 17).

address to the African leaders gathered at the science forum. Among the African dignitaries present was Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, King Mswati of Swaziland, President Quett Masire of Botswana, President Mabuto Sese Seko of Zaire, and President Chissano of Mozambique.

The forum afforded South Africa a strategic platform to communicate the relevance of existing multilateral organizations such as the OAU, the SADC, and the UN to its foreign policy. The president's speech also marked an early expression of the new government's intention to confine its regional and continental relations within the SADC and the OAU respectively. For SADC, specifically, Mandela's speech heralded the organization's centrality to the emerging regional policy of postapartheid South Africa.

The State visit to Mozambique is significant because it symbolizes postapartheid South Africa's first official exercise of relations in southern Africa. As the earliest demonstration of regional policy, the Mozambican visit establishes the GNU's interest in removing conflict from the regional arena. The state visit also demonstrates South Africa's interest in supporting regional moves toward democracy. With these two dominant interests in mind, President Mandela urged both the FRELIMO administration and

² Weekend Argus (Cape Town), July 23/24, 1994, p.7.

the rebel movement, RENAMO, to decisively end their decades' old civil war. The firm, though friendly, pressure was clearly aimed at keeping Mozambique moving toward openly contested democratic elections.

Instructively, the diplomatic engagement approach used in Mozambique forms the basis of South Africa's overall strategy toward southern Africa. The emphasis on peaceful negotiation as a means to removing conflict is a key factor behind South Africa's emerging regional policy. President Mandela has even suggested that regional states use South Africa's transition and, reconciliation experience, as a model for peaceful settlement of conflicts.³ This approach, is particularly evident in the manner in which South Africa approached and developed its position on the brutally consuming two decade old Angolan civil war.

In early August 1994, President Mandela visited Angola on a peace mission. The visit was used as an opportunity to emphasize South Africa's interest in advancing a peaceful negotiated settlement to Angola's civil war. President Mandela offered to mediate a settlement to the conflict. As

³ See: The Star (Johannesburg), July 27, 1994, p.3. President Mandela urged Mozambique to "use our transition as a model" in a conversation with Mozambique's National Elections Commission (CNE) president, Brazao Mazula. Also See: The Star (Johannesburg), August 12, 1994, p.3. Bishop Tutu and other influential leaders call for a CODESA-like conference to address Lesotho's political and constitutional deadlock.

in the case of Mozambique, Mandela offered South Africa's transition as a relevant model for breaking the civil war stalemate in Angola. The president's initiative immediately received positive feedback both regionally and abroad. The United States, for example, applauded Mandela for his positive involvement and promised to urge UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, to travel to Pretoria for high-level talks. US State Department Spokesperson, Michael McCurry, added further that "recent events in South Africa illustrate that tolerance and compromises are the essential elements in a peaceful transition to democracy," and that "no one is better placed to bring that message to Angola than Nobel laureate Nelson Mandela."⁴

The Angolan state visit again signaled South Africa's attempt to structure its regional policy to lobby for the cessation of ongoing civil wars. The state visits to Mozambique and Angola underscores the administration's concern with stabilizing the region through reconciliation and democracy. In this respect, the Angolan visit literally mirrors the determined approach exhibited in Mozambique.

The crisis in Lesotho in which the late King suspended the constitution and then sacked the democratically elected government provided an early opportunity for the Mandela

⁴ The Star (Johannesburg), August 10, 1994, p.12.

administration to showcase its determination to guard the region from further conflict. The president abandoned his usual amicable posturing and berated the King for his action. South Africa then demanded the restoration of the democratically elected government. The King was left with very little leeway to second-guess the seriousness with which South Africa viewed the disruption of democracy in Lesotho.

In a show of solidarity, the SADC backed South Africa's call for the immediate reinstatement of Lesotho's parliamentary democracy. The contempt with which the region viewed the King's actions was displayed at the SADC summit (August 29, 1994) which marked South Africa's admittance to full membership. The King and his delegation had to suffer the indignity of being unanimously snubbed by the SADC membership.

The Lesotho crisis, provided an early opportunity for the SADC to align itself with the new South African leadership. In effect, the wholesale snubbing of King Letsie and his entourage, forged a coherent block and highlighted an emerging consensus to multilaterally address regional instability. And if that was not enough inducement for the King to restore parliament, the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) engaged in troop maneuvers just outside the border of Lesotho's capital, Maseru. The

maneuvers were meant to convey the message that South Africa could consider more than just flexing its military muscle if democracy was not restored. Choosing not to test South Africa's regional resolve, the King reinstated the constitution and handed power back to the democratically elected government.⁵ In so doing, South Africa firmly secured its interests and simultaneously drew the region closer together.

South Africa's emerging southern African role is evolving within a domestic setting that poses profound challenges for the formulation and application of regional policy. The political transition⁶ that accompanied the historical 1994 election has spawned a state that is in the process of redefining the very fibers of its constitutional democracy.⁷ As the Mandela administration sets about the business of governing, the structural and psychological

⁵ The Star (Johannesburg), September 16, 1994, p.5. Lesotho reinstated Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle after King Letsie III suspended the constitution and sacked the democratically elected government on August 17, 1994.

⁶ Transition (the establishment of new formal political rules) is used as distinct from transformation (the changing of social and political relations). This distinction was first used by Price. See: Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa 1975-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 285-301.

⁷ See: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200, (1993).

residue of apartheid confronts the domestic context within which regional policies must operate.

President Mandela's role is central to the continued durability of South Africa's transformation. On the occasion of the president's first 100 days in office, a Gallup poll found his popularity steadily rising.⁸ There was also praise for the president's regional foreign policy from some analysts in the academic community in South Africa. Temba Sono, executive director of the Centre for Development Analysis, commented in the media that Mandela's Africa policy had "carved a successful African diplomacy probably unmatched by any African leader in the last thirty years." He added further that the president's "foreign policy goals seem to be peace, reconciliation, interdependence and prosperity," and that "these goals (are) firmly within the framework of South Africa's national interest."⁹

In contrast to Sono, John Barrat avoids heaping praise on the new administration's emerging regional policy. He contends that South Africa in its new foreign relations is still "a country with many friends and no enemies."¹⁰

⁸ The Star (Johannesburg), August 30, 1994, p.1.

⁹ The Star (Johannesburg), July 27, 1994, p.12.

¹⁰ Weekend Argus (Cape Town), August 27/28, 1994, p.19.

Praise for the new South Africa continues to flow in from almost every conceivable quarter which is unusual in the "divided world" of the post-Cold War era. The honeymoon period internationally has not begun to fade as South Africa is still being warmly courted by her many new friends. Skeptical of a world of no enemies, Barrat urges South African policy makers to make use of this unusual period to gain advantages. In so doing, he also cautions those policy makers to chart a foreign policy that is in the interests of all South Africans. His cautioning should be read in the context of his concern not to have white South African interests sidelined by a realigned foreign policy. He adds further, that South Africa cannot escape its leadership role in the southern African region. But Barrat urges the new government to "set new directions for the achievement of democracy, security and sustainable development"¹¹

Barrat provides a conservative assessment of the state of foreign policy in the Mandela administration. He cautions analysts not to make hasty assumptions about the course of such policy and perhaps that is the best insight the article offers. It is true that the new administration is still charting a new policy but to say that such policy is merely "reacting to the advances of a world enamored with

¹¹ Ibid, p.19.

Table 1

Human Development Indicators (HDI) in Southern Africa

Country	Life Expectancy at Birth in 1990	Adult Literacy Rate in 1985	Percent of Children in School	Average Number of Years in School	GDP Per Capita (US \$) 1985-88
Middle Level					
South Africa	61.7	80.0	57.9	3.7	5 480
Botswana	59.8	70.0	47.3	2.0	2 510
Low Level					
Swaziland	56.8	68.0	46.3	3.0	2 110
Namibia	57.5	73.0	49.2	1.7	1 500
Lesotho	57.3	72.6	49.3	2.7	1 390
Zimbabwe	59.6	62.3	42.2	2.0	1 370
Zambia	54.4	67.4	45.8	2.6	870
Tanzania	54.0	52.0	35.3	2.0	570
Malawi	48.1	41.7	28.4	1.7	620
Mozambique	47.5	27.6	18.9	1.6	1 070
Angola	45.5	35.7	24.3	1.5	840

Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Indicators, 1991.

the achievement of our (SA) transition to democracy" is an overstatement of the situation.¹² Further, the portrayal of a state with "many new friends and no enemies" smacks of the dated precepts of the realpolitik vision of the cold-war era.

Barrat's analysis ignores the fact that every major policy move the new government has embarked upon has been in keeping with the publicly stated foreign policy objectives of the African National Congress.¹³ South Africa is pursuing a new and distinct foreign policy that reflects the realities of the post-Cold War period. Its regional policy is grounded by the argument that strong democratic states are a prerequisite for peace, human rights, arms control, and overall economic cooperation. In keeping with this policy the new government is pursuing its policy objectives in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and, more recently, in Swaziland.

The southern African region is made up of ten states:
South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland,

¹² Ibid, p.19.

¹³ Mandela, Nelson, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol.72 No.5, (November/December 1993), 86-97. At the time of writing Nelson Mandela had not yet been elected to office and he was speaking as the President of the African National Congress.

Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, and Tanzania.¹⁴ As of this writing, all ten states are members of the SADC. South Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1990 was \$90.72(bn). This figure illustrates South Africa's relative economic strength when it is contrasted with the combined GDP of \$27.20(bn)¹⁵ in 1990 of the remaining nine SADC states.¹⁶

Unlike the impression given by the Barrat article, South Africa is actively pursuing foreign policy goals that aim at cementing relationships with states in the region. A significant part of the theoretical groundwork for a postapartheid regional policy is drawn from the protracted apartheid struggle by those who now hold power in the GNU. Regional policy is being defined in terms of a diplomatic engagement that departs radically from the often brutal policies of the previous National Party (NP) government. In essence, the new government rejects the confrontational

¹⁴ The island Mauritius is also a member of SADC, therefore, the total membership count is twelve. However, Mauritius is not normally considered a part of geographical southern Africa.

¹⁵ This study quotes monetary values in US dollars (\$) and South African rand (R). The conversion value between the two currencies as of November 4, 1996 is: \$1.00 equals R4.70.

¹⁶ World Development Report, quoted in Southern Africa After Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources, Bertil Oden, ed., (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), 12.

posture that historically characterized the apartheid regime's role in southern Africa. Peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation are the hallmarks of South Africa's postapartheid regional engagement.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The scope of this study is limited to the role of South Africa, in the region of southern Africa, during the postapartheid era. For the purposes of this study, the postapartheid era began on May 10, 1994, on the occasion of the official inauguration of President Mandela.

The regional role of South Africa in the postapartheid era will be analyzed in terms of the formulation and application of foreign policy in the region. In the tradition of the realist paradigm, this study assumes a state-centric international political system. However, this study also acknowledges the existence of other actors within that system, as the focus on the multilateral body, the SADC, suggests.

The central purpose of this study is to assess South Africa's postapartheid regional role. Specifically, this study seeks to isolate the domestic, regional, and global variables that influence the formulation and application of the new administration's foreign policy toward the region.

The basic assumption guiding this study, is that a new regional policy is charted within a working framework of national interests. It is suggested that South Africa defines national interests in terms of pressing domestic needs and its perception of the regional and international situation. The overall analysis of South Africa's regional policy, emphasizes the centrality of continuity and change in the assessment of all variables.

Domestic pressures weigh heavy on the policy choices the new government is embarking upon.¹⁷ The linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy is well established in the literature.¹⁸ Since the Mandela administration has made the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) the centerpiece of its domestic policy, this study analyzes the linkage between stated RDP policy and regional policy.

The Mandela administration is formulating South

¹⁷ See: Sunday Times (Johannesburg), September 4, 1994, p.20. A study by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit and the World Bank found that among the 9 000 households surveyed: 70% of blacks were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the quality of their lives; the corresponding percentage for whites is 75%. Domestic priorities rated in order of importance by blacks were: jobs, piped water, housing, electricity and schools. Peace was 6th, political settlement 11th. Whites cited: peace, political settlement, lower taxes, inflation, and jobs.

¹⁸ See the concise discussion on 'causality' in Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis", in A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light, eds., Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 93-97.

Africa's postapartheid regional policy under a unique overlay of change and continuity. On one hand, South Africa is an old established state that is accompanied by the political, economic, institutional, and legal heritage established in almost fifty years of apartheid rule. During the apartheid era, destabilization policies characterized South Africa's regional policy. On the other hand, the new South Africa symbolizes a distinct political break with the old order. The Mandela regime is now firmly in control of a state that popularly expresses its destiny in terms that contradict the very political and social fabric of the old order. The new government has signaled that South Africa will seek to interact in the region through peaceful policies which aim at mutual development. Despite this reorientation of South Africa's regional role, it is significant that almost every aspect of the state's political administration, economy, and society continues to be impacted by the residue of apartheid rule.

The structural implications of this mixture of change and continuity, poses special problems for the formulation and application of a new regional policy. Accompanying the dramatic change that saw the installation of the first majoritarian administration, is an institutional framework that remains fundamentally intact. As of this writing, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) continues to be

predominantly staffed by civil servants from the F. W. de Klerk regime. President Mandela has curiously chosen to retain the National Party appointee, Rusty Evans, as Director General of the DFA, a move rumored to be a political concession to the National Party (NP). The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, and his Deputy Minister, Aziz Pahad, both stalwarts of the ANC while in exile, are the new guard in charge of the 'old order' DFA.

The predominantly 'old order' composition of the DFA poses a structural dilemma for the Mandela regime. Can President Mandela trust that the DFA will unequivocally adopt and implement a new regional policy based on cooperation rather than conflict? This is an important area of concern because it directly impacts the manner and context in which regional policy is formulated and applied. The distinct possibility exists that in the face of an intransigent DFA, President Mandela, may choose to formulate regional policy in a manner that alienates and, thereby, neutralizes the official role of the DFA. Nevertheless, in lieu of the directives of the final constitution, the institutional framework of the DFA and other governmental departments remains intact. This situation poses more than just a short term structural uncertainty for the Mandela administration in terms of the formulation and application of a new regional policy.

The contextual analysis of the region also proceeds under an overlay of continuity and change. Central to the investigation of regional dynamics, is an evaluation of South Africa's emphasis on securing national interests through the multilateral initiatives of the SADC.¹⁹ This study, therefore, pays close attention to the manner in which South Africa uses this body in the formulation and application of its regional policy.

This study recognizes the contribution of scholars who analyze the regional destruction wrought by colonialism, the Cold War, and apartheid South Africa in southern Africa. The legacies of these periods continue.²⁰ The regional context in which South Africa must forge a new role is characterized by asymmetric development largely brought about during these periods. The cumulative effect of these periods has led to a region that is heavily dependent on South Africa in the related areas of trade, transport,

¹⁹ See: The Star (Johannesburg), Tuesday August 2, 1994, p.14. The article indicates that Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, signaled to the Front Line States, in a meeting in Windhoek (Namibia), that the old political front be subsumed into SADC as a forum for political resolution and security management.

²⁰ See: The Citizen (Pretoria), Wednesday July 13, 1994, p.6. A SADC seminar estimated economic damage to southern Africa by South Africa's destabilization policies at a cost of \$100 billion. The seminar concluded that the legacy of apartheid threatened democracy, peace, and security in the region.

communications, and labor. The study shows that the South Africa cannot escape a leadership role in a heavily dependent region.

The analytical theme is expanded to cover new regional policy and resultant initiatives in a framework that underscores the necessity to view emerging trends in terms of continuity and change. The Mandela administration may inherit a dominant role in the region but a foreign policy based on cooperation rather than conflict may very well lead to a situation where dominance is compatible with regional cooperation and development.

The theme of continuity and change also informs the global context in which this study of international relations proceeds. The 'New World Order' (NWO), like the southern African region, is an order in flux. It is true that the end of the Cold War has released the analyst from the limitations of the East-West paradigm. However, the destruction and instability caused by the brutal proxy-wars that characterized the cold war in southern Africa, are still a pervasive reality in the region.

Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has changed the structure of post-1945 international relations, there is a continuity in global structures and processes. The South's struggle to gain sustainable development, in an international economic environment characterized by scarce

resources, remains fundamentally the same. The economic marginalization of Africa continues and the trend is unlikely to recede in the foreseeable future.²¹ The NWO with its one superpower hegemon, threatens to increase the polarization between developed and underdeveloped states through what Manfred Bienefeld has characterized a "more open and explicit form of imperialism."²² In these contexts, the internal development dynamics of the individual states in southern Africa, and the collective region, are similarly fated to those states and regions elsewhere in Africa. The reintegration of the Eastern-bloc into the world economy further undermines the continent's ability to develop as scarce capital flows east rather than south.

This study provides a balanced assessment of South Africa's new foreign policy by situating the analysis in the contexts of domestic, regional, and global trends. An attempt is made to show that postapartheid South Africa's regional policy seeks to address the developmental gap between the southern African state system and the developed

²¹ See: Sunday Times (Johannesburg), September 11, 1994, p.20. A high profile meeting between EU and SADC fell short of providing anything but moral support for the region.

²² Manfred Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a new Imperialism", Third World Quarterly, Vol.15 No.1, (1994):31-48.

states of the West. Though South Africa is the dominant state in the region, the GNU is seeking to restructure relations more fairly. In particular, the restructuring of trade relations is a dominant theme of postapartheid regional relations. In general, South Africa is avoiding the confrontational role of the apartheid regime by emphasizing peaceful and cooperative relations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A myriad of studies focusing on policy issues appeared in South Africa with the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. However, very little attention is given to regional issues in the body of literature produced during this period.

Much of the literature flowing from this period came in the form of policy studies and certain trends and predictions are predominant. A current review of the literature by South Africa scholars will uncover a plethora of published and unpublished policy-oriented studies. These studies often take the form of discussion documents.

In the work of Schlemmer and Lee (eds.), the observation is made that the period of negotiation has produced more documents on major policy issues facing South Africa than ever before.²³ This observation is correct.

²³ L. Schlemmer and R. Lee, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford

However, no attempt is made to deal specifically with the issues of regional policy in their book. In fact, F. Van Zyl Slabbert, in his article, only refers to regional policy in passing.²⁴ Van Zyl Slabbert, adopts the position that the post-cold war period has witnessed the withdrawal of the superpowers from the region leaving regional issues internal to the arena of southern African processes. This position ignores the continued influence of global forces in the region. For example, the United States continues to be influential in the region.

Schlemmer's article, briefly argues that regionally by 1990 "the strategic balance had shifted in favour of the South African government"²⁵ He refers to Namibia by saying that it represented the 'major price' South Africa paid in the region. The perception that apartheid South Africa merely walked away from its interests in Namibia is a mistaken one. The episode proved to be more complicated than Schlemmer's article reflects.²⁶ In short, the book is

University Press, 1990), vii.

²⁴ F. Van Zyl Slabbert, "The Basis and Challenges of Transition in South Africa," in Schlemmer and Lee, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives 1991, 9.

²⁵ L. Schlemmer "The Turn In the Road: Emerging Conditions in 1990", 17.

²⁶ For an expanded analysis of the issues surrounding the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia see: Brian Wood, "Peace without Losers?: South Africa's and Namibia's

a disappointing analysis of South Africa's policy options and the possible impact of policy choices in the region.

Nattrass and Ardington's (eds.) work proves to be even more of a disappointment than Schlemmer and Lee.²⁷ Here the articles fail to consider South Africa's emerging options and possible role in the region. The bulk of the chapters in this work analyzes South Africa's economic links with the economies of the North. Special attention is paid to the impact of sanctions on the economy of South Africa.

However, not one article attempts to analyze the links between South Africa and the economies in the southern African region. This omission is unwarranted since the authors state that their book attempts to analyze key political and economic issues in South Africa's political economy. Clearly, South Africa's present and future political economy is of relevance to the entire region, yet no analysis of attending issues are offered.

R. Schire (ed.), also does not include a single article that deals specifically with policy choices, in the regional

Independence", in Nancy Thede and Pierre Beaudet, eds., A Post-Apartheid South Africa? (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 53-76.

²⁷ N. Nattrass, and E. Ardington, eds., The Political Economy of South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990).

context, in his publication.²⁸ Schire, uses a public-policy framework to analyze major policy choices facing a postapartheid South Africa. Curiously, no analysis is presented in terms of the impact of South Africa's public policy choices on the region.

The general failure to explore regional issues illustrates the manner in which prominent South African scholars view South Africa's role in the regional context. Their omission is indicative of an often glossed over perception that southern Africa is incidental to the policy options facing South Africa. This perception is perhaps best illustrated in Nattrass and Ardington's publication. Here the editors envision showing the link between South Africa's economy and that of the world. However, not one sentence speaks to the link between South Africa's economy and that of the states in the region.

The notable exception to this trend is the report of the Commonwealth Expert Group.²⁹ The report was assembled by Harker et al., and it specifically addresses the human resource implications for southern Africa as South Africa

²⁸ R. Schrire ed., Critical Choices for South Africa: An Agenda for the 1990's (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990).

²⁹ J. Harker, et al., Beyond Apartheid: Human Resources in a New South Africa (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1991).

joins the region. The report points to two major concerns: First, that the region's development is tied into the successful transition in South Africa. The authors contend that if South Africa becomes embroiled in conflict, Western donor states will not invest in programs that aim at addressing the ravages of apartheid. The consequence of such an action would be to stunt the development of the entire region. Secondly, the authors envision a 'brain drain' in the region as skilled professionals flock to the lucrative markets of a postapartheid South Africa. The report also places emphasis on the role of the SADC(C) in the postapartheid period. It suggests that the SADC(C) states train South African personnel for the transition period. The SADC(C) states are suggested as possible models for strategies to be implemented in creating an integrated security force and non-racial public service in the transition period.

Though a welcomed departure from the myopic view of the scholars above, the report does have a few weaknesses. In its discussion of the role of the SADC(C) in the postapartheid era, the report seems to assume that the SADC(C) will represent a coherent consensus on the development of states in the region. This assumption has yet to be tested. Also, the report regards the process of reconciliation in South Africa as an irreversible process.

Even though the transition has been remarkably smooth till now, the assumption is not entirely justified.

In general, the scant research produced by South African scholars on regional issues, which precede and straddle the transition period, tends toward an inward preoccupation. Regional questions receive very little attention, if any at all. Consequently, this period produced very little scholarly debate around the insertion of South Africa into the southern African arena. Where regional issues are addressed, it is usually within the framework of South African perspectives and interests. The ongoing regional processes and debates are to a large extent ignored.

There is, however, some indication that the debate will widen and be enlivened. The University of the Western Cape's (UWC)- a school initially set aside for 'colored' education, Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS)- in an attempt to broaden and integrate regional issues into the scholarly debate, introduced a working paper series that focuses on regional issues in November 1990.³⁰

In April 1991, Greg Mills, then lecturer at UWC and Christopher Clapham of the department of politics at

³⁰ Under the co-directorship of Rob Davies and Peter Vale the Centre's series is titled: Southern African Perspectives.

Lancaster University, published "Southern African Security After Apartheid: A Framework for Analysis" under the CSAS paper series.³¹ The paper constitutes an early attempt to apply a regional design to the discussion of security issues. The authors argue that South Africa will remain the powerhouse in the region. This they claim will place South Africa in the position to be influential in facilitating regional security. However, this position of power will mean "perpetuating the existing fears of neighboring states about South African regional pre-eminence."³² The article proposes that a multilateral alliance modeled on the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) be established to address regional security issues. Though they are acutely aware that they can be criticized for being Eurocentric, the authors offer no analysis of how to adapt the structure to the needs of the region. They do, however, point to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as points of departure for further analysis of 'Third World' security needs. The essential contribution of the article is its provocation of scholarly debate with the assertion

³¹ Greg Mills and Christopher Clapham, Southern African Security After Apartheid: A Framework for Analysis, Southern African Perspectives, No.8, (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, April 1991), 1-10.

³² Ibid., 6.

that:

Any prospective military alliance must take account of dangers to the region which go beyond such Cold War bogies as 'communism', 'the Cubans' or 'Western Imperialism'. The threats to regional stability are now being equated with the refugee crisis, health, poverty and underdevelopment, which may most effectively be handled within the broad context of a southern African CSCE. A purely military approach to such problems would only worsen them.³³

A further reason for installing a CSCE-type body flows out of their argument that a majority government in South Africa will owe a substantial debt to the Front Line States (FLS) for the support given to the liberation struggle. This, the authors say, may result in a situation where:

South Africa might ... find itself in the unenviable role of propping up former allies in these states. This situation could be avoided through the establishment of a multilateral structure in which there is a shared responsibility towards regional security.³⁴

The immediate weakness in their discussion is that of the burden of costs. The authors fail to address how such a body will be financed. This is especially pertinent since southern Africa does not have the financial clout to install a CSCE model on it's own. Also missing from the discussion, is an analysis of what is entailed in moving toward such a

³³ Ibid., 9.

³⁴ Ibid., 9.

model. What are the conditions necessary for such a body to get off the ground? The place for another multilateral body is highly questionable and the reasons forwarded are not entirely justifiable. It is more likely that the role of existing multilateral bodies such as SADC will be central to the process of security in the region.

The CSAS continues to publish studies aimed at highlighting the concerns around security in the postapartheid southern Africa. Several of the studies analyze the region within a Strategic Studies framework. Of note, Hasu H. Patel, addresses the ongoing regional security concern in his article "Peace and Security in a Changing Southern Africa: A Frontline View" utilizing an expanded view of security. Patel, a professor of political science at the University of Zimbabwe, asserts that peace and security in the region are seen in primarily nonmilitary terms.³⁵ This is a departure from the military-oriented Strategic Studies position popularized by Nye during the

³⁵ See for example: Hasu H. Patel, Peace and Security in Southern Africa: A Frontline View, Southern African Perspectives, No.12, (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, April 1992) 1-22. also; Xavier Carim, Strategic Perspectives for Southern Africa in the 1990s: Theoretical and Practical Considerations, Southern African Perspectives, No.23, (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, August 1993) 1-31. And; Ken Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations, Southern African Perspectives, No.30, (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, February 1994) 1-30.

Cold War era.³⁶

Patel's article divides security into nonmilitary and military categories. By nonmilitary security he specifically refers to food security, educational security, employment security, monetary security, environmental security, social security, and psychological security.³⁷ This broadened definition of security has seemingly provoked a widened debate around the parameters of what regional security implies in the region.³⁸

In his conclusion Patel states the problem of security and the prospects of peaceful development in the region this way:

The southern African region has been a region of war since the mid-1970's and especially during most of the 1980's, principally because of the key conflictual situation in the region, namely the conflict between white domination and African liberation. This conflict resulted in South Africa's regional destabilisation policy which brought death and destruction to the region. Since about 1980 this destabilisation policy has largely been wound down and hopefully a "peace dividend" could be used for socio-economic development in the region. However, ... the region will take generations, if ever, to recover from the vast human and non-human

³⁶ See J. Nye Jr., "The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges", in Adelphi Papers, 235, (Spring 1989), 20-34.

³⁷ Patel, Peace and Security in Southern Africa, pp.1-4.

³⁸ See: Xavier Carim, Strategic Perspectives, pp.1-31. and; Ken Booth, Theoretical Considerations, pp.1-30.

damage to which it has been subjected, and a true peace dividend will only come with a relatively smooth transition to majority rule in South Africa.³⁹

Patel's article represents a voice from a state in the region other than South Africa. Although he follows much the same argument of the Mills and Clapham article, he does reintroduce the legacy of white domination in the region into his framework. Perhaps the central contribution of the article is his use of an expanded definition of security in the region. The expanded definition serves as a basic framework in which scholars can debate future regional security. It also has the potential for establishing basic guidelines upon which to fashion future attempts at stabilizing the region. The CSAS continues to publish studies that analyze the security predicament in southern Africa.

A dichotomy is apparent in the analysis of the southern African region in the more recent literature. This dichotomy is also apparent in the overall literature on regional issues. On one side of the analysis there are scholars who assert that the region is in the process of regaining its autonomy. Accompanying this line of argument is the belief that southern African states will soon be in the position to determine their own economic development and

³⁹ Patel, Peace and Security in Southern Africa, 14.

relations.⁴⁰ On the other side of the analysis are scholars who claim that 'western imperialism' has won the day in southern Africa. This perspective specifically assigns South Africa the role of securing western interests.⁴¹

Dan O'Meara, in his article "Regional Economic Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Dream or Reality?", provides a more middle-of-the-road analysis. He points to the extra-regional and global forces which have determined the continuum of choices regional players have. This is so even though states have the autonomy to determine their own national interests. O'Meara predicts that extra regional forces will continue to impact the playing field in southern Africa.⁴²

⁴⁰ See: Peter Vale, Starting Over: Some Early Questions on a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy, Southern African Perspectives, No.1, (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, November 1990) 1-23; and, Rob Davies, "South Africa and the SADCC: Regional Cooperation after Apartheid", in G. Moss and I. Obery, eds., South Africa Review #6 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992).

⁴¹ See: Thomas Ohlson and John Stedman, Trick or Treat?: The End of Bipolarity and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa, Southern African Perspectives, (Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, December 1991) 1-30; and, Thomas Ohlson et., al., The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

⁴² Dan O' Meara, "Regional Economic Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Dream or Realty," in A. van Niekerk and G. van Staden, eds., Southern Africa at the Crossroads (Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 1991).

Two recent articles on regional analysis boldly lay out prospective scenarios for regional relations, for southern African relations. In a thought-provoking article Stedman and Ohlson's survey the entire region and suggest three possible scenarios. The study is also distinctive in that it includes a postapartheid South Africa in the analysis of the region's future. The first scenario, annihilation, envisions all of Africa becoming totally separated from the rest of the world. This scenario sees the continent moving toward total marginalization in the global order. The second scenario, neocolonialism, sees South Africa as the dominant player in the region and the conduit for relations and transactions with the North. The third and final scenario, regionalization, envisions state's overturning their marginalization by bonding together in strong regional autonomy that defies their declining economic global stature.⁴³

Taken together, the three scenarios anticipate a looming regional marginalization from the world economy. In this sense, Ohlson and Stedman are clearly overly sensitive that southern Africa faces an impending drift away from a relevant presence in the global order. Though the authors contend that the scenarios are meant to enliven the current

⁴³ Ohlson and S. Stedman, Trick or Treat?, 13-16.

debate, their seeming pessimism indicates a measure of uncertainty. Instead of broad scenarios, perhaps the authors should have focused the study on developmental options. This approach would have to consider the dynamics of postapartheid South Africa's role in the region's development. In addition, the authors would also have to decipher the contradictory dynamics of the global economy. The lack of focus in these two areas is perhaps the weakest aspect of Ohlson and Stedman's study.

Though clearly in favor of regional cooperation as a means for development, the authors do not go nearly far enough in discussing the efficacy of regionalism as envisioned by the OAU and the SADC. The study also mistakenly ignores the positive influence South Africa could have in drumming up global interest in trade and investment in the region. That South Africa enjoys an unusual international status for a country of its size and power goes without saying. Trading on its international goodwill alone, South Africa may very well be able to keep the region from fading into irrelevance. Recent trends in South Africa's relations with the developed North strongly suggest that the international influence of the Mandela administration is making the region more relevant in global economic terms. This development alone erodes the argument that an imminent marginalization of southern Africa is

unavoidable as Ohlson and Stedman seem to fear.

Rob Davies, the former co-director of the CSAS, and now an ANC member of parliament in the GNU, is the author of the other article which proposes future scenarios for regional relations.⁴⁴ Davies views quantitative versus qualitative change as the two major trends in the region. The first scenario, quantitative, involves the development of the region through a liberalization of relations between South Africa and the region. The second scenario, qualitative, envisions a realignment of the forces through a distinct program that promotes a more balanced long term development of the region. In his analysis, Davies ignores the contention illustrated by the South African literature above that a postapartheid South Africa will be inwardly preoccupied and, therefore, not instrumental in the region's development. Davies normative approach to regional relations also tends to take for granted that the principles of the ANC will translate without question into government policy. Additionally, Davies does not pay close attention to the influence of domestic constraints on the way in which

⁴⁴ Robert Davies, "South Africa Joining SADCC or SADCC Joining South Africa?: Emerging Perspectives on Regional Economic Cooperation After Apartheid", in Van Niekerk and Van Staden eds., Southern Africa at the Crossroads: Prospects for the Political Economy of the Region (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1991).

South Africa approaches its regional role.

Andre du Pisani's⁴⁵, Larry Swatuk's⁴⁶ and Peirre Beaudet's⁴⁷ respective articles, provide a more balanced approach to postapartheid southern African relations than the normatively framed analysis discussed above.

Du Pisani, writing in 1993, basis his analysis of South-southern African relations on the four following assumptions:

First, South Africa's future economic and development policies will impact deeply on the region. Secondly, regional relations will be accorded a relatively low priority for a future democratic government. Its principal preoccupation will be socioeconomic reconstruction and the consolidation of political power. Thirdly, democracy and the lifting of isolation will imply (re)admission to regional, continental and international organizations, which in turn will place new demands on the South African foreign service and call for a recast of Africa policy. Finally, the (re)admission of a democratic South Africa to Southern Africa may revive old, and generate new, conflicts in the region."⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Andre du Pisani, "Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future Of Southern Africa", Issue, Vol.xxi/1-2, (1993), 60-69.

⁴⁶ Larry A. Swatuk, "Prospects for Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa", Journal Of The Third World Spectrum, Vol.1 No.2, (Fall 1994), 17-31.

⁴⁷ Pierre Beaudet, "South and Southern Africa into the 1990's", in Nancy Thede and Pierre Beaudet, eds., A Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 142-166.

⁴⁸ Andre du Pisani, "Post-Settlement South Africa", 61.

Du Pisani is convinced that South Africa will seek to strengthen its hegemonic domination in the region. He rejects the argument that South Africa will be the engine for regional development. The "thinking" in South Africa's state and corporate sectors is based on the assumption that trade and export is essential for the country. Diplomacy based on trade and export will benefit South Africa more than the region. He argues further, though not justifiably, that South Africa seems to have very little interest " in a formalized, comprehensive regional regime based on the principles of equitable and region-wide development.⁴⁹ Consequently, he alerts the region to "the implications for the region of both 'reformed apartheid' and 'power sharing after a transfer of power'. In his conclusion, Du Pisani warns that "narrow interests" and "domestic concerns" may again act to derail peaceful development in the region.⁵⁰

The distinction of Du Pisani's article lies in his rejection of the popular argument that postapartheid South Africa will be an engine of broad political and economic development in the region. He raises the concern of domestic restructuring in South Africa as a limiting factor for regional cooperation. Nevertheless, in terms of foreign

⁴⁹ Ibid., 64.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 69.

policy, the Mandela administration has indicated that it intends to place the region central to its focus. This weakens Du Pisani's contention that the new government will accord the region a very low priority. However, the implication of the argument does direct scholarly attention to the possible ambiguity between stated policy and actual practice.

Larry Swatuk's article is one of the most recent to consider the prospects for regional integration in southern Africa. Like Du Pisani, Swatuk addresses the contention in the normatively framed literature that South Africa will emerge as the 'engine of growth' in the postapartheid period. Swatuk argues that the restructuring of regional relations and organizations are vital for the development of the region. He writes that:

a restructuring of regional relations and organizations is imperative if Southern Africa is to have any chance at a hopeful future beyond debt and destabilisation. The majority of Southern Africa's states, as juridicially and empirically constituted, are unviable political economies. They will never provide to the region's people the twin public goods of political security and economic prosperity ... unless they can overcome the externalization of their economies and the tenacious hold by their political classes upon sovereignty.⁵¹

⁵¹ Larry Swatuk, "Prospects for Regional Integration", 17-18.

Swatuk's central hypothesis is that despite the movement toward democracy in the region, structural adjustment programs, aimed at debt restructuring in the various states, seriously limit the prospects for regional integration. He envisions the region sinking into further decline and criticizes the position that forwards "optimistic scenarios" as "premature at best."⁵²

The contribution of the article lies in the analysis of South Africa's role as hegemon in the region. Swatuk aptly recognizes that South Africa will be very busy with internal restructuring in the postapartheid period. Such restructuring obviously poses severe obstacles for South Africa and detracts from its perceived potential to fuel development in the region. Swatuk is convinced that debt, not strategic minerals, will characterize South Africa's relations with the North in the post-Cold War and postapartheid eras.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of three main trading blocs will also force southern Africa into what Swatuk terms "de facto self reliance." The SADC will struggle to provide a regional identity among states that have only narrow interests. Curiously, however, Swatuk's analysis of the gross limitations of regional integration,

⁵² Ibid., 18.

though insightful, calls for "new regionalism and novel forms of South-South cooperation."⁵³ Despite the call, Swatuk is strained to point out the possible avenues for such cooperation other than to drive home the point that the prospects for regional integration are slim.

Pierre Beaudet's article, constitutes the most provocative analysis of South Africa's insertion into the region. He posits that the 'dominant trends' in southern African relations indicate that the future holds a mix of conflict, marginalization, and inequality.⁵⁴ The distinction of Beaudet's article lies in his hypothesis that a postapartheid South Africa may advance to more political stability but that the process will not be expeditious. He envisions the next decade to characterize a period where "any national consensus will remain extremely fragile and that the new South African state will be based on an incomplete social and political contract."⁵⁵ The economic crises that South Africa finds itself in will continue in a period characterized by a 'deconstruction-reconstruction' process. The dynamics of this process may dramatically alter the fabric of South African society but Beaudet warns

⁵³ Ibid., 34.

⁵⁴ Pierre Beaudet, "South and Southern Africa" 142-166.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 143.

that it may also lead to "long-term stagnation."⁵⁶

Beaudet's article, takes the first two bold steps in the literature to challenge the normative options so many of the authors above offer for future development in the region. First, Beaudet contends that South Africa's future relations with southern Africa will not 'significantly' depart from those of the apartheid years. Domination is still the most likely prospect. Second, he does not see the South African leadership being able to make available the necessary economic instruments that will lead to advanced development in the region.

The post-destabilization period has left the region with states that exhibit asymmetric development. This skewed integration is evident in the fact that South Africa's economy is three times larger than all the other states in the region combined. South Africa has used its economic dominance to become the major trading partner in the region. Further expansion of trade to the rest of Africa now represents 10% of South Africa's exports.⁵⁷ These trade inequities may very well lead to a form of "modernized domination." Beaudet stresses this contention by referring to the work of Tostensen who argued in part

⁵⁶ Ibid., 146-147.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 154-158.

that: "There is a real danger that the Constellation of Southern African states (CONSAS) could be reactivated after being stripped of its racist overtones." ⁵⁸ The trade imbalance will be perpetuated by the internal instability of states like Angola.

Beaudet's conclusion aptly paraphrases Gramsci in his prognosis for future southern African relations by saying that possible "relations lies somewhere in that grey zone between the 'optimism of the will' and the 'pessimism of the intelligence'." ⁵⁹ Beadet's analysis paints a sober picture of the unfolding and ongoing dynamics in the region. The article challenges the normative approach scholars to show why dominant trends will not continue in regional relations.

Despite the scholarly challenge, studies continue to appear utilizing the normative approach without providing an explanation of how such policy is likely to develop. Baron Boyd's article illustrates this point. Boyd admits that an analysis of a future regional role for South Africa is bound to be highly speculative. He writes that there is much uncertainty about the future of postapartheid South Africa. For example, very little is known about the final structure of the government, the role of interest groups, or the role

⁵⁸ A. Tottenson, cited in Pierre Beadet "South and Southern Africa", 158-159.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 163.

of the military. Consequently, the typical models used to examine foreign policy development are of minimal use.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, in an attempt to ground his study in theory, Boyd operationalizes a set of assumptions. These assumptions are meant to reflect ongoing trends in regional and international politics. First, he assumes that a postapartheid regional policy will be based on national interests. Secondly, that a postapartheid South Africa will be a democratic state. And finally, that a postapartheid economy will be a mixture of capitalism and socialism. Operating on these assumptions, a new regional foreign policy will seek to address internal needs by balancing it with the realities of the external environment. The balance will reflect on the national interests of the state.

Boyd's conceptual framework leads him to the conclusion that a postapartheid 'economic viability' is dependent on improving the economies of the region. This is because the southern African political economy is highly interdependent. Since South Africa will likely remain the "economic colossus" of the region, a symbiotic relationship based on "interests" needs to be established between regional states

⁶⁰ Baron Boyd Jr., "South Africa and its Neighbours: Continuity and Change in the Post-apartheid Era", in Chipasula and Chillivumbo, eds., South Africa's Dilemmas in the Post-Apartheid Era (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993), 139.

and South Africa.⁶¹

Boyd's conclusions do not distinguish his article in any substantive way. This is so despite the fancy footwork on his theoretical framework. In sum, his article aligns itself with the normative approaches discussed above. In keeping with the normative trend Boyd points out that a new "institutional structure must be developed to manage regional economic relationships and development in a mutually advantageous manner" but he fails to address how.⁶² Not a single tangible policy is suggested. Moreover, the article is vague on why such an arrangement will be in the interest of South Africa.

In late December 1993, Nelson Mandela, in his official capacity as President of the ANC, published an article entitled "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy," in the journal *Foreign Affairs*.⁶³ The article was as much a 'thank-you note' to the international community for their support against apartheid as it was a reassurance that the new South Africa would pursue a democratic future. Furthermore, the article seemingly anticipates the regional tensions that accompany South Africa's postapartheid

⁶¹ Ibid., 140-151.

⁶² Ibid., 150.

⁶³ Mandela, Nelson, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72 No.5, (Nov/Dec 93), 86-97.

insertion into the region.

The article - written in the context of the then ongoing multiparty negotiations - lays out the foreign policy "pillars" the ANC would pursue as follows:

- that issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental;
- that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide;
- that considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations;
- that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent, mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;
- that the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign policy choices;
- that economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world. ⁶⁴

The policy options are generally framed without any real substantive discussion of how these options will be translated into policy. In essence the contribution of the article is that it provides a sketch of the normative assumptions that make up the thinking of senior ANC officials.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 87.

This review of the literature on southern African regional issues finds that the majority of studies tend toward emphasizing normative options for relations in the postapartheid era. Du Pisani's, Larry Swatuk's and Beadet's articles are the notable exceptions. Beadet's article provides the most grounded and realistic insight. His contention that dominant trends will continue in southern African relations is generally bypassed by the typically normative contention, as illustrated by Davies, that South Africa's long range interests are best suited by balanced development that can be readily realized "within the constraints imposed by the increasingly complex international conjuncture."⁶⁵ In addition to being overly optimistic about southern Africa's place in the global economy, this position presupposes that the policies proposed by the ANC and the SADC can and will be implemented.

HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses are tested in this study:

- (A) The Mandela administration is seeking to aggressively distinguish its policies towards southern Africa from

⁶⁵ Rob Davies, "South Africa Joining SADCC", in Van Nieukerk and Van Staden, Emerging Perspectives, 242.

those of the former apartheid regime through the emphasis of a human rights based foreign policy. Such a foreign policy is based on the presupposition that human rights are central to international relations in both the political and economic spheres.

- (B) South Africa's foreign policy focus is shifting from the primarily European emphasis of the former apartheid regime, to a focus centered on the southern African region. South Africa's new regionally focused foreign policy will develop two major trends: The first trend is characterized by a diplomatic role in which South Africa guards its regional interests by intervening in conflict areas in the role of peacemaker; and, the second trend is characterized by an emphasis on centering the Southern African Development Community as the regional vehicle for the rationalization of South Africa's political and economic interests in the region.
- (C) The 'moral dividend' that President Mandela gained internationally as a result of his struggle against apartheid, and the support the African National Congress received from southern African states during the years of armed liberation struggle, are overriding factors which influence how South Africa perceives its role in the region. These factors influence the

current administration towards a cooperative rather than confrontational role in the region.

- (D) South Africa is addressing the regional instability caused by ongoing conflicts through an emphasis on negotiated settlements which seek the creation and maintenance of secure multiparty democratic states. Such policy draws on the argument that the region is in flux and that unstable states foster cross national destabilizing factors such as refugees, illegal arms trade, and drug trafficking. The emphasis on multiparty democratic states stems from President Mandela's argument that only democracy can provide durable "solutions to the problems of humankind." ⁶⁶
- (E) The political and economic obstacles facing the successful implementation of the domestic Reconstruction and Development Programme diminishes the government's economic leverage and ability to be instrumental in the mutual development of the region. Though South Africa is structuring its foreign policy objectives to reflect the perception that the region is interdependent, it is more likely that in the foreseeable future South-southern African relationships will continue to be characterized by the dominant role

⁶⁶ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", 87.

and position the new government inherited.

METHODOLOGY

This study utilizes primarily a case study approach that is extended to include elements of the traditional approach in its examination of the hypotheses listed above. This method will allow for a comprehensive description and explanation of all the qualitative and quantitative variables impacting the formulation and application of regional foreign policy. The state is the unit of analysis used in this study.

The case study approach is amenable to the consideration of multiple variables in the analysis of foreign policy formulation and application. This approach rejects the causally-oriented methods that seek to restrict the number of variables considered. The case study method further allows for the consideration of data which is specific and general, typical and peculiar, and descriptive and thematic.

By including elements of the traditional approach, the study is operationalized to consider qualitative data which may impact the role of South Africa in the postapartheid era. The traditional approach specifically relates to an analysis of factors which qualitatively influence state

behavior, government policies and positions, and issues of national interest. Domestic variables, such as the respective policies of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, which influence the foreign policy making process, fit into this category.

This study utilizes both primary and secondary sources in the collection of data. Research was conducted in South Africa and the United States. Documentary research is the backbone of the study. The process of documentary research requires the analysis of all relevant official government policy statements as made available through the monthly publication of the Government Gazette in the Republic of South Africa. The official regional policy statements of the African National Congress and the Southern African Development Community was extensively used.

The study also relies heavily on secondary sources of information. Such information was gathered from books, professional and academic journals, magazines, and daily and weekly editions of South African and international newspapers. South African newspapers such as The Star (Johannesburg), The Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), The Citizen (Pretoria), and The Argus (Cape Town), play a pivotal role in supplying information and analysis of domestic and regional matters which relate to southern African relations.

The archival resources of the following South African institutes were used in both the primary and secondary information gathering process: Centre for African Studies (University of Cape Town); Centre for Southern African Studies (University of the Western Cape); Institute for Strategic Studies (University of Pretoria); and the independent South African Institute for Race Relations in Braamfontein. In Washington, D.C., the resources of the Library of Congress, the Brookings Institute, TransAfrica, and area universities were consulted.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The timely nature of this study sets it apart from the body of literature on southern African relations. Because of time constraints, the vast majority of studies dealing with South-southern African relations, focus on the apartheid era and the period leading up to the multiparty negotiations in South Africa. During the negotiation period, a few studies attempted to forecast the region's postapartheid political landscape. These studies by nature are highly speculative and, therefore, provide very limited substantive analysis.

Even now that the new administration in Pretoria is more than two and a half years old, only one study dealing

with southern African relations has emerged.⁶⁷ Given the time constraint, this is not at all surprising. However, of particular significance is the fact that this study does not specifically analyze the dynamics of a possible reoriented postapartheid foreign policy on the region even though it broadly focuses on regional security. The present study's focus is, therefore, timely positioned to incite scholarly attention and debate.

This study is also the first of its kind to include an analysis of the impact of postapartheid domestic policy, on the formulation and application of foreign policy in southern Africa. Specifically, the investigation of the linkage between the Reconstruction and Development Programme - the centerpiece of the government's domestic policy - and regional policy, is one of the main and novel contributions of this study to the scholarly literature.

The role of a postapartheid SADC, as a vehicle for the articulation, rationalization, and even implementation of South Africa's regional policy, is another timely contribution of the study to the scholarly debate. The

⁶⁷ See Thomas Ohlson et. al., The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994. This is the most recent study on regional dynamics to appear in the post-apartheid period. The study focuses on regional security concerns in general and therefore is not directive on the development of South Africa's regional policy.

analysis will go beyond just normative speculation on the regional role of the SADC, to an analysis of the organization's instrumentality in harmonizing the respective interests of states with that of dominant South Africa.

The unique underlying issue to which all the various foci in this study point, is whether the first majoritarian government in the postapartheid era, in terms of its southern African relations, can pursue a foreign policy that radically departs from the apartheid regime. In so doing, an attempt is made to provide the framework within which South Africa's postapartheid regional policy operates.

As a whole, the role of South Africa in the region is analyzed in terms of change and continuity. The presupposition which fuels the overall inquiry is that a postapartheid regional policy operates in a paradigm characterized by national interests. To the extent that national interests guide policy formulation, South Africa continues its political and economic domination of the region. The character of relations is, however, changing from conflict to cooperation. Nevertheless, South Africa's domestic priorities continue to restrict its role as facilitator of regional transformation. In this respect, the study is original and, therefore, makes a unique and timely contribution to the field of international relations.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter One covers the introduction, purpose, hypothesis, methodology, theoretical framework, literature review, significance and organization of the study.

Chapter Two, provides an analysis of the current standing of South Africa's regional policy in terms of formulation and application. Special emphasis is placed on the political context in which the new regional policy is evolving. This includes contrasting with apartheid policy with postapartheid regional policy under an overlay of continuity and change.

Chapter Three, focuses on the regional context in which policy is formulated and applied. This section provides an analysis of the political conditions in the region and the possible influence such conditions have on South Africa's regional policy. The role of the SADC in the formulation and regional articulation of South Africa's regional policy is also addressed in this chapter.

Chapter Four, focuses on the linkage between regional policy and domestic policy. The influence of the policies of the domestic Reconstruction and Development Programme on the regional policy priorities of the Mandela administration will be the center of the discussion and analysis provided.

Chapter Five, seeks to ascertain what South Africa's national interests in the region are. The discussion draws the chapters together in an attempt to evaluate domestic and regional variables which influence and shape the concept of national interest.

Chapter Six, summarizes the relevant findings of the research. It attempts to assess whether the hypotheses posed in Chapter One have been proved or disproved. There is a discussion surrounding the possible direction future policy will take. Areas for further research are also identified in the study's conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study has recourse to alternative logic when contrasted with the normative approaches to southern African relations discussed above. The emphasis here is on the specific national interests of the Mandela administration as a guide to possible foreign policy development. This emphasis is based on the contention that foreign policy choices in the region are best deduced within a framework of neorealist and functionalist theory.

Neo-realism is the intellectual descendent of classical realism. Classical realism tended to be presented in an unsystematic way. Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics, is the first serious attempt to develop an orderly interpretation of realism.¹ This seminal work is the best known and most referred to study in what is now referred to as structural realism. Structural realism continues to be a popular framework to analyze international relations.

Waltz's structural realism centers its focus on the international system. This focus is justified with the

¹ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

argument that the international system influences how states relate to each other. In the same vein as the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, Waltz's structural realism sees states as actors whose main purpose is to secure national interests. States relate in an international system which is anarchic and their behavior can be characterized as: "unitary actors who at minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination." ²

Although states interact in an environment that is essentially anarchic, Waltz argues that: "the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly." ³ The explanation for this regularity lies at the systemic level. It is precisely the anarchic character of the international arena that accounts for the regularity. States must rely on the principle of "self-help" to provide for their own security. In this way, states transform the structure of the international order. Waltz emphasizes those characteristics of the structure which influence the way individual states relate to other states. Structure for Waltz is the manner in which states are arranged in the international system. This arrangement of states is the

² Ibid, 93.

³ Ibid, 66.

focus of structural realism.

One of Waltz's central methodological assumptions is that his study separates the systemic from the reductionist. The assumption however is not entirely sound. It is not possible to clearly and distinctly separate wholes from parts, ends from means, and causes from effects. Even Waltz refers to the relationship between component parts and the whole in the first chapter of his study. The separation of the relationship between wholes and parts restricts the power of explanation. Waltz's systemic level definition of international relations is restricted by its scope in providing a fuller understanding of that arena primarily because it ignores an analysis of the respective nature of nations.

Waltz's theory does not fully explain how change occurs in the international system primarily because change stems not from the structure of the system, but the parts of the units. Robert Gilpin, in his study War and Change in World Politics, attempts to show how change occurs in the state system.⁴ He proposes the argument that states engage in an ongoing cost-benefit analysis of all possible options to pursue. Gilpin's theory attempts to explain the rise and fall of empires and hegemonies. Where the benefits are

⁴ Robert Gilpin, War And Change in World Politic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

thought to be more than the costs, states embark on territorial, political or economic expansion to change the system. When states are satisfied with their position, that is, an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, equilibrium is achieved. Equilibrium is not the same as balance. Any state system is in equilibrium when it is no longer profitable to change the system.⁵

Gilpin argues that hegemonies are the most stable systems. However, in hegemonic systems "the principal mechanism of change throughout history has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war (i.e. a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system)." ⁶ The rationality of war is the center of Gilpin's theory. War is intimately related to change. This is in contrast to Waltz's contention that in balance of power theory war is merely one means of achieving the survival of all independent and sovereign states. Similar to the analysis of Waltz, the focus is state-centered. For Waltz, equilibrium is the rule and hegemony the exception. Gilpin's theory places hegemony as the rule and equilibrium as the exception.

⁵ Ibid, 10-15.

⁶ Ibid, 15.

Recent studies insisting that neorealism be linked conceptually with other nonsystemic theories to explain more fully how change in international order arises are common in the literature.⁷ The rationale behind this line of argument is based on the perception that despite all the modifications, the realist paradigm does not fully explain the problems that have surfaced in the post-cold war era. Among these problems are ethnic tensions, nationality issues, religious fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, migration and refugee problems. The other side of the coin is the continued inability of the realist paradigm to explain fully why states cooperate. The neorealist framework, on its own, is not equipped to provide a comprehensive analysis of multilateral institutional security. This study conceptually links neorealist theory with neofunctionalist theory to attempt to explain these shortcomings.

David Mitrany's 1966 study A Working Peace System is among the most prominent contributions to classic functionalism.⁸ The central focus of the study is to

⁷ Michael D. Yaffe, "Realism in Retreat?: The New World Order and the Return of the Individual to International Relations Studies", Perspectives on Political Science, Vol.23 No.2, (Spring 1992), 68-88. and; F. Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics", International Security, Vol.17 No.1, (1992), 177-198.

explain how national ties might impact international integration and thereby reduce extreme nationalism. Mitrany argues that modern society is confronted with a myriad of technical problems which can best be addressed by skilled technicians and not politicians. Therefore, these nonpolitical problems require collaborative responses from states.

The successful collaboration in one technical field or functional area would lead to further collaboration in other related areas. This process Mitrany termed ramification. The positive outcomes of collaboration would lead political leaders to recognize common benefits of such cooperative endeavors. Consequently, political leadership will be more willing to encourage further collaborative tasks. Mitrany's theory in essence reduces the sovereignty of the state. In short, Mitrany envisioned international peace through integration in functional areas.

The successful creation of the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC) in 1952 and the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958 highlighted Mitrany's contribution but also raised the question of the conditions that preceded integration. Scholars began to question the Hobbesian image of an anarchic war burdened state system in

⁸ David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).

Europe. As a result alternative approaches appeared to explain international cooperation.

Ernst Haas in his works The Uniting of Europe⁹ and Beyond the Nation State¹⁰ deals specifically with the European experience with integration. Haas defines integration as a process "whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states."¹¹ His conceptual approach to the study of integration is known as neo-functionalism. Haas' central contention is that the decision to integrate is impacted and dependent on a calculation of perceived costs and benefits by major groups in the prospective unit.¹² The integration process for Haas is advanced by elites in government and private sectors who aim at achieving pragmatic rather than altruistic interests.

Haas acknowledges the intellectual debt owed to Mitrany but he rejects Mitrany's contention that technical tasks

⁹ Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958).

¹⁰ Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

¹¹ Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 16.

¹² Ibid, 13.

could be separated from politics or welfare from power. Haas maintains that for integration to occur, it must first be perceived to be in the interests of political elites. In essence Haas directs his efforts not to the understanding of conflict among states but rather toward an understanding of how states achieve collaborative behavior.

This study addresses some of the inadequacies presented by the studies on southern African policy above. A concerted attempt is made to provide a more balanced and objective analysis of the role postapartheid South Africa plays in the region. The study does not provide a normative analysis, instead it seeks to identify options which have grounded potential for translation into foreign policy.

Theory, then, has a central place in international relations because it provides structure and organization to knowledge. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, provide a concise and useful description of the purpose of theory in this way:

Theory - although not to be confused with the scientific method - enables us to apply the methods of scientific inquiry in an orderly rather than a haphazard way. It helps us to relate knowledge in our own field to that of other fields. Finally, it provides a framework for evaluating the policy recommendations, either explicit or implicit that abound in all the social

sciences.¹³

In terms of a theoretical framework, international relations demands a paradigm which offers grounded, and empirically sound theory, for the analysis of relations among states. The post-cold war period, together with the demise of apartheid, challenges the analyst to provide a workable framework which not only reflects the current political situation in the region, but also the direction the region is likely to move in. In the context of this study's focus, such a framework must seek to assess the variables of continuity and change which will most likely characterize South Africa's post apartheid role in the region of southern Africa.

To fully analyze the dynamics of that role, this study will use neorealist theory as its primary analytical tool. Where the linkage between South Africa's domestic policy and foreign policy is explored, the vast literature will be consulted to guide the analysis. Finally, the study draws on some aspects of functional literature, primarily that of David Mitrany and Karl Deutsch, to assess the economic, social, and welfare initiatives of South Africa's regional policy.

¹³ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 16.

Realism is the dominant paradigm in international relations. Neorealism, the intellectual descendant of classical realism, attempts to provide structure to classical realist theory. Towards this end, neorealists clearly define key concepts and design studies to be conducive to the empirical testing of propositions.

In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) some scholars have criticized realist theory as static theory that cannot explain how change in the international system occurs.¹⁴ In fact, classical realists and neorealists are consistent on how change occurs in the international system. For these theorists, change is linked to the unequal distribution of power among states in the international system.¹⁵ There are, however, important distinctions between classical realism and neorealism. A further discussion of the work of Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin will highlight these distinctions and also underscore the continued usefulness of the neorealist paradigm in the

¹⁴ See for example: R. Rosecrance, "International Relations Theory Revisited," Vol.35, (1981), 691-713. also, R. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization, Vol.38, No.2, (1984), 225-286.

¹⁵ See for example: Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 4th ed., (New York: Knopf, 1967); see also, Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); and, Robert Gilpin, The political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

post-cold war era.

In neorealism, like classical realism, power remains the central variable. However, in neorealist theory, power struggles are inherent in the nature of relationships between states and not entirely an end in itself.

Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, sums up the place of power in neorealist theory the best when he says:

Just as the instrument of power and of sanctions does not exhaust the nature of law, the nature of Politics is also not exhausted by primarily referring to power as its most important tool.¹⁶

Classical and neorealist theories also disagree on the source which fuels the struggle for power. Neorealists do not see the struggle for power as related to human nature as the classical theorists claim. For neorealism, the struggle for power is related to the very nature of the international system.

Neorealist studies have been extended to include, conceptually, other theoretical approaches to international relations. For example, the work of Kenneth Waltz, is based in neorealism theory but also includes systems constructs. Waltz's approach to the study of international relations has

¹⁶ Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, The Munich School of Neorealism in International Politics, cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, 119.

spurned a theoretical direction in neorealism known as structural realism.¹⁷

Structural realism views international relations as more than just the collection of foreign policies. An emphasis is placed on the structure of the international system as the agent that shapes the political relationships of states. Waltz argues that states interact in a patterned relationship in the international system that is essentially anarchical. For Waltz, structure refers to the manner in which various parts of the international system are arranged. The arrangement of parts is the focus of structural realism.

In Waltz's theory, "The concept of structure is based on the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes."¹⁸ States, in an anarchical system, seek any arrangement to survive and promote security. This is accomplished primarily through two approaches. First, states use whatever domestic (internal) means to increase their political, military, and economic capacities. Second, states seek to align or realign with other actors in the

¹⁷ See: Kenneth M. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

¹⁸ Ibid., 81.

external environment. The pattern of relationships in the system is then defined by the structure of the system. Of special importance is the number of states in any system. As the structure changes so does the pattern of relationships among states. In Waltz's perspective, it is the very structure of the system which reduces the inherent conflict of the anarchic international system.

Waltz's structural realism does not view international relations from a reductionist point of view. This constrains his theory's ability to explain change. Waltz is not concerned with units at a national or subnational level where change often stems from. Waltz however argues that reductionist approaches rely excessively on economic, psychological, and sociological explanations and thereby fail to capture the essence of politics.¹⁹

Robert Gilpin's work seeks to address the issue of change in the international system. His theory is aimed at explaining the rise and fall of empires and hegemonies. He wrote during the seventies, a period where scholarly focus was on the decline of American economic power. International theorists at this time were concerned with consequences of lost hegemony in terms of international stability. Questions concerning the fate of international

¹⁹ Ibid., 40-79.

trade and finance were central to this period's scholarly focus.

Gilpin envisions change to be initiated when states engage in a cost-benefit analysis and decide on paths of action.²⁰ Like Waltz, Gilpin builds on classical realist theory but is specifically concerned with making such theory empirically accountable. He distinguishes himself by opting not to use a systemic approach but rather a reductionist actor-oriented perspective couched in microeconomic language. Gilpin, in comparing himself to Waltz, argues that his perspective does not disregard the system but that its starting point differs. On this point he says in part:

Waltz starts with the international system and its structural features in order to explain aspects of the behavior of individual states. My *War and Change in World Politics* emphasizes the opposite approach, namely, that of economic or rational choice theory: I start with individual state actors and seek to explain the emergence and change of international systems.²¹

In an attempt to pin down the genesis of change, Gilpin theorizes that states seek change in the system through the expansion of territory, political advantages, or economic

²⁰ Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 3-12.

²¹ Robert G. Gilpin, "The richness of the tradition of political realism," International Organization, Vol.38, No.2, (Spring 1984), 288.

means. By acquiring an advantageous distribution of power, major actors are able to manipulate the behavior of states in the system.

Gilpin's theory defines international politics as cyclical. The cycle is characterized by five varying phases:

- 1) The international system is stable to the extent that no state believes it is beneficial to attempt to change the system.
- 2) A state will seek to alter the international system if it believes the costs do not exceed the benefits.
- 3) A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion, to the point where the marginal costs of further change are equal to or less than the marginal benefits.
- 4) When an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.
- 5) Unless the disequilibrium in the international system is resolved, the system will be changed and a new equilibrium that reflects a redistribution of power will emerge. ²²

Where foreign policy is concerned, Gilpin suggests that states weigh objectives and choose a "satisficing" approach which ensures the achievement of combinations of benefits. States use their foreign policy to increase their influence but also use such measures as threats, coercion, alliances, and spheres of influence. However, security in the modern

²² Gilpin, War and Change, 10-11.

period is also advanced through the use of sophisticated technological innovations.

Gilpin's theory envisions three categories of change. First, there is a change in the actors (empires, states) of the system. The system changes in this way when the cost-benefit calculus alters the benefits of the existing system. Second, change takes place in the components of the system. This means that there is a fundamental alteration of the internal power structure of a state. The emphasis is on the alteration of the distribution of power among the states. The third and final change, occurs in the nature of the political, social, and economic relationships among states.²³

For Gilpin, relations among states are characterized by successive changes in an international system where forces either lead the system to either conflict or accommodation. The dynamics of his neorealist position is best summed up when he says:

"World politics is still characterized by the struggle of political entities for power, prestige, and wealth in a coalition of global anarchy. Nuclear weapons have not made the resort to force irrelevant; economic interdependence does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace

²³ Ibid., 50-105.

international anarchy.²⁴

The present study also concerns itself with the influence of domestic issues on foreign policy. The influence of domestic policy on foreign policy is well documented in the literature.²⁵ James Rosenau, considers domestic sources of foreign policy as central to its nature and application as the international context it is formulated for.²⁶ Joseph Frankel views foreign policy decisions as distinct from all other kinds of decisions. Frankel argues convincingly that foreign policy decisions are uniquely impacted by an interplay between internal and external environments.²⁷

F.S. Northedge, argues that the internal political environment and the resulting pressures, determine the limits a government has in formulating foreign policy. In his analysis, foreign policy formation represents a continuous series of domestic compromises and adjustments between the levels of government and social structure. He

²⁴ Ibid., 230.

²⁵ For discussion see: K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992), 271-307.

²⁶ James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

²⁷ Joseph Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

writes that:

What we can say with some assurance is that the precise constellation of these forces may vary from one country to another, depending upon its traditions, political system, social and economic structure and many other variables, but that, except on minor issues which can be settled 'in the office,' foreign policy-making will always proceed in the midst of the kind of vortex of conflicting (domestic) forces ... ²⁸

It is clear that in Northedge's analysis, the foreign policy process is surrounded by conflicting domestic forces.

Ultimately, internal pressures determine the way in which a state handles its foreign policy.

Neorealist theory is also concerned with the concept of national interest as it relates to foreign policy formulation. Joseph Frankel argues that national interest should not be narrowly defined. National interest must include moral, religious, and other altruistic elements. He makes the point by saying in part:

The notion of 'national interest' is based upon the values of the national community, values which can be regarded as the product of its culture and as the expression of its sense of cohesion, values which define for men what they believe to be right or just.²⁹

²⁸ F.S. Northedge, The Foreign Policies of the Powers (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 23.

²⁹ Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, 86.

James Rosenau, also places national interest as central to the process of foreign policy-making. He explains that the concept of national interest is used both in political analysis and political action. National interest in political analysis is an analytical tool that seeks to explain or test the soundness of a state's foreign policy. In political action, national interest is used to justify, denounce, or propose policies.³⁰

In sum, the theoretical literature pertaining to the influence of domestic variables and national interests on foreign policy allows this study to evaluate more effectively the context in which such policy is formulated. The next step is to extend the neorealist framework to include functionalism as a conceptual tool to explore South Africa's regional relationship with the SADC.

The most influential functional writer, David Mitrany, views the development of international organizations, which perform human welfare tasks, as a means of eroding popular support for nation-states.³¹ This cooperation, is thought to diminish the threat to international peace nationalism is perceived to pose. Mitrany is careful not to attack the

³⁰ See Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, 4-45.

³¹ David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966).

concept of nationalism directly. Instead, he argues that modern states have a dynamic range of technical, politically neutral, functions they are expected to perform which would be best performed in the context of international cooperation.

Several of these tasks, for example, the control of maritime traffic, international mail, or the granting and supervising of radio broadcast frequencies, are not performed effectively at the national level. Mitrany, therefore, proposes that governments delegate such tasks to nonpolitical technicians working in a framework of an international organization. His doctrine of "ramification" explains that technical cooperation in one nonpolitical field would lead to cooperation in other technical fields. The functionalist approach therefore builds on existing interdependencies by taking on specific functional tasks of economic and welfare cooperation. Such a strategy avoids a politically divisive nationalist debate. Moreover, such a strategy creates a community of interests that may make significant inroads into national frontiers.³²

Mitrany's theory avoids an open confrontation with state sovereignty. According to him, the great virtue of the functional method is that of "technical self-

³² Ibid., 62.

determination" where function determines the institution, powers, and authority necessary for its performance. He suggests that such functional strategy could eventually develop into a comprehensive federal political system by installments. This federalism would be durable because it would be grounded on a record and tradition of functional cooperation. In this way, nationalism would be replaced by allegiance to the international community.³³

The work of Karl Deutsch is also theoretically informative to this study.³⁴ Deutsch's method is known as the transactionalist approach. The transactionalist approach isolates the variables that distinguish an organized and interdependent community from a random grouping of individuals. Also, the conditions that are necessary to promote and maintain a sense of community among the population in a given region are identified.

Deutsch hypothesizes that increased state interaction leads to increased inter-state relevance. This does not necessarily lead to integrated communities unless relations are mutually responsive. For Deutsch, integration is a

³³ Ibid., 73-83.

³⁴ See: Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953); also; _____, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968); Karl Deutsch et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

condition that is achieved through mutually beneficial transactions among populations in a region. These transactions establish a sense of community among populations and thereby provide a nonviolent structure to deal with conflict.³⁵ The community decides on the institutions and procedures to deal with nonviolent conflict resolution.

Deutsch does not assume that transactions among populations leads to a unitary supranational state. He distinguishes between an "amalgamated security community" and a "pluralistic security community." In the former a common government arises when two or more formerly independent units merge. The United States is used as an example of this type of arrangement. In the latter, individual governments retain their independence. The relationship between Canada and the US is used to illustrate this model.³⁶

Deutsch's methodology isolates two main patterns of communication that characterize emergent regional

³⁵ Also see: Paul Taylor "The Concept of Community and the European Integration Process," in Michael Hodges, ed., European Integration (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 203-223. Taylor coins the term "socio-psychological" community in his discussion of the common values which emerge from transaction flows.

³⁶ Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 122-194.

communities. First, he looks for a high volume of transactions within the region over a wide range of economic, political and social activities. Thereafter, he looks at the transactions within a community and the transactions between that community and the external environment. In this way, transaction flows are used to determine the degree of interdependence in a region, and also the level of dependence states have in terms of the external environment.

For the purposes of this study, functional theory is used to provide insight into the conditions that facilitate southern African cooperation. In the context of post-apartheid southern Africa, this study rejects the argument that functional cooperation will replace or reduce state nationalism. Tom Ostergaard, in a recent article, surveys the theoretical relevance of market integration theory, the development integration model and the neofunctional model.³⁷ He concludes that neither of these theories, in an unadapted form, is suited for the southern African context. Ostergaard argues that even though regional integration is appealing to southern African leaders, the fact that the

³⁷ Tom Ostergaard, "Classical Models of Regional Integration-what Relevance for Southern Africa?" in Bertil Oden, ed., Southern Africa After Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992), 27-47.

economies of the region primarily provide raw materials for export, complicates any economic scheme aimed at intra-regional interaction.

In Ostergaard's analysis "Southern Africa needs a less ambitious model of regional integration."³⁸ He correctly predicts that when postapartheid South Africa is inserted into the region, regional integration schemes will be on the agenda of southern Africa. This study uses Ostergaard's analysis as a guide in its investigation of the 'schemes' of regional interaction as proposed by the evolving regional policy of South Africa. Since neorealist theory is primarily concerned with military and security issues, functional theory is used to the extent that it helps explain regional cooperation in economic, social, and welfare issues.

³⁸ Ibid., 45.

CHAPTER THREE

TRACING AN EMERGING REGIONAL POLICY

The unconditional unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and other liberation movements, by former President F.W. de Klerk, on February 2, 1990, initiated the institutional context that transformed apartheid South Africa. Nine days after President de Klerk's unbanning order, Nelson Mandela walked away from Cape Town's Victor Verster prison in an historic moment that symbolizes the dawn of a new political era.¹ Thereafter, a political whirlwind unraveled the domestic preconditions that make a consideration of postapartheid South Africa's role in southern Africa, timely and relevant.

Kal. J. Holsti suggests that national role conceptions, as defined by the policy-makers, are useful in the explanation of foreign policy behavior. Holsti points out that the behavior of a state can be traced to the policy-makers perception of the role that a state plays in the

¹ Nelson Mandela wrote to President de Klerk's predecessor, P.W. Botha, in 1986, offering proposals to resolve South Africa's political crisis. This communication is widely considered to be the first step in the negotiation process that evolved under de Klerk's administration.

international or subregional arena.² Building on this concept of role, this chapter seeks to identify the decisions and actions of the Mandela administration in the southern African region as a means to explain the contours of the Government of National Unity's (GNU) emerging regional policy. Domestic constraints on South Africa's regional policy are considered in chapter four.

THE LINK BETWEEN STRATEGY AND THEORY

It is a perception of renewed hope that the Mandela administration wishes to project in its regional posturing. Since the assumption of power in May 1994, South Africa has moved toward pursuing a regional strategy that stresses mutual cooperation and accommodation in the region. Policies aimed at cooperation and accommodation are evolving within the context of a regionally centered, highly visible, diplomatic strategy. As of this writing, the new government is pursuing a state by state diplomatic engagement of the region. Significantly absent from the new approach, is the openly confrontational posture that characterized the regional policies of the former apartheid state. The new

² See: K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.19, No.3, International Studies Quarterly, (September 1970), 233-309.

diplomatic approach can be characterized as incremental and pragmatic. It utilizes the international goodwill that surrounds President Mandela to flaunt an image that advocates openness and democratic universality. The new regional policy is a projection of what Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo refers to as, the "de-ideologisation of foreign relations."³ Nevertheless, the theoretical presuppositions that underlie the Mandela administration's new approach to southern African relations, can be traced to the broad ideological populism of the Freedom Charter.

The Freedom Charter emerged under the auspices of the Congress of the People, in Kliptown near Johannesburg, on the June 26, 1955. The Congress of the People was made up of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions. The ANC ratified and adopted the Freedom Charter in March 1956 under the leadership of Chief Albert Lutuli.⁴

The framers of the Freedom Charter, envisioned the document to be a 'peoples' agenda for a postapartheid South Africa. Theoretically, the document attempts to provide the

³ The Star (Johannesburg), May 22, 1995, p.11.

⁴ See: Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to US (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 123-127.

following general base upon which future foreign policy principles are to be formulated:

There shall be peace and friendship; South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations; South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of international disputes by negotiations, not by war. The peoples of the protectorates - Basutoland(now Botswana), Bechuanaland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland - shall be free to decide for themselves their own future; The right of all peoples of Africa to independence and self-government and shall be recognized and shall be the basis of close cooperation.⁵

Subsequent regional policy statements by the ANC build on the broad framework provided in the Freedom Charter. In October 1993, the ANC released its most comprehensive post Cold War foreign policy document. The document entitled Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa is written in the populist language style of the Freedom Charter.⁶ Where the specific basis for the formulation of a regional policy is concerned the document states:

We have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid. While South Africa's people experienced discrimination and repression at home,

⁵ Ibid, p. 213.

⁶ African National Congress, Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa: A Discussion Paper (Johannesburg: Department of International Affairs), 1993.

the peoples of other countries fell victim to barbaric destabilization policies which left nearly two million people dead, displaced millions more, and inflicted damage estimated at \$65-billion on the economies of neighbouring countries. The region sustained us during our struggle and our destiny is intertwined with the region; our peoples belong with each other. Southern Africa is, therefore, a pillar upon which South Africa's foreign policy rests. Closer regional co-operation and economic integration after apartheid will benefit the entire region. Defining the terms, conditions and principles on which this should be constructed, is of fundamental importance.⁷

Significantly, the primacy of southern African relations in the postapartheid era, is accorded consistent priority throughout the document.

The primacy of southern African relations was also notably emphasized upon the release of then political prisoner, Nelson Mandela. The speech following his release emphasized the central place the Frontline States occupy in any reformulation of South African regional policy. In that speech, a new southern African policy was boldly heralded with the declaration that "The sacrifice of the Frontline States will be remembered by South Africans forever."⁸

⁷ Ibid, 6.

⁸ Steve Clark, ed., Nelson Mandela Speaks: Forging a Democratic, Nonracial South Africa (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1993), 25.

Though the entire reference is made up of only one sentence, the considerable political weight of the occasion underlined and reassured regional states of their central position in the reformulation of a future postapartheid foreign policy.

The centrality of regional states in the reorientation of regional policy, is repeatedly confirmed in subsequent discussions by the ANC. In late 1993, an authoritative discourse on postapartheid foreign policy, aimed at an international audience, appeared in a prominent American political science journal. The article, by then President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, postulates that South Africa cannot, and will not, develop at the expense of southern Africa. The ANC perceives a future majority government that "will resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interests at the expense of southern Africa."⁹ This position draws on a 1992 discussion document assembled in the ANC's trade and industry policy unit, under the direction of economist, Tito Mboweni. The document argues that South Africa must renounce any "hegemonic ambitions" in the region. In addition, regional cooperation or integration schemes must not be used as a "vehicle for the one-sided promotion of South Africa's immediate

⁹ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, (November-December 1993), 91.

interests." ¹⁰

The Mandela article, and Tito Mboweni's discussion document, both envision a postapartheid South Africa that significantly alters the regional role of the former apartheid state. At the same time, a hegemonic role for a postapartheid South Africa is rejected. Cooperation instead of confrontation, similar to the positions expressed in the Freedom Charter, is the basis for a reoriented postapartheid foreign policy. The Mandela article though similar in context to earlier ANC policy documents, develops the perceived economic role of South Africa in the region, one step further. For the first time since Nelson Mandela's release, the ANC posits the position that a postapartheid South Africa cannot be the sole economic savior of the region. Instead, it is submitted that southern Africa will only move toward development under the following conditions:

If the principles of equity, mutual benefit, and peaceful cooperation are the tenets that inform its future. Reconstruction cannot be imposed on the region by external forces or unilaterally by ourselves as the regions most powerful state. It must be a collective enterprise of southern Africa's people.¹¹

Since responsibility for developing the region cannot be

¹⁰ African National Congress, Discussion Document on Regional Co-operation and Integration in Southern Africa After Apartheid (Johannesburg: Department of International Affairs, 1992).

¹¹ Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", 91.

that of South Africa's alone, regional states, must adopt policies which seek to develop the region within peaceful and constructive interstate cooperation. The article clearly rejects the normative arguments that a postapartheid South Africa will be the primary 'engine of growth' or the economic 'powerhouse' for regional development. The implied rationale in this argument is that South Africa seeks to chart development within the contexts of objectives which secure national interests. The position is not new. In a journal article in 1987, then exiled head of the ANC's Department of International Affairs (DIA), Thabo Mbeki, referred directly to the essence of a postapartheid foreign policy. Mbeki writes that a new foreign policy would be "predicated on the pursuit of identifiable national interests, with the full understanding that this had to be balanced with the interests of other countries."¹²

The ANC's regional policy articulations in the postapartheid period are generally consistent with the organizations stated positions during the apartheid era. In December 1994, the DIA released a foreign policy document entitled Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South

¹² Thabo Mbeki, "South Africa's International Relations : Today and Tomorrow," South Africa International, No:21, Vol:4, (April 1991), 234.

Africa.¹³ The nineteen page document is a broad restatement of previous positions. This postapartheid document also uses the populist language of the Freedom Charter. Besides restating the foreign policy principles discussed in President Mandela's article, the document again renounces a hegemonic role for South Africa in the region.¹⁴ Similar to President Mandela's article, reference is made to the linkage between domestic policy and foreign policy. The discussion is bridged in this way:

Foreign policy being an integral part, or rather, an extension of national policy and interests, becomes, consequently an important component in our strategy for development and social purposes.¹⁵

The distinction of the document is in the brief discussion of the role of the governments Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). This reference provides the only publicly accessible discussion to date of the role of the DFA in postapartheid South Africa. The document stresses the role of the DFA in this way:

For the effective pursuance of our foreign policy objectives it is absolutely necessary that the responsible department of government

¹³ African National Congress, Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa (Johannesburg: Department of International Affairs, December 1994), 5.

¹⁴ Ibid., 8.

¹⁵ Ibid., 12.

carries out its task in an unbiased manner. Hang-ups of the past and old prejudices should not be allowed to interfere in the workings of a department that has its brief clearly spelt out. It becomes an urgent priority for the new government and its major constituent - the ANC - to ensure that the Department of International Affairs (DFA) is, therefore, revamped and transformed into a truly effective arm of the Government of National Unity.¹⁶

The discussion clearly indicates the ANC's discomfort with the 'old order' makeup of the DFA under the Director General, Leo Henry 'Rusty' Evans. Rusty Evans, who served in the same position for the last two years of President de Klerk's administration, was retained in his position by President Mandela and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo. The retention was seemingly in part a gesture of goodwill to the National Party (NP), but it was also a realist move to retain an experienced white career civil servant, to administer a mainly white 'old order' Ministry. The discussion below addresses the postapartheid role of the DFA.

The review of the policy documents above suggests a general adherence to a non-confrontational, mutually beneficial, national interest driven foreign policy, which broadly seeks political and economic cooperation with the states of southern African. The discussions stop short of

¹⁶ Ibid, 1-2.

providing the mechanisms that will enable an ANC-led government to realize its objectives. The most significant ANC discussion of postapartheid regional interests in the post-cold war era is found in the Mandela article. Though the article is similar to most of the other policy discussions, the Mandela article now carries the intended international notoriety afforded by the weight and authority of the President of a new South Africa. In the absence of an official White Paper outlining South Africa's new foreign policy, the Mandela article assumes a de facto legitimacy as the most authoritative window on the GNU's regional policy.

REGIONAL POLICY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

Following the inauguration of President Mandela in early May 1994, the GNU immediately embarked on a diplomatic engagement of the states in southern Africa. During the early part of July 1994, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, visited his counterparts in Namibia and Mozambique.¹⁷ These visits came at a time when international attention accorded South Africa a new and prominent global status. Making use of the international goodwill that surrounds him, President Mandela intervened in the Angolan crisis in an attempt to return UNITA's Dr. Jonas Savimbi to the ongoing peace

¹⁷ The Star (Johannesburg), July 12, 1994, p.11.

negotiations. At a summit convened to discuss the peace process in Angola, President Mandela used his influence to engage regional players in the Angolan peace process. President Mandela's efforts encouraged President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, President Mobutu sese Seko of Zaire, and President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, to draw the region together to procure peace in Angola. The summit proved a success. Zaire and Angola entered high level talks to end the Angolan civil war. President Mandela secured UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, return to the renewed peace process. Southern Africa's early success in the Angolan crisis, confirmed a revitalized approach to regional conflict. South Africa's active shuttle diplomacy in the region proved the GNU's commitment to interstate cooperation as a means to secure southern Africa.

As the talks concerning a negotiated end to Angola's civil war continued, South Africa joined the Southern African Development Community on August 29, 1994. Amid international speculation of South Africa's possible contribution to the SADC, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, signed on as the eleventh member of the regional body.¹⁸

¹⁸ The Star (Johannesburg), September 7, 1994, p.7. The article highlighted the comments by Ambassador Harald Ganns, German Director for African Affairs, who commented that South Africa's new membership in SADC would enhance southern Africa's development. The comments were made at a summit between the EU and SADC, held in Berlin.

The occasion was hailed by the President of SADC, Botswana's President Sir Ketumile Masire, as a triumph over colonialism and racism. The president expressed hope that South Africa would strengthen efforts to consolidate the region's move toward development and democracy. The symbolism of the celebration, further enhanced South Africa's intent to project its evolving cooperative image in southern Africa.

The first year of President Mandela's administration witnessed a proactive attitude toward establishing cooperative southern African relations. This active engagement policy is highlighted by the number of Treaties and Agreements South Africa entered since the inauguration of President Mandela. The following partial listing illustrates the extent of South Africa's regional engagement through treaties and agreements since May 10, 1994:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| Angola: | September 9, 1994
General upgrading of diplomatic relations. |
| Botswana: | June 22, 1994
General upgrading of diplomatic relations. |
| Lesotho: | June 20, 1995
An extradition treaty aimed at curtailing stock theft. |
| Mozambique: | July 7, 1994
Agreement to establish a joint permanent commission for cooperation. |
| | March 1, 1995
Agreement outlining mutual |

assistance and cooperation
in the area of combating
crime.

March 1, 1995
Agreement outlining cooperation
in the area of tourism.

March 1, 1995
Declaration of intent concerning
cooperation in joint agricultural
ventures.

Namibia: May 10, 1994
General upgrading of diplomatic
relations.

May 16, 1994
Agreement on the transport of
goods by road.

In addition to treaties and agreements, South Africa is making use of official state visits to engage the region. These visits serve to convey South Africa's interest in pursuing a regional policy that seeks mutual engagement, democratization of states, and the general stabilization of the region. The objectives pursued on these state visits are consistent with the policy positions articulated by the ANC's Department of International Affairs (DIA) and Nelson Mandela before his assumption of power in mid 1994.

Apart from signaling a departure from the previous Western focus of foreign policy, the first official state visit to Mozambique on July 21, 1994, established three major regional objectives which subsequent state visits to the region also display. The first objective is

characterized by the president's official recognition of the contribution southern African states made to the liberation of South Africa. Here the liberation struggle is presented as a triumph of collective struggle to establish the basic human rights of equality, freedom, and justice, over the forces of historical racism. The second objective serves to express the desire to establish mutual political and economic cooperation within a framework which rejects the obvious economic and military hierarchy of the region. The third objective directs diplomatic pressure on the host nation to democratize the state as a means to achieve domestic stability. Here the implied rationale is based on President Mandela's previous argument that multi-party democracies provide the most beneficial framework for durable "solutions" to the domestic and regional crises in southern Africa.¹⁹

These three regional objectives were clearly visible during President Mandela's three day state visit to Tanzania in late May, 1995. The president arrived in Tanzania, the northernmost member of SADC, to a carnival-like reception. Businesses and schools closed for two hours as thousands of people lined the streets of Dar es Salaam to greet President Mandela. Writing from the capital political reporter,

¹⁹ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", p.87.

Jovial Rantao, captured the elevated expectations that commonly pervade South Africa's return to the region.

Rantao wrote that the state visit:

Revealed that the South African President does not belong to South Africa alone (rather) (h)e is the leader of Africa: an African leader who is expected to lead the continent out of poverty and help transform it into a land of milk and honey. ²⁰

Cognizant of the heightened expectations, the president steered clear of grandiose gestures toward the government and people of Tanzania. At a state banquet in Dar es Salaam, President Mandela thanked President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, of the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi party, for the considerable support Tanzania had given towards the liberation struggle in South Africa. The president's speech clearly emphasized the agenda contained in the first and second objectives listed above, when he said in part:

The discussions we are having during these three days should further facilitate the deepening of trade, tourism, mining, defence and other relations. Much progress has already been made in the past year. But we can still do better. For many years, freedom fighters from South Africa burrowed in the bosom of your hospitality. We have been raised from the depths of racial oppression, in great measure, on the pedestal of your sacrifice. It is

²⁰ The Star (Johannesburg), June 7, 1995, 12.

therefore only fitting that we should return, free men and women, to report to our Tanzanian brothers and sisters, that South Africa is at last unshackled; the dream of Africa's political liberation has been realized. The Government of National Unity is determined to place South Africa firmly within the fellowship of African nations. Even more, we are duty-bound not to forget friends in need and friends indeed; no matter what powerful associations we might today have. The bonds that join us as peoples is deeper than gratitude. The democracy which South Africa achieved with your help has allowed us to begin at last to address the legacy of apartheid. However, for our people and for Africa, vigilance and joint efforts to address the challenging socio-economic problems we face, are of utmost importance.²¹

In a move that characterizes the political emphasis of the second objective, the president pledged logistical support for the country's first upcoming multiparty presidential election. The election, scheduled for October 29, 1995, is threatened by dissension among the thirteen participating parties. At the time of the state visit, about half of the parties indicated that they would boycott the upcoming election. In a meeting with the leaders of the thirteen parties, President Mandela firmly urged them to settle their differences and work in union to make sure the election is successful. The pressure the president exerted at this meeting served to underscore the desirability with

²¹ The Citizen (Johannesburg), May 30, 1995, p.2.

which South Africa viewed democratic state structures throughout the region.

The Tanzanian state visit and the Mozambican visit are almost identical in purpose and diplomatic strategy. Both visits came at a time when each respective country was busily preparing to have a national election. The official presence of postapartheid South Africa served to communicate the success of that country's democratic transition. In terms which describe South Africa's recent transition, the President urged the commencement of democratic elections. In either case, the approach of the ANC-led GNU is consistent with the earlier stated foreign policy objectives of the ANC.

The general outcome of either visit was devoid of a commitment by South Africa to provide capital for any developmental venture whether, state or private. Rather, the state visits to Mozambique and Tanzania did little more than embrace the political relevance of the two states in southern African relations. This relevance is predicated on the smooth transition to democracy in each country. In both cases, the emphasis on democratization of the state as a primary move toward ending conflict and its resultant instability was clear.

Upon the arrival of President Mandela in Dar es Salaam, the media speculated that South Africa would sign a trade

agreement with Tanzania. A trade agreement is thought to be a necessary boost for a country that the World Bank lists as the third poorest state after Mozambique and Ethiopia.²²

Despite the obvious desirability of a trade pact with South Africa, President Mandela ended his state visit without any indication that such an agreement was forthcoming. In fact, the visits to Mozambique and Tanzania concluded without specific plans for bilateral political and economic cooperation. Instead, the president deferred such cooperation to the authority of the SADC as a means to plan, structure, and implement regional development. This move highlighted the significance of the SADC as the premier alliance for political and economic cooperation in South Africa's regional policy. A discussion of what the GNU means by regional economic cooperation is considered next.

After a week-long tour to the Far East in early July, 1995, President Mandela returned to South Africa and accepted the invitation of King Moshoeshoe II to visit Lesotho. The policy focus of the state visit to Lesotho is consistent with the three objectives described above. The state visit to Lesotho afforded South Africa the opportunity to applaud the manner in which that country solved its earlier constitutional crisis. That crisis provided South

²² The Star (Johannesburg), May 30, 1995, p.3.

Africa with its first test of its regional policy.

In August 1994, deposed King Letsie, the father of King Mosheshoe II, sacked the democratically elected government of Lesotho. South Africa immediately called for the reinstatement of constitutional rule. In addition to strong language, South Africa flexed its military muscle in an obvious attempt to severely caution King Letsie. Regionally, a meeting of the SADC was convened to call for the reinstatement of democratic rule in Lesotho. The pressure from President Mandela and other SADC members proved successful. Fearing isolation and even invasion, King Letsie stepped down and allowed the reinstatement of the constitutional democracy.

The state visit to Lesotho was contextually colored by the country's earlier constitutional crisis. During the crisis, South Africa clearly demonstrated that it would use peaceful and forceful measures to secure the return of democracy in Lesotho. For King Moshoeshoe II, the state visit provided an opportunity for the landlocked state to show its willingness to comply with the regional interests of South Africa. A move not promoted by either party as a one-sided affair, but rather a mutual harmonization of relations. For Lesotho, the harmonization of relations and regional cooperation with the Mandela administration is especially important since almost all of its labor force is

employed across the border in South Africa.

During the state visit, President Mandela used familiar language to underscore the three regional objectives demonstrated during his visits to Mozambique and Tanzania. The President paid tribute to Lesotho's role in the struggle against apartheid. After that, he highlighted the economic role of thousands of migrant Basoto miners who derive 40% of Lesotho's gross national product from South Africa. Throughout the state visit, President Mandela extolled the virtues of democratic governance as he applauded Lesotho's return to constitutional democracy.

The Lesotho visit concluded with the expressed desire to mutually increase political and economic ties. The President addressed the declining employment trend in South Africa's mining sector and pledged continued support for the retraining of retrenched Basoto mineworkers. Retraining assistance he said would constitute "one of the main areas of official South African development assistance to Lesotho."²³ Without forwarding a tangible plan to increase economic ties, the president ended his state visit with an unusual gesture. He proclaimed that South Africa would "look sympathetically" into landlocked Lesotho's request to

²³ The Citizen (Johannesburg), July 13, 1995, pp.1-2.

provide it access to the sea.²⁴ As of this writing, that proclamation remains a mere departing gesture.

Similar to the earlier state visits to Mozambique and Tanzania, the president avoided making one-sided promises of economic cooperation and developmental aid to Lesotho. The president's national interest rhetoric in Lesotho differs only in the choice of words, but not intent, from those made earlier. South Africa's interest in mutual cooperation, democratic states, and regional stability, was again stressed when he said:

The future prosperity of our region, like that of our continent, requires of us that we adopt a co-operative and integrated approach to the things that jointly affect us. The conditions for regional co-operation and integration have never been so favourable. Democratic governance throughout the region, stability and increasingly like-minded approaches to economic matters provide a framework for integrated strategies for regional development and security.²⁵

Lesotho has played a central role in defining the parameters of the GNU's new regional policy. The state visit showed South Africa's willingness to cooperate with Lesotho. The strong arm tactics that President Mandela displayed during Lesotho's constitutional crisis clearly

²⁴ The DEA (Kimberley), July 14, 1995, p.5.

²⁵ The Citizen (Johannesburg), July 14, 1995, p.1.

suggests that South Africa will not tolerate any destabilization close to its borders. The message was sent with such clarity that Lesotho eagerly entered into an extradition treaty with South Africa a month ahead of President Mandela's state visit, in an obvious move to appease South Africa.²⁶

The signing of the treaty between South African Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, and his counterpart Kelebone Maope, also provides South Africa with the opportunity to move away from the heavy-handed regional policies of the former apartheid state. During the 1980's, apartheid South Africa conducted several cross-border attacks into Lesotho to capture and kill anti-apartheid activists living in Lesotho. The desire to distance the GNU from the confrontational regional policies of the former apartheid state, was expressed by Justice Ministry spokesperson, Susan de Villiers, when she said that "There is a process now of rationalisation that was not done in the past." ²⁷

The extradition treaty is important to South Africa because it provides a vehicle to curb cattle rustlers from Lesotho who cross the border from the Maluti mountains into

²⁶ The Star (Johannesburg), June 21, 1995, p.9.

²⁷ Ibid, p.9.

the province of the Free State. However, the treaty represents more than just a means to curb cross-border cattle theft, it also demonstrates the GNU's intention to frame a new regional role within the confines of mutual cooperation.

President Mandela's initiatives in Mozambique, Tanzania, Lesotho, and particularly Angola, show the extent to which postapartheid South Africa is pursuing a regional role based on cooperation instead of confrontation. The first year of the GNU's southern African policy, may be characterized as an active period of diplomatic political engagement by the President. Clearly, President Mandela has emerged as the preeminent force in the political landscape of southern Africa. On May 6, 1995, after months of shuttle diplomacy between South Africa and Angola, UNITA and the Angolan government endorsed the Lusaka Protocol. The agreement cleared the way for the UN managed demobilization of rival armies as envisioned under the Lusaka Protocol. The resumption of the peace process in Angola also demonstrates the regions renewed commitment toward cooperation.

THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

The above discussion of the unfolding regional policy

of South Africa neglects to define the institutional process of regional policy making. The omission is based on the fact that very little is known about the formal process of foreign policy making in postapartheid South Africa. Therefore, any attempt to fully define the institutional structure of the foreign policy process would essentially be no more than a speculative exercise. What is known about the formal process of foreign affairs is that the Interim Constitution vests the right to appoint and accredit ambassadors, and to negotiate and sign international treaties, in the President.²⁸ The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is charged with coordinating foreign missions and embassies. This role is a continuing institutional feature of the apartheid regime.

Except for a handful of political appointees, the DFA remains substantially unchanged under the new ANC-led government. Scores of foreign trained diplomats that were recruited by the ANC before the 1994 elections are yet to find positions within the DFA.²⁹ Ironically, the same officials who once orchestrated apartheid regional policy

²⁸ Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200, (1993), s.82 (1).

²⁹ See: Sunday Times (Johannesburg) April 16, 1995, p.3. John Daniels who advised the DFA on restructuring, indicated that the junior diplomatic core will be made up of 50% of the original staff, 35% of staff from the TBVC foreign affairs staff, and only 15% new recruits.

now oversee the implementation of postapartheid policy. Furthermore, the DFA has absorbed the former homelands of Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda, and Ciskei's (TBVC) foreign affairs ministries. This means, for example, that the former Ambassador of the homeland Boputhatswana, who represented his internationally unrecognized 'state' in Pretoria, is now fully integrated into the DFA. This is the case with each of the four former nominally independent homelands (Bantustans). As a result of this absorption, the entire apartheid foreign affairs apparatus is now contained within the DFA.

As of this writing, the Mandela administration seems restrained in its efforts to reorient the institutional makeup of the DFA to reflect South Africa's new political realities. Consequently, the official role of the 'old order' Ministry remains largely characterized by the elitist diplomatic tradition which historically fueled its secretive nature. This situation is proving to be the source of prodigious concern and criticism within the halls of the GNU, the ANC-alliance, academia, and the media. The most damning criticism of the DFA comes from the House of Assembly in Parliament. Raymond Suttner, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee in the National Assembly, has emerged as the most severe critic of the DFA. Advocate Suttner, a distinguished ANC member of parliament,

is concerned that the DFA represents a distinct diplomatic tradition at variance with the postapartheid vision GNU. He argues that the DFA as it is now constituted, historically defended the apartheid state's intransigence primarily within forced international isolation. Suttner is concerned that the official role of the DFA in the foreign policy process be clarified. This includes a rationalization of the process of training and retraining of the DFA.³⁰

Suttner's criticism also draws attention to the lack of coordination on foreign policy decisions between the President and the DFA. In early June 1995, he bombarded the DFA for not providing the rationale behind South Africa's relationship with Indonesia and Sudan.³¹ Suttner, is concerned that South Africa's relationship with Indonesia and Sudan contradicts the Mandela administration's policy on international human rights. He also criticized the DFA for being unable to explain why the GNU voted in favor of extending the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, and its decision to vote against a US proposal calling for a UN investigation into human rights abuses in Cuba. Suttner

³⁰ Raymond Suttner, Some Problematic Questions in Developing Foreign Policy after April 27 1994, Southern African Perspectives, No.44, (Cape Town: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, June 1995), 3-5.

³¹ See: Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 9-14, 1995, p.11.

also points to the role of the President in furthering the problem of coordinating foreign policy. President Mandela has tended to initiate foreign policy actions without providing an explanation for his decisions. This may partly explain why the DFA cannot provide an explanation of the foreign policy actions Suttner raises.

Neil Coleman of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), an integral part of the ANC-alliance, supports Suttner's criticism of the DFA and the President. He adds that South Africa is forgoing a leading role in defending international human rights. He argues that neither the DFA nor President Mandela is providing the moral leadership the world expects from South Africa:

South Africa can play a leading role in challenging global apartheid and the policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs should be geared towards doing so. But we have yet to see such policies emanating from the department.³²

Both Suttner's and Coleman's barrage of the DFA draws attention to the fact that the DFA seems to be at odds with the new South Africa. Buttressed by a predominantly 'old order' makeup, with scant exposure to a democratic tradition, the DFA operates under the apartheid perception that it is excluded from public or parliamentary review. As

³² Ibid., p.11.

Suttner points out, this perception is at odds with the new South Africa:

We need to remember that what ever is done by the minister or the Department of Foreign Affairs is done in the name of South Africa and the public. We need to move away from a situation which presumes that because foreign affairs has a special area of concern it can be exempted from the same degree of public scrutiny that applies to defence or security or home affairs. Foreign Affairs should be sufficiently transparent to enable meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny. Now that we have a democratic government, we are entitled to expect a democratic foreign policy which is accountable to the people of South and driven by them.³³

This round of criticism of the DFA emerged at a foreign policy symposium organized by the Centre for Southern African Studies (CSIS) and the International Labour Resource and Information Group (ILLrig). At that symposium, John Daniels, of the University of Durban Westville's (UDW) Department of Political Studies, attributed the poor performance of the DFA to the fact that ninety percent of the DFA staff is comprised of 'old order' civil servants. The DFA seems to be a department still reeling under the forced international isolation of the apartheid era. Daniels, an advisor to the DFA, says the secretive manner in which the DFA operates indicates that:

³³ Ibid., p.11.

The Management of the department lacks expertise and new blood. Foreign policy is made by a small elite and a group of bureaucrats who are determined to maintain the shroud of secrecy in the department.³⁴

The extent to which the DFA is a Ministry still operating under an apartheid mentality is apparent from the funding priorities assigned to its 1995 budget. The 'old order' mentality of the DFA first emerged during a parliamentary debate on the ministry's budget in May, 1995. The debate led parliamentarians to question the priorities of South Africa's new diplomacy. Parliamentarian, Fatima Hajaig, offered the following critique of the budget:

More is being spent on countries which have long-established ties with South Africa, namely North America, South America and Europe. The amount allocated to them is approximately R387 million. On the other hand, for relationships with Africa South of the Sahara, coupled with North Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, Oceania, in other words, the rest of the world, only a total of approximately R242 million is to be spent. One would have thought more would be spent on countries where little or no activity existed in order to strengthen these links.³⁵

The proposed budget of R1,13 billion was also severely criticized by the parliamentary oversight committee for its

³⁴ Ibid., p.11.

³⁵ Quoted in Suttner, Some Problematic Questions, p.6.

North American and Eurocentric focus. The proposed budget concentrated on 55.4% of funding to existing missions in Europe and North America. The budget allocates a mere 16% of funds to missions in Africa despite the fact that exports to Africa made up 32% of total exports in 1994.³⁶ Absent from the budget proposal, is funding for a mission in Addis Ababa where the OAU is headquartered. The budget also does not allocate sufficient funds to upgrade the mission in Gabarone where the SADC is headquartered. In fact, out of R645 million allocated for foreign missions, less than R105 million is set aside for African missions despite the fact that exports to the continent made up almost thirty two percent of South Africa's total 1993 exports. The SADC is allocated R51,3 million as opposed to R59.5 million for the USA.³⁷ This formula ignores the repeated emphasis by the Mandela administration that South Africa's new foreign policy is generally centered on Africa and particularly on southern Africa.

Perhaps the most striking 'old order' inclusion in the proposed budget, is the substantial funding for the external radio service, Channel Africa (formerly Radio RSA). During the apartheid era, the external radio service was primarily

³⁶ The Star (Johannesburg), May 22, 1995, p. 11.

³⁷ Suttner, Some Problematic Questions, pp.7-8.

used to combat the perceived "total onslaught" threat in southern Africa. The decision to spend a sizable R35.5 million to keep the radio in operation, is defended on the grounds that it now promotes the new South Africa in the region. The rationale for promoting South Africa through a radio service staffed by the DFA, is additional evidence that the department is still operating under an apartheid mentality.³⁸

The Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs officially condemned the skewed allocations of the DFA's budgetary allocations. The Committee, in its report, called for the alignment of allocations with the stated policy priorities of the Mandela administration. On this point, the report stated that:

Reprioritisation should cast under the spotlight not merely allocations to new missions and projects but the entire spectrum of allocations. Within the spirit of budgeting from zero, an overall conception of priorities needs to be developed which should inform the entire process of resource allocation.³⁹

Despite the criticism that the DFA's budget does not reflect South Africa's new foreign policy goals, it received

³⁸ See: Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), May 5-11, 1995, p.2. The proposed budget was reviewed by the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly.

³⁹ Ibid., p.7.

parliament's approval in late May 1995. The vote is surprising especially if one considers that the Department of Finance ordered all government departments to institute reprioritization in terms of the new objectives of the GNU.⁴⁰ As it stands now, the 1995 DFA's official budget openly contradicts the emerging regional objectives of the Mandela administration.

President Mandela has not directly commented on the controversy which surrounds the DFA. This official detachment compounds the confusion surrounding the role of the DFA. More disturbing, is the president's use of the controversial DFA to shield his office from direct public criticism on unpopular foreign policy decisions. The president used the DFA to handle his decision to vote for an extension of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, thereby, demonstrated his determination to deflect criticism from his administration. South Africa was confronted with the decision whether to vote for an extension of the 25 year-old NPT, just days before the first anniversary of the historical elections that ended apartheid. The decision placed South Africa in the uneasy position between the competing interests of the United States (US) and Non-Aligned Movement. Russia, France, and Britain joined the US

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.7.

and argued in favor of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. The NAM, to which South Africa and the rest of the southern African region belong, posited the argument that an extension of the NPT would not provide any incentive for the reduction of the nuclear armaments accumulated by the Big Five during the Cold War.⁴¹

South Africa was caught in the middle of the argument with membership loyalties to the NAM, but at the same time as a nuclear power generator and member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The US launched the most intense and visible lobbying effort of the Big Five states. Reacting to the international pressure, senior advisor to Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, Abdul Minty, declared that South Africa was seeking a "statesmanlike" compromise between the U.S. position and that of the NAM.⁴² That perception was immediately compromised when The Washington Post reported details of a leaked demarche which US Ambassador, Princeton Lyman, delivered to Foreign Minister Nzo on March 10, 1995.⁴³ The note sternly warned the Minister that a vote against the extension of the NPT would undermine "mutual interests" and would raise questions about South Africa's

⁴¹ Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley), April 13, 1995, p.7.

⁴² Sunday Times (Johannesburg), April 23, 1995, p.13.

⁴³ The Star (Johannesburg), April 19, 1995, p.10.

"non-proliferation credentials." ⁴⁴ The DFA refused to either confirm or deny the contents of the demarche.

On April 19, 1995, at the UN's Nuclear Non-Proliferation summit of a 178 nations, Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo, bowed to US pressure and voted in favor of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. The vote drew harsh criticism from academics, Non Governmental Organizations (NGO), and the media. South Africa was seen to have compromised the interests of the developing world by bowing to US pressure. This perception was strengthened when US Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, dismissed South Africa's attempt to provide consensus on periodic monitoring of NPT obligations. Albright claimed a victory for the Clinton administration by commenting that "others realized ... the course of wisdom was to negotiate in good faith on the accompanying documents and then agree unanimously to extend the treaty."⁴⁵

Despite the ego deflating blow Ambassador Albright delivered to the Mandela administration, the President escaped permanent damage to his public image. His decision to vote in favor of the NPT was deflected by the controversy surrounding the DFA. The President's political maneuvering

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.10.

⁴⁵ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), May 14, 1995, P.4.

blurred the line between his decision and the DFA's handling of the vote. The DFA was blamed for keeping South Africa's position from parliamentary or public scrutiny. Regionally, it is unclear whether the president or the DFA consulted extensively with the OAU or the SADC on its decision. Convenient for the president, the unpopular vote is mostly attributed to the incompetence and 'old order' mentality of the DFA. Both domestically and regionally, President Mandela emerged unscathed in his decision to vote in favor of preserving the nuclear privileges of the US, China, Britain, France, and Russia.

NGO's and academia also fell prey to the political maneuvering by President Mandela. While ignoring the role of the president, the director of the Group for Environmental Monitoring, David Fig, commented on the secretive and unprincipled manner in which the DFA handled the vote when he wrote that:

Our new foreign ministry has failed to break with past traditions of opacity in foreign policy formulation. In other areas of government, whether housing, land, energy, forestry, or arts and culture, well advertised public participatory processes have been instituted. Why there has been no public consultation process in the field of foreign affairs? Why can the principles on which we base our foreign policy not be debated more widely? Why does the new ministry continue to emulate the old, both in content and process? Why are principled positions

suddenly abandoned and myths created they were never held in the first place? Like housing, land and energy issues, foreign policy principles are a public concern.⁴⁶

Adding criticism in the same vein, Peter Vale, Director of the Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) at the University of the Western Cape, captured the concerns surrounding the DFA when he said:

This foreign policy decision will be seen to be one made by whites in the interests of a world in which white interests are protected and defended. It does not reflect what the majority of people feel about the issue - South Africa's people have not been consulted at all. This (the Big Five) is a very privileged club which is now licensed to get more nuclear capacity while those outside it are forced to resort to illicit ways of developing a nuclear capacity. In a sense it is an apartheid treaty - some countries are in and some are out.⁴⁷

In concordance with the elitist character of the DFA, the department's leadership responded angrily to the criticisms. In a move reminiscent of the apartheid era's undemocratic bureaucratic culture, Director General, Rusty Evans, singled out the chairman of the Portfolio Committee

⁴⁶ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), April 28-May 4, 1995 p. 8. Dr. Fig's article appeared above an equally long article by US Ambassador P. Lyman, who argued the virtues of South Africa's vote.

⁴⁷ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), April 21-27, 1995, p.2.

on Foreign Affairs, Raymond Suttner, for being a subversive critic of government. The attack called into question the motivation and integrity of the criticism. Rusty Evans said in part:

South Africa's foreign relations are too serious to be dealt with at the uninformed and suspiciously motivated level of debate ... Armchair experts on foreign affairs do this country a grave disservice by sorely embarrassing the relations between our government and the countries which were mentioned. The way not to conduct foreign policy is too seek to undermine, discredit and destroy the political leadership and the key institutions of this country.⁴⁸

The veracity of the Director General's attack even caught the Mandela administration off guard. As Evan's comments became public, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and senior ANC member, Aziz Pahad, was unveiling plans to increase public awareness and participation in foreign affairs. He proposed a foreign policy think tank as a medium for the public and private sector to submit recommendations on foreign policy issues.⁴⁹ In contrast, the Director General reacted to the criticism in a manner he was accustomed to. The president remained silent throughout the controversy in an obvious effort not to

⁴⁸ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 15-22, 1995, p.6

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.6.

redirect the focus of the criticism.

The political fiasco that accompanied the NPT vote, raises serious doubts about the consistency of foreign policy decisions in postapartheid South Africa. The NPT case illustrates a situation where the president was able to scapegoat the bias of the 'old order' DFA to his advantage. However, recent revelations indicate that President Mandela's international and domestic reputation as a statesman is being questioned by the emergence of evidence which points to a link between South African foreign policy and donations to the ANC.⁵⁰ Initially, the controversy that surrounded South Africa's recognition of the Polisario's Sahrawi Republic (Western Sahara) seemed to primarily illustrate a hazardous disjunction between the Presidency and the DFA on matters of official foreign policy. In June 1995, President Mandela agreed to the request by President Mohamed Abdel-Aziz to institute full diplomatic relations between South Africa and the Sahrawi Republic.⁵¹ Two months later the DFA had not yet instituted diplomatic recognition. The Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs approached Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo to clarify

⁵⁰ Manchester Guardian Weekly (Great Britain), December 17, 1995, p.3.

⁵¹ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), August 4 - 10, 1995, p.6.

the reason for the delay in recognition. Despite the efforts of the Portfolio Committee, the official reasons behind the delay remain unclear. Speculation that the DFA's 'old order' relationship with Morocco was behind the delay in recognition of Saharawi then became widespread. Comments by the Director General, Rusty Evans, supports this observation. In late June 1995, he indicated that relations with Morocco were inherited from the apartheid regime and that to change the nature of the ties would reduce the established diplomatic leverage. Motivated by its foreign relations with Morocco, apartheid South Africa supported the Kingdom's request for a UN sponsored referendum to determine whether the people of Sahrawi wanted independence.

The common assumption in the southern African region was that President Mandela supported Western Sahara's independence claims. Presently, South Africa is the only country in the SADC that does not formally recognize the Sahrawi Republic. Morocco resigned from The Organization of African Unity (OAU) when it admitted the Sahrawi Republic as a member in 1982. South Africa's membership in the OAU and the SADC seemed a compelling reason for President Mandela to order diplomatic recognition of the Sahrawi Republic. The DFA's seeming refusal to follow through on recognition again fueled concerns about the coherence of the GNU's regional and continental foreign policy.

The Saharawi situation raised speculative concern that South Africa potentially has two conflicting foreign policy postures. The speculation would continue were it not for the emergence of strong evidence that suggests the failed recognition has more to do with the Moroccan government's cash donations to the ANC rather than the DFA's intransigence. President Mandela is facing international criticism that highlights instances of cash donations to the ANC and foreign policy favors. The criticism is spurred on by the president's admission at a briefing of political scientists in Pretoria that Taiwan made a donation of more than \$9 million to the ANC during his visit in 1993. Though the president insists that the donation was merely an act of friendship, his admission may explain why his administration is slow to abandon diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The president also received cash donations to the ANC from the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia. The donations also seem to explain why he refuses to openly criticize Indonesia's abysmal human rights record in East Timor.

A donation to the ANC coffer's again diminished the president's stance on international human rights with the recent execution of nine Ogoni dissidents by the Abacha regime in Nigeria. South Africa's internationally criticized 'quiet diplomacy' policy toward Nigeria in the

weeks leading to the executions was attributed to General Sani Abacha's reported donation of \$4 million to the ANC's general election campaign of 1994.⁵² The execution also highlighted another instance of the cacophony which permeates the foreign policy relationship between the President and the DFA. The lack of communication between the president and the DFA was demonstrated by his ardent commitment to South Africa's 'quiet diplomacy' approach towards the Abacha regime when the Commonwealth Heads of Government met in New Zealand on November 9, 1995. The DFA did not inform the President that South Africa's High Commissioner in Nigeria, George Nene, had received official confirmation of Nigeria's intention to execute the nine Ogoni dissidents. Despite the serious nature of the Abacha regime's official confirmation, the DFA did not inform the President of the situation. When the death sentence was carried out on November 11, 1995, President Mandela was caught by surprise. The executions came two days after the High Commissioner had received official confirmation that Nigeria intended to hang the nine Ogoni dissidents. President Mandela angrily responded to the executions by withdrawing South Africa's High Commissioner in Lagos. In addition, the president called for tough punitive sanctions

⁵² Manchester Guardian Weekly (Great Britain), December 17, 1995, p4.

against Nigeria to be instituted immediately. The OAU and the SADC were not consulted in the decision to call for international sanctions. South Africa earned the distinction of being the only country in Africa to demand international penalties against Nigeria.

The fallout surrounding the inept handling of the Nigerian crisis stung the Mandela administration. Without the backing of its regional and continental allies, South Africa found itself isolated on its Nigerian stand. Facing certain repudiation at the OAU, South Africa backed off its calls for sanctions against Nigeria. South Africa then softened its stance by avoiding the issue entirely. Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, was left to rationalize the failure of South Africa's foreign policy process in this way:

The entire world was caught unawares ... so I don't think (Foreign Affairs officials) could have had a finger on the pulse of such a controversial decision.⁵³

The statement by Pahad conceals the fact that the DFA missed several early opportunities to influence Nigeria's position. For example, High Commissioner George Nene did not maintain contact with Nigerian dissidents, but rather he liaised only within government circles. As is now a common feature of the relationship between the DFA and the Foreign Affairs

⁵³ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), November 17-23, 1995, p.4.

Portfolio Committee in Parliament, the latter was not briefed on the Nigerian situation despite Chairman Suttner's request. The maelstrom surrounding South Africa's policy leading up to the executions, is further aggravated by Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki's, visit to Nigeria about a month before the executions. Mbeki confined his meetings to the military junta, thereby, neglecting a valuable opportunity to meet with pro-democracy forces who oppose the Abacha regime. This contention is supported by Wole Soyinka, Nigeria's exiled Nobel laureate and founder of the French based opposition group, National Democratic Coalition of Nigeria (Nalicon). Soyinka angrily denounced Mbeki's imprudence for not meeting with imprisoned opposition leaders Moshood Abiola and Olusegun Obasanjo as a failure "to distinguish between the oppressive state and the people." ⁵⁴

The inconsistent manner in which the Mandela administration and the DFA reacted to the Nigerian crisis underscores the need to rationalize South Africa's foreign policy process. South Africa's regional interests are jeopardized by the haphazard interaction between the Office of the President and the DFA. The DFA's preoccupation with

⁵⁴ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), October 20-26, 1995, p.26. Soyinka also berated President Mandela for not taking a tougher stance against the Abacha regime.

the previous regime's Western centered interests is a significant threat to the new government's regional posturing. The Mandela administration must move to restructure the DFA to consistently reflect the regional objectives of postapartheid South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

POSTAPARTHEID REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

The postapartheid era is being defined by the Mandela government's eagerness to project a non-hegemonic and consultative posture towards regional relations. Since assuming power in April 1994, South Africa has aggressively sought to realign its role in southern Africa. In a clear rejection of the destabilization policies of the former regime, President Mandela is spearheading a diplomatic engagement strategy that communicates a desire to pursue peaceful and constructive relations in the region. This cooperative posturing is extended to include strategic matters related to regional economic development.

In just two and a half years of postapartheid rule, the Mandela administration has swiftly realigned South Africa's political relationships with the region. Though the president's diplomatic engagement strategy can be applauded as a milestone in cementing peaceful relationships, there are potentially divisive issues related to economic realignment and structural development that must be addressed. Given the dimensions of the historically skewed economic relationship between South Africa and southern

Africa, the Government of National Unity (GNU) does not want to appear reluctant about restructuring its role in the region's economy. The GNU is obviously sensitive to any perception that would betray its overall cooperative and peaceful posturing in the region. For this reason, South Africa consistently and, prominently, advocates an equitable restructuring of the region's economic market and trade regime. This does not mean that South Africa is not cautious about the way it realigns regional economic relations. Though some states in the region, particularly, Zimbabwe and Zambia, are eager to establish permanent bilateral versions of a preferential trade agreement with South Africa, the Government of National Unity (GNU) is committed to a multilateral trade regime regulated under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A distant objective of structuring multilateral trade negotiations under the SADC is to facilitate a free trade area in Southern Africa. The emphasis here is on mutual cooperation that benefits the entire region and not just South Africa. The GNU considers this position to be in the best interests of South Africa and southern Africa.

As the region slogs to realign its economic relations, the trade patterns apartheid South Africa established during more than four decades of economic relations with southern Africa remain fundamentally unchanged. Aware of its

dominant economic position, the GNU stresses the complexity of the task at hand. However, the incremental pace of economic restructuring is frustrating the expectations of a region dependant on its trade relationship with South Africa.

DEFINING A NEW ECONOMIC ERA

Decades of colonialism, apartheid, and expanding monopoly capital have rendered southern African states intricately dependent on South Africa. Dan O'Meara provides a lucid explanation of the origins of the skewed relationship between South Africa and southern Africa when he says:

Colonialism fashioned a Southern African region marked by a fairly high degree of what can be called skewed integration - an essentially regional economy in which the central pole of accumulation was the mining and later the agricultural, industrial and service sectors of the South African economy. All other economies in the region except that of Angola were locked into this regional economy as suppliers of cheap migrant labour, certain goods and services (water, energy, transport, etc.) to the South African economy, and as markets for its manufactures and capital.¹

¹ Dan O'Meara, "Regional Economic Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Dream or Reality?" in A. van Niekerk and G. van Staden (eds.), Southern Africa at the Crossroads (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1991), 132.

Postapartheid South Africa thus inherits a dominant economic stature in the region. The extent of that domination is shown in its average gross national product (GNP) which is more than four times the size of all the SADC states combined (See Table 2). In terms of unilateral trade, South Africa currently supplies close to ninety percent of all imports to the southern African region.² States like Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique are almost entirely dependent on South Africa for their source of petroleum and electricity.³

The Mandela administration is aware that some states are fearful of continued economic domination by a postapartheid government. To counter this fear, the GNU forwards the position that postapartheid South Africa will seek increased regional cooperation and not purposely dominate the region's economy for its own purposes.⁴ Towards this end, the GNU has openly declared its support

² Andre du Pisani, "Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa", Issue, Vol.xxi/1-2, (1993), 60.

³ Baron Boyd, "South Africa and its Neighbors: Continuity and Change in the Post-apartheid Era", in Chipsula and Chilivumbo, eds., South Africa's Dilemmas in the Post-Apartheid Era (Lanham: University Press, 1993, 140).

⁴ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, (November-December 1993), p.91.

Table 2

Basic Regional Economic Indicators

Country	Area ('000km ²)	Population (million) (1991)	GDP (US\$ Billion) (1991)	GNP per capita (US\$) (1991)
Angola	1 247	10.0	3.5	350
Botswana	582	1.3	3.64	2 530
Lesotho	30	1.8	0.58	580
Malawi	118	8.8	1.99	230
Mozambique	802	16.1	1.22	80
Namibia	827	1.5	1.96	1 030
Swaziland	17	0.8	0.80	900
Tanzania	945	25.2	2.22	130
Zambia	753	8.3	3.83	390
Zimbabwe	391	10.1	5.54	650
Total SADC	5 712	79.7	28.01	604
South Africa	1 221	38.9	91.17	2 470
Sub-Saharan Africa including South Africa	24 287	527.8	255.5	350
South Africa as % southern Africa	18%	29%	78%	2.7 times
South Africa as % of Sub-Saharan Africa	7%	5%	35%	7.3 times

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1993.

for fair regional economic cooperation.

The postapartheid era finds southern African states eager to restructure regional trade relations with South Africa. This eagerness is born out of their unstable state of underdevelopment and mounting debt which was brought about in large measure by the destabilization policies of apartheid South Africa. Since postapartheid South Africa inherits the economic heartland of the region, it exercises considerable influence over the nature of regional restructuring. The GNU's reoriented engagement of the region, delineates a distinct moral obligation to accommodate the developmental aspirations of the region. However, in a region characterized by weak state structures, high population growth, scarce capital, and confined market opportunities, the obstacles to functional integration schemes, are significant. The additional burden of state-by-state structural adjustment programs also limits the extent to which policies of regional integration can proceed. Nevertheless, the region is of vital importance to South Africa's economy. Therefore, the GNU has presented guidelines which aim at increased economic cooperation in the region. The approach does not envision the functional economic integration of the OAU, but rather it hinges on sectoral regional cooperation as a primary point of departure. For example, the Mandela administration

entered into a formal agreement with Namibia on the transport of goods between the two countries.⁵

Before turning to a discussion of the Mandela administration's policy for regional economic cooperation, it is necessary to distinguish the concept from that of economic integration. Rob Davies provides clear and useful explanation of the distinguishing characteristics between the two concepts in this way:

Economic integration refers to a process in which the economies or markets of individual states are merged (in whole or part) into a distinct entity - a regional economy or market. Economic cooperation, on the other hand, is a much more open ended concept referring to a range of situations in which individual countries act together for mutual benefit. It includes, for example, situations in which countries share or make available to each other resources, technology or expertise, collaborate in joint projects or act together in external economic relations.⁶

A document prepared by the GNU's Department of Trade and Industry, in March 1994, serves to provide cautious criteria for regional economic cooperation. These criteria illustrate what the GNU considers vital to manageable and practical regional cooperation. Though the approach is not

⁵ The agreement was signed on May 16, 1994.

⁶ Robert Davies, "Approaches to Regional Integration in the Southern African Context", Africa Insight, Vol.24, No.1, (1994), 12.

extensively detailed, it leans toward the promotion of sectoral cooperation as a first step. Full market integration, as a means to secure equitable development throughout the region, is a distant objective. This does not necessarily mean that the GNU rejects formal market integration schemes as suggested by the OAU, the SADC, and the COMESA. Rather, indications are that the GNU is cautious of overly ambitious integrative schemes. The document suggests that southern African relations be structured to reflect links which:

- (1) are mutually beneficial
- (2) promote overall economic development
- (3) do not aggravate the economic dominance of any country or countries
- (4) promote interdependence
- (5) facilitate intra-regional trade and investment flows
- (6) strengthen the competitiveness of individual countries and the region as a whole in the global economy.⁷

The document stresses that mechanisms for cooperation should be based on practical goals. Incremental economic cooperation is preferred over ambitious grand alliance schemes. The fear of overt economic domination is addressed by characterizing South Africa as domestically constrained. The document states in part:

South Africa realises the fears of other

⁷ The Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, A Vision for Economic Integration and Cooperation in Southern Africa, (March 1994).

countries in the region that they might be swamped by its larger economy, but it has neither the desire to portray itself as the engine of growth nor the capacity to act as the engine of growth for the region because of major domestic economic challenges which it will have to meet.⁸

The document is an important landmark in the ongoing debate surrounding South Africa's role in regional economics. It aptly portrays South Africa as domestically constrained, yet open to non-confrontational regional economic cooperation. The guidelines compliment the diplomatic regional approach of President Mandela and are based on a realist interpretation of the political and economic conditions in southern Africa. As Erich Leistner of the Africa Institute of South Africa points out, the GNU's pragmatic approach is based on the following realist considerations:

- (1) Southern Africa is an important market for South Africa's export of manufactured goods.
- (2) Favorable business conditions in the (region) benefits South Africa in that many foreign commercial interests use the country as bridgehead for their activities in the region.
- (3) The support that South Africa can expect to receive from organizations such as the EU and the World Bank is influenced by its willingness to cooperate with the (region).
- (4) South Africa will increasingly have to rely on the (region) to supplement

⁸ Ibid., p.1.

- its water resources and power supplies.
- (5) Unsettled conditions in the region directly affect South Africa through the streams of refugees, the spreading of diseases, the smuggling of arms and narcotics.
 - (6) The outside world tends to assess South Africa's future prospects in the light of trends and events elsewhere in the region.⁹

As of this writing, regionalism in southern Africa is based on the following three competing alliances: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) led by South Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC, now SADC)¹⁰, and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA, now known as the Common Market of Eastern and Southern African States or the COMESA). South Africa's experience with a measure of market integration is confined to the SACU. The favorable trade relations which South Africa has historically defended in the SACU suggests that the organization will continue as the prime vehicle for relations with the BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland) states. The fate of the COMESA as the primary regional trading bloc seems to be sealed by South Africa's policy to center the SADC as the vehicle for comprehensive political and economic

⁹ Erich Leistner, "Prospects of Increasing Regional Cooperation", Africa Insight, Vol.24, No.4, (1995), 55.

¹⁰ SADCC was formalized into SADC by the Windhoek Treaty on August 17, 1992.

cooperation. Nevertheless, the existence of three competing alliances provides an additional challenges for the GNU's regional policy. The implications of these challenges are considered next.

REGIONALISM AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

South Africa's formula for regional economic relations became clear when President Mandela avoided issues relating to bilateral economic cooperation during his state visits to Mozambique, Tanzania, and Lesotho. Instead, the president's strategy consistently alluded to the role of the SADC as the forum for regional negotiations toward multilateral economic cooperation. Multilateral economic cooperation is cast within the familiar approach that emphasizes peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation. This posturing rejects a hegemonic economic role for South Africa and is essentially an extension of the ANC's positions on the principles for regional engagement discussed above.¹¹

The discussion of formal integration schemes in southern Africa continues into the postapartheid era. The end of apartheid seemed to act as a catalyst to intensify the discussion. The debate continues in the face of the

¹¹ See for example: Thabo Mbeki, "South Africa's International Relations: Today and Tomorrow," Southern Africa International, Vol.21. No.4, (April 1991) 220-235.

marginal performance that similar schemes on the continent of Africa experienced.¹² In part, the external demonstration of regional trading blocs such as the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU), reinforce an interest in southern African regionalism. The present focus has its genesis in the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) continental vision of self-sufficiency through the creation of a common market. This vision arose when the OAU ratified the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in July 1980, with the intention of refocusing regional schemes towards the creation of an African Common Market by 2001. Following the Abuja OAU summit of 1991, the date was extended to the year 2025. Nevertheless, the Lagos Plan commits OAU member states to the formation of an African Economic Community. As a newly admitted member of the OAU, South Africa is keen to align itself with the continental vision of economic self-sufficiency.

The existence of the three competing regional alliances (the SADC, the COMESA, and the SACU) in the postapartheid era is forwarding a contentious period of organizational rivalry. The rivalry is especially intense in areas of

¹² For an appraisal of the performance of integration schemes in Africa, see: Guy Martin, "African Regional Cooperation and Integration: Achievements, Problems and Prospects", in Ann Seidman and F. Anang, eds., 21st Century Africa : Towards a New Vision of Self-Sustainable Development (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1992), 69-99.

Table 3

Membership in Regional Organizations

	SADC	COMESA	SACU
Country			
Angola	Yes	Yes	No
Botswana	Yes	No	Yes
Lesotho	Yes	Yes	Yes
Malawi	Yes	Yes	No
Mozambique	Yes	Yes	No
Mauritius	Yes	No	No
Namibia	Yes	Yes	Yes
South Africa	Yes	No	Yes
Swaziland	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tanzania	Yes	Yes	No
Zambia	Yes	Yes	No
Zimbabwe	Yes	Yes	No
Total Membership	12 (includes Island of Mauritius)	22 9 (southern African states)	5

overlapping interest such as trade privileges. The EC, a major donor of developmental aid in southern Africa, has expressed concern over the duplication of activities between the SADC and the COMESA.¹³ Intensifying the animosity between the COMESA and the SADC is South Africa's ardent refusal to join the COMESA. South Africa's decision is based partly on the COMESA's internal political disorder which gives the impression that it is struggling to maintain authority over its twenty two member states.¹⁴ This impression fuels a negative perception of its potential role in postapartheid southern Africa, a situation that has weakened its bargaining position with the GNU.

The intense competition between the SADC and the COMESA has placed the Mandela administration in the difficult position of having to choose sides between the two rival organizations. The rivalry between the SADC and the COMESA is rooted in the obvious convergence of purpose between the two organizations. With the threat of apartheid removed, the SADC's founding purpose as a development organization is

¹³ Gavin Maasdorp, "The Future Structure of Regional Trade Integration and Development Cooperation in Southern Africa", Africa Insight, Vol.24, No.1, (1994), 6.

¹⁴ Paul B. Rich, "South Africa and the Politics of Regional Integration in Southern Africa in the Post-Apartheid Era" in Paul B. Rich (ed.), The Dynamics of Change in Southern Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 39.

being redirected along the lines of the OAU's trade and integration focus. This broaches the trading bloc imperatives upon which the COMESA was founded. Emerging out of the PTA which was founded in 1978, the COMESA is made up of twenty two members in eastern and southern Africa. Since any country bordering a COMESA member can petition for membership, the organization is therefore not regionally bound.

The SADC decided at its 1994 Leadership Summit that it would not tolerate dual membership in both organizations. SADC prefers that the COMESA contain its trading bloc to eastern Africa. However, of the SADC's twelve members, only South Africa, Botswana and newly admitted Mauritius are not dual members. At the SADC summit held in Johannesburg, it became clear that members did not favor resigning from the COMESA. The SADC's Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende, indicated a tentative and nervous response to the situation with his remark that the SADC "would not demand to know from any country whether they have pulled out" from the COMESA.¹⁵ The conflict of interests is set to reach new heights with the COMESA's General Secretary, Bingu Wa Mutharika, warning that if South Africa did not join the COMESA it would face punitive trade tariffs. The GNU dismissed Mutharika's

¹⁵ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), September 15-21, 1995, p.4.

comment by insisting that South Africa favors rationalized, smaller, and more manageable regional organizations.

The SADC, with its roots in the struggle to resist apartheid South Africa's hegemonic ambitions, has captured a central place in the GNU's regional policy. The Mandela administration has repeatedly insisted that the SADC is the forum of choice in its overall postapartheid regional strategy. The GNU's support for the SADC can be seen as a recognition of the role the Front Line States (FLS) played in charting the regional body to resist apartheid domination. The ANC link to the SADC stretches back to the observer status it was granted by the founding members of the SADC. In his opening address at the SADC's 15th summit on August 28, 1995, President Mandela ignored the COMESA's regional claims by confirming South Africa's conviction that the SADC is the regional forum of choice. The President used the summit, the first on South African soil, to stress the interdependency of the SADC states. In his speech, he warned member states not to allow national interests to restrict regional cooperation towards growth.¹⁶

President Mandela's warning echoes the reality that there are divergent and competing interests among the members of the SADC. The SADC, as originally defined in the

¹⁶ The Star (Johannesburg), August 29, 1995, p.10.

1980 Lusaka Declaration, was essentially formed to counter the regional hegemony of apartheid South Africa. Despite this declaration, the SADC did not require that its member states renounce bilateral ties with South Africa. As a result, the BLSN (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia) states remained tied to the South African dominated SACU. Lesotho and Swaziland, were also included in South Africa's Rand Monetary Area (RMA). This meant that the value of currency in Lesotho and Swaziland is tied to the South African rand. In addition, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique retained strong bilateral economic ties with apartheid South Africa. These arrangements essentially betrayed the SADC's proposals for independence from South Africa's economy and further enhanced the continuing centrality of the state in pursuing narrow national interests. The pursuit of national interests, based largely on ambitions of domestic self-sufficiency, undermined the SADC's ability to adopt a coherent regional coordination strategy.

The absence of any formal discussion on integration at the signing of the 1992 Windhoek Treaty which reconstituted the SADC, again illustrated an inability to tackle issues relating to narrow national politics.¹⁷ The omission is

¹⁷ See: Lloyd John Ching'ambo, "SADC : The Rebirth of SADCC ", Southern African Political and Economic Monthly

especially suspect since the Windhoek Treaty elevated formal integration as the organizations main objective. The SADC's institutional integrity is set to be tested now that the primary political cohesion afforded by apartheid has disappeared. The postapartheid era may very well witness an escalation in existing national rivalries between member states of the SADC. The existence of serious national rivalries between member states has been a recurring factor in the history of the SADC. For example, Zimbabwe's decision in 1987 to end its almost three decade-long agreement on the importation of electricity from Zambia to complete Phase II of the its Hwange Project seriously undermined Zambia's position as a source for the region's electrical supply.¹⁸ Here the SADC proved unable to mediate the conflict of national interests between Zimbabwe and Zambia. A significant part of the problem lies with the fact that political leaders direct the prerogatives of the SADC. The role of interest groups as illustrated by the neo-functional integration model is non-existent and, therefore, have no bearing on how states choose to interact.¹⁹

(SAPEM), (August 1990), 22-25.

¹⁸ See: Paul B. Rich, "South Africa and the Politics of Regional Integration", 39.

In the postapartheid era, the SADC faces mounting international pressure to attempt formal integration from aid donors such as the EC and the United States Agency for international Development (USAID).²⁰ Such pressure ignores the lack of consensus on integration among the SADC's members. Ironically, the absence of an institutional consensus on the terms of formal integration, is elevating the vertical integration between NGO's, and individual member states. The prospects for horizontal integration is further frustrated by the reality that the IMF and World Bank deals individually with southern African states within the precepts of the state apparatus. These variables combined essentially ensure that the continued centrality of statehood is the single most important threat to the SADC's supra-national ambitions.

In the face of competition from the COMESA, the SADC is charting a distinct course to substantiate its seeming ascendancy over the COMESA. Amid rumors of internal quibbling and President Mandela's admission that not all went as planned, the 1995 SADC summit in Johannesburg

¹⁹ See Tom Ostergaard: "Classical Models of Regional Integration: What Relevance for Southern Africa", in Bertil Oden, ed., Southern Africa After Apartheid (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), 44-45.

²⁰ See: SADC, Industry Sector Report (Maputo: SADC, 1992).

witnessed the signing of the first substantive protocol since the organization was founded fifteen years ago. The Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems is a major advancement toward cooperation on issues relating to the shared use of the regions water systems. Angola and Zambia refused to sign the protocol on the grounds that their respective governments had not completed their cabinet consultations.²¹ The Johannesburg summit ended with an approval of a request from the COMESA for a joint summit to address tensions between the two bodies. The approval coincided with the admission of the Island of Mauritius to SADC. Mauritius decision to join the SADC, instead of the COMESA, was portrayed as a victory for the SADC.

Significantly absent from the 1995 summit is an agreement on the restructuring of trade regulations between member states. South Africa heads the portfolio of Investment and Finance in the SADC and part of this portfolio's duties is to restructure trade in the region. Before the summit, the GNU's Department of Trade and Industry indicated that it was assessing the obstacles facing regional trade. Instead of tackling issues such as trade liberalization and tariffs at that point, the GNU proposed an electricity pool as a first step to overcome the

²¹ The Star (Johannesburg), August 30, 1995, p.9.

structural barriers to regional trade. The electricity pool is aimed at accommodating the development of regional industries by making electricity widely available throughout the region. The GNU estimates that the project would save the region \$600 million in energy costs.²² President Mandela expected the proposal to be adopted as a protocol at the Johannesburg summit, instead it received a luke-warm acceptance that amounted only to the signing of an inter-governmental memorandum of understanding.

The SADC members seemed to be pressing the GNU to deliver on the vision of cooperation and mutual accommodation it so vigorously proposes at the 1995 SADC summit. South Africa was clearly not ready to make any major moves toward restructuring economic relations. Part of the problem in 1995 lay with rationalizing the competing interests of the SACU with those of the SADC. Despite the Mandela administration's decision to center the SADC as the primary regional alliance, the regional place of the South African dominated SACU is still in question. Indications are that South Africa is not ready to discard its revenue generating customs union. The role of the SACU as a conduit for trade arrangements with the BLSN states is crucial

²² The Star (Johannesburg), July 10, 1995, p.12. The Minister of Minerals and Energy Affairs, Pik Botha, addressed a meeting of SADC members where the electricity pool plan was revealed.

because it secures an all important, and largely unhindered, market for South Africa's manufactured goods. The BLNS countries are essentially a captive market for South African trade. It is estimated that more than a quarter of South Africa's manufactured goods end up in the SACU countries.²³ In 1992, trade with the BLNS countries amounted to about \$4 billion.²⁴ This figure is more than double the export earnings to the entire continent of Africa and is about fifteen percent of total exports.²⁵ These figures suggest that the SACU will remain a preeminent vehicle for South Africa's regional trade. The GNU has not indicated intentions to the contrary.

Though the GNU inherits the SACU from the previous regime. The SACU is the region's only fully operational integration scheme with a proven track record.²⁶ Member states have previously complained that the trade regulations of the SACU provide unfair advantages for South Africa.

²³ Erich Leistner, "Prospects of Increasing Regional Cooperation", p. 55.

²⁴ Ibid., p.56.

²⁵ Ibid., p.56.

²⁶ The present SACU arrangement stems from a 1969 agreement, it replaced the 1910 Customs Agreement. For a detailed discussions of SACU's origins, see: Rob Davies, The Southern African Customs Union (SACU): Background and Possible Negotiating Issues Facing a Democratic Government. Southern African Perspectives, No.33, (Cape Town: CSAS, UWC, March 1994), pp.1-6.

President Mandela has previously indicated that the "approach to the reform of SACU will be guided by broader considerations than implications for the South African treasury."²⁷ However, since the arrangement has proven beneficial to its members, South Africa is not expected to bargain away its dominant position or merely discard the customs union.

Writing before Namibia's accession to the SACU, and the 1994 general election in South Africa, J.H. Polhemus provides this insight into the possible future of the BLS(N) states in the postapartheid SACU arrangement:

Their (BLS) place in the future economic structure of the region is unsettled, and probably largely beyond their control. South Africa ... will continue ... to be overwhelmingly powerful in the region, and, while its prospective leaders may talk of redressing past imbalances, building non-exploitive relationships, and affirmative action for disadvantaged neighbors, talk is cheap. The proof will come when a government in power has to choose between disadvantaged neighbors and its own people when allocating resources which will be inevitable scarce. ... For the BLS states, like observers of the Southern African scene ... there are, for the present more questions than answers.²⁸

²⁷ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", p.92.

²⁸ James H. Polhemus, "Still South Africa's Hostages? The BLS States in a Changing Southern Africa", in Paul B. Rich (ed.), The Dynamics of Change in Southern Africa (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), 271.

Polthemus may be overly pessimistic on the future of the BLNS states in the SACU. South Africa may very well choose to merge the SACU with the SADC, however, the matter of the SACU's future can only be speculated on since negotiations to restructure the SACU have stalled and are expected to resume at the close of 1996. When those negotiations resume, the GNU will have to rationalize SACU's continued existence with the growing influence of SADC.

THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Zimbabwe, stands out as the most visible state in the region to openly challenge South Africa's postapartheid vision on economic cooperation, particularly as it relates to regional trade. Being South Africa's largest regional trading partner, Zimbabwe has on more than one occasion urged South Africa to decisively harmonize its economic relations in the region. The extent to which relations between the two countries seemed to deteriorate is perhaps best illustrated by the actions of the Zimbabwean President at a dinner held in Ghana after an Accra conference on reviving private investment in Africa. Television footage shows President Mugabe snubbing South Africa's Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, by openly ignoring him throughout the course of the formal dinner that was hosted by President

Jerry Rawlings of Ghana. As if to telegraph his contempt for South African trade practices, President Mugabe spoke of "some African countries" that keep their borders closed to open and fair trade.²⁹

Zimbabwean manufacturers joined President Mugabe in condemning the influx of South African goods into their country. Their anger was, of course, directed at the practice of placing exorbitant tariffs to exclude Zimbabwean goods from entering South Africa. The South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO), estimated that South Africa's share of Zimbabwe's total imports grew from twenty four percent in 1992 to thirty seven percent at the close of 1995.³⁰ The relative ease with which South Africa gained access Zimbabwean markets began in 1991 when the Mugabe government began scrapping foreign exchange controls, export subsidies and import tariffs as a condition of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans. South Africa took advantage of these reforms by increasing its economic penetration of Zimbabwe's markets while at the same time leaving its own protectionist barriers intact.

President Mugabe seemed to reach the end of his tether when he virtually threatened the GNU to renegotiate the

²⁹ The DFA (Kimberley), June 28, 1996, p.8.

³⁰ The Star (Johannesburg), April 17, 1996, p.6.

expired 1964 trade agreement which provides access for Zimbabwean goods to South Africa or to face possible punitive sanctions. The position was strongly supported by Zimbabwean manufactures. Zimbabwean economist, Erich Bloch, captures the common sentiment among his country's manufactures in his comment that:

Zimbabwe may have no alternative but to react in a manner similar to the United States' stance against Japan; imposing heavy tariffs directed against specific South African Products.³¹

This sentiment was echoed at the Congress of the Confederation of Zimbabwe's Industries (CZI), held in early July, 1995. According to press reports, the discussion at the Conference was dominated by the fears that South Africa would expand its domination of regional trade.³² The issue of trade imbalances and tariffs also served to dull the enthusiasm that delegates felt concerning South Africa's potential to attract global investment to the region. The conference ended with a warning to South Africa that if trade imbalances were not addressed, drastic measures may be sought to readdress the situation. The counter-strategy suggested is to force South Africa to liberalize its trade practices or face severe punitive trade sanctions.

³¹ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), June 23-29, 1995, p.17.

³² The Citizen (Johannesburg), July 11, 1995, p.6.

The situation worsened when at the closing of the February 1995 SADC conference on trade held in South Africa, when several regional states accused the GNU's declared policy of prioritizing regional trade relations as mere lip service. The conference closed without any advancement on issues related to trade. The GNU seemed to take notice of the criticism. Merely two weeks before the August 1996 SADC conference on trade, the GNU moved to sign a preferential trade agreement with Zimbabwe for a period of three years.³³ The agreement lowered South African tariffs on Zimbabwean clothing and textiles from seventy percent to twenty percent by the year 2000.³⁴ After the allotted time, the trade agreement is designed to dissolve into a SADC trade protocol.

The trade agreement with Zimbabwe anticipated the signing of a Protocol on Free Trade at the close of the 1996 SADC summit held in Lesotho. As of this writing, the finer details of the Protocol are not known. South African Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, has indicated that the fine details will be negotiated into the first quarter of 1997.³⁵ Nevertheless, the Protocol on Free Trade

³³ The Star (Johannesburg), August 7, 1996, p.1.

³⁴ Ibid, p.2.

³⁵ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), August 25, 1996, p.2.

is a major step on paper towards realigning the economic imbalances in the region. The SADC trade protocol also makes arrangements for the SACU to consider South Africa's existing tariff structure. In particular, the request by Zambia to sign a similar trade agreement as the one concluded with Zimbabwe has been referred to the SACU. This is a one clear indication that South Africa is moving the SACU to compliment rather than rival the SADC's position in the region. For its part, the SADC signaled a vote of confidence in South Africa by unanimously electing President Mandela as the new chairman of the organization.

The Protocol on Free Trade is perhaps the most convincing sign that southern Africa is working peacefully and constructively together.³⁶ However, negotiations are still in the infancy stages, and, therefore, any expectation that a free trade treaty will be forthcoming is indeed hasty. The SADC must first deal with a proliferation of existing southern African treaties and agreements before free trade can become a reality. Even the Protocol on Free Trade calls for the phasing out of tariffs over a period of eight to ten years.³⁷ Though this basically gives South

³⁶ Protocols on Energy Cooperation, Transport, Communications and Illicit Drug trafficking were also signed at the 16th annual SADC summit.

³⁷ The Citizen (Johannesburg), August 26, 1996, p.4.

Africa at least a decade to restructure and develop its European, Asian, and North American trade relations. In essence, the Protocol allows South Africa the time to gain access to global markets before opening its domestic market to free regional trade.

Already there are strong indications that not all the SADC states are comfortable with the Protocol's terms. Zambia, for example, is voicing strong reservations about the phasing out of tariffs over a decade. As of this writing, Zambia is concerned that the protocol merely prolongs South Africa's advantageous access of the region's markets. At the heart of the contention is the ever-present fear that the trade imbalance between South Africa and the region will increase unabated. Zambia's Minister of Trade Syamukagumbu Syamujane argues that South Africa "must open up its markets to goods from other countries, we (southern Africa) are losing out because of our lower tariffs, while South Africa's tariffs remain high."³⁸ The GNU's Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Erwin, counters Syamujane's contention by emphasizing that the immediate removal of all tariffs would only accelerate the trade imbalance in South Africa's favor.³⁹ Erwin is right, however, this will

³⁸ Ibid., p.4.

³⁹ Ibid., p.4.

probably be the case a decade from now when free trade becomes a reality in southern Africa. Until then, the real 'big fish' for South Africa is to gain preferential trade access to the markets of Europe, Asia, and North America. The GNU is aware that such trade would provide the necessary capital inflow it needs to rejuvenate South Africa's stagnating economy.

South Africa's trade negotiations with southern Africa must be seen within the broader contexts of the GNU's attempts to access the global market. The relatively slow advancement of trade negotiations in the region leading up to the 1996 SADC summit, can be attributed to South Africa's intense preoccupation in negotiating market access to the European Union (EU). The Lome Convention is the treaty which links the EU with seventy African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP states). South Africa is seeking full membership in the Lome Convention. The EU has responded with an offer of limited membership which allows South Africa immediate tariff-free access in return for a progressive opening of South African markets to European companies.

In the face of the EU's position, the Mandela administration is continuing the strong stance that only full Lome membership is acceptable. The position holds that South African industries need time to develop a competitive

edge. South Africa is concerned that allowing the EU greater access to its markets would curtail any real development of domestic industries. However, the EU consistently refuses to give South Africa full Lome membership.⁴⁰ Ambassadors from seventy ACP developing countries seem to agree that South Africa should only be given partial membership in Lome.⁴¹

In its quest to gain entry into Lome, South Africa has agreed that it will not seek financial benefit from the European Development Fund (EDF). This means that South Africa will not receive a portion of development funds allocated to the ACP countries. However, South Africa is expected to gain advantages from the EDF in terms of aid for refugees. The negotiations continue in earnest, but the probable outcome is that South Africa will only be given a watered-down membership in the Lome Convention. The reason for this is that ACP countries have pointed to the substantial aid South Africa already receives directly from the EU budget. In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) promises investment in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in South Africa. The aim of the EU is to create a free trade area with South Africa. For its part,

⁴⁰ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), May 14, 1995, p.1.

⁴¹ The DFA (Kimberley), May 23, 1995, p.13.

the Mandela administration is reluctant to open domestic markets to stiff European competition. Instead, South Africa seeks a fifteen year transition period to adjust uncompetitive sectors toward open market trade. On the other hand, it is clear that South Africa is very intent on achieving full accession to Lome, in order to fully benefit from the agreement's preferential trade access to the EU market.⁴²

As the negotiations between the EU and South Africa proceed, the Mandela administration continues to stress that trade relations with southern Africa remain the government's top priority. Since South Africa embarked on its diplomatic engagement strategy in the region, there has been a tangible demonstration of the intention to realign trade patterns. This is a significant reversal of the domineering and destabilizing policies of the former government. The postapartheid era finds South Africa willing to restructure its trade practices in southern Africa. The amicable resolution of the trade battle between Zimbabwe and South Africa suggests that the Mandela administration is in the process softening its domination of the region's market. In addition, the nature of the trade pact signed between South Africa and Zimbabwe reinforces the GNU's contention that

⁴² For a recent appraisal of negotiations, see: African Business (International), September 1995, pp.47-48.

SADC is the primary locus of regional trade negotiation. The question now - given the enormous domestic challenges facing postapartheid South Africa - is whether the Mandela administration can afford to ambitiously realign its economic relations with southern Africa? This question, along with its domestic context, is considered in the next chapter.

Though the current GNU policy regards the eleven members of the SADC as the theater of regional economic cooperation, South Africa's commercial interests extend into Europe, North and South America, Asia, Africa as well as the Indian Ocean islands of Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, and Reunion.⁴³ Negotiations with EU indicate that South Africa is fervently moving toward accessing the wider global market. This move suggests that the economic planners in the Mandela administration view increased trade with markets formerly blocked by apartheid markets as vital to the economic growth interests of South Africa. As South Africa seeks wider access to the global market, the fate of southern Africa's economic future remains tied to South Africa. The overtly dominant economic position South Africa inherited in southern Africa is slowly and decisively being

⁴³ See: Peter Vale and Khabele Matloso: "Beyond the Nation-State: Rebuilding South Africa from Below", in Harvard International Review, (Fall 1995), 36-37.

discarded.

As the region looks to South Africa to set the ball in motion, southern Africa is still an undeniable hostage to the political and economic agenda of South Africa. Incapacitated by apartheid policies of economic and military domination, southern African states are weak and still suffer under the patterns of apartheid domination. As the region limps into the postapartheid era the historical overlay of asymmetric development is still the pervasive characteristic of the region. The region remains trapped and peripheralized as sources of cheap labor, raw materials, energy and water, for South Africa. However, after more than two and a half years of postapartheid rule, there are strong indications that South Africa is moving to decisively restructure its trade relations in southern Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS ON REGIONAL POLICY

The principal aim of any foreign policy is to safeguard the national interests of the state. Foreign policies are necessary because states interact and compete in an essentially anarchic world system. In democracies, foreign policy making is influenced by the constraints of the domestic political setting. Postapartheid South Africa is no exception to this general rule.

The influence domestic variables have on foreign policy is well documented in the literature of International Relations. Northedge, in his work The Foreign Policies of the Powers, aptly sums up the nexus between domestic forces and foreign policy when he says "foreign policy-making will always proceed in the midst of the kind of vortex of conflicting (domestic) forces"¹ Henry Kissinger, points out further that the domestic political setting limits the extent to which a state can be occupied with foreign policy.² Kissinger's observation is very relevant to the

¹ Northedge, The Foreign Policies of the Powers, New York: The Free Press, 1968, p.23.

² See: Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy . New York : W. W. Norton and Company, 1977.

interplay between domestic and foreign policy in South Africa. The postapartheid era finds the Mandela administration confronted by development challenges bequeathed by the separate and unequal policies of the apartheid state. Separate development under the National Party (NP) regime established the conditions of mass impoverishment the majority of South Africans endure.

Postapartheid South Africa is in the unique position of being both a new state and very much an old state at the same time. The democratic ascent of the ANC effectively ended decades of apartheid rule by the NP. For the very first time, more than forty million black South Africans are included in the political process as equal citizens. The new dispensation also includes seven political parties that have access to open and free national, provincial and local elections. In this sense, postapartheid South Africa is a new country. On the other hand, postapartheid South Africa is a longstanding sovereign state that comes equipped with decades of apartheid baggage and international commitments. It is this developmentally skewed state, with all its structural and psychological apartheid residue, that confronts the hopes and aspirations of the new South Africa. Inevitably, a long-term confrontation between the two South African realities will complicate the GNU's efforts at

Table 4

Political Parties in the Government of National Unity

Name of Party	Name of Leader	Number of Seats in Parliament		Number of Ministerial Posts in President Mandela's Cabinet
		National Assembly	Senate	
African National Congress	N. Mandela	252	60	22 Ministers: (Deputy President Mbeki is also a cabinet member)
National Party	F.W. de Klerk	82	17	None: (Withdrew from cabinet in June 1996)
Inkatha Freedom Party	M. Buthelezi	43	5	3 Ministers
Freedom Front	C. Viljoen	9	5	None
Democratic Party	T. Leon	7	3	None
Pan Africanist Congress	S. Mogoba	5	None	None
African Christian Democratic Party	K. Meshoe	2	None	None
Total: 7		Total: 400	Total: 90	Total: 25

democratic consolidation and nation building. The enormity and immediacy of this domestic challenge can therefore reasonably be held to influence the way in which South Africa perceives its postapartheid role in southern Africa.

The analysis in this chapter is grounded by the conviction that the developmental challenges facing South Africa curtails the extent to which the Government of National Unity (GNU) can occupy itself with southern African relations. The enormity of the development challenge will be a long-term influence on the manner in which South Africa perceives its postapartheid role in southern Africa. However, this does not mean that South Africa lacks the political will to canvass for equitable development in the region. The Protocol on Free trade signed at the 16th annual SADC summit is a clear demonstration of South Africa's intention to address its economic dominance of the region. This Protocol, is an example of sectoral cooperation which the GNU prefers over formal integration at this time.

The pace at which the Trade Protocol envisages free trade is deliberately and necessarily slow. This aspect has already drawn criticism from some states in the region. Zambia, for example, criticizes the Protocol because it does not immediately open South Africa's markets to regional

imports.³ But South Africa cannot be swayed by such pressure. For at least the next decade, South Africa cannot afford to open its markets to free trade from the region or elsewhere. The government must structure its trade relations within a fiscal policy that seeks to inject vitality into the stagnant economy. Opening its markets to immediate free trade is not a panacea for the ills that afflict the economy. The most immediate challenge is to consolidate its domestic market and operationalize the postapartheid ideals that brought the Mandela government to office. The failure to do so will spell doom for the administration's promises of houses, healthcare, schools, and jobs, for the impoverished masses.

It is in this context that southern African policy must be viewed. The consolidation of a fragile democracy beset by mounting developmental challenges is undoubtedly the Mandela administration's primary order of business. However, it should not be assumed that the GNU will inevitably turn away from southern Africa. Despite the constraints of the economy, the Mandela administration is adamant that South Africa's future cannot be separated from the region. Therefore, the GNU urges states to unite behind sound economic policies that will benefit the entire region.

³ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), August 25, 1996, p.2.

REGIONAL POLICY WITHIN A BELEAGUERED ECONOMY

The end of legal apartheid was met by sincere jubilation in the southern African region. Part of that celebration encompassed hopes and expectations for redirected regional alliances that would spirit renewed cooperation toward peace, reconstruction and development. South Africa's freedom immediately heightened speculation about its developmental role in the region. Some distinguished analysts were quick to refloat the speculation that places postapartheid South Africa as the 'engine room' for regional development.⁴ An expanded position of this argument posits western-style integration models as a durable means to facilitate and coordinate regional development.⁵

The expectation that South Africa can pull southern Africa toward equitable development is an overly optimistic if not an unrealistic assessment. Namibian based political analyst, Andre Du Pisani, aptly encapsulates the shortcomings of the locomotive hypothesis in this concise manner:

⁴ See for example: Rob Davies, Integration or Cooperation in a Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Some Reflections on an Emerging Debate, Southern African Perspectives, (Cape Town : Centre for Southern African Studies, UWC, 1992), 1-25.

⁵ Ibid., pp.6-20.

This crude understanding of South Africa's future role in the region is informed by the suspect notion that there would be no conflict of interests between a hegemonic center and its periphery, and/or alternatively that some arrangement to prevent unequal distribution of benefits would be sufficient to ensure equitable regional development. Moreover, it fails to consider the catalogue of domestic economic and and social fractures within the South African body politic.⁶

Du Pisani further criticizes the argument's political and economic reliance on regional alliance schemes as an unqualified "primitive functionalism".⁷ The criticism is well founded. The technocratic projection of integrative alliances as a durable means of addressing regional crises and development issues is unfounded in the African context. Recently, the African Development Bank (ABD) added its voice to the growing chorus of critics who question the relevance of integration schemes in southern Africa. The point was made by highlighting the strains that integration projects have faced elsewhere in Africa.⁸

For its part, the Mandela administration is seemingly

⁶ Andre du Pisani, "Post-Settlement South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa", Issue Vol.xxi/1-2, 1993, 60-61.

⁷ Andre du Pisani, quoted in Paul-Henri Bischoff, "1994 and Beyond: Parameters of Change in Southern Africa", Africa Insight, Vol.25, No.2, (1995), 111-112.

⁸ African Development Bank (ADB), Economic Integration in Southern Africa. Abidjan: ABD, 1993, p.vi.

also not convinced that formal and full regional integration is the immediate solution. This does not mean that the GNU rejects the integration ideals contained in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Abuja Declaration.⁹ What it does mean is that the Mandela administration prefers sectoral cooperation in a trade regime that continues to provide some protectionist cover for its textile, clothes, motor vehicles, sugar, and furniture (among other) industries.¹⁰

This reasoning led to the signing of the Protocol on Free Trade on August 24, 1996. The protocol ensures that region will have a chance to upgrade its trading competitiveness before free trade takes over. It must be conceded that South Africa also ensured that for at least eight years after the agreement is finalized, it will be protected from the wholesale importation of southern African goods.

The strategy that the GNU advocates for regional development is necessarily cautious. The GNU is careful not to over-state its capacity to influence the region's economic fortunes. For this reason, the Mandela

⁹ African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework (Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994), 116-117.

¹⁰ See: Eric Leistner, "Prospects of Increasing Regional Cooperation: A South African Perspective", Africa Insight Vol.25, No.1, 1995, 56.

administration emphatically rejects the conjecture that it has the capacity to act as the developmental catalysts and savior of the region.¹¹ The position President Mandela favors is one that hinges on a collective approach that harnesses regional resources in a manner that distributes benefits fairly.

President Mandela has adopted this position based on a realistic assessment of South Africa's fragile economy. The economy it should be noted is fraught with structural weaknesses that derive from decades of apartheid mismanagement. Postapartheid South Africa is thus saddled with having to navigate the treacherous terrain of revitalizing South Africa's economy. The path to a revitalized economy is literally littered with obstacles which impede economic growth. Charles Simkins provides a useful categorical contextualization of the variables limiting economic growth:

1. Conjunctural factors, including the effects of difficult international economic conditions and extensive drought;
2. Structural factors of long standing, many of which account for the poor performance of the economy since the mid-1970's, and which have been exacerbated by a low gold price and poor commodity prices in recent years.
3. Political factors, whose effects can be

¹¹ See position in: Republic of South Africa, A vision for Economic Integration (Pretoria: Department of Trade and Industry, March 1995), 1-19.

traced through the imposition of trade and financial sanctions during the 1980's and the consequent sapping of private sector confidence.¹²

Simkins concludes that the enduring effects of these factors, combined with an annual population growth of more than two percent make it very likely that the poor growth of the economy will continue into the next decade. If this scenario persists South Africa will certainly be confronted by the perplexities of the Malthusian dilemma.

South African economist, G.L. de Wet, points out that apartheid mismanagement has relegated the economy to a decade old carry-over growth ceiling of three percent. This growth trap directly undermines the GNU's combined attempts to provide basic services and increased employment opportunities. It threatens to override any expectations of socio-economic upliftment. e Wet, describes the growth trap in this way:

The ceiling is imposed by the balance of payments. The current account constitutes an active, and the capital account a passive constraint. In the absence of a net inflow of foreign financial capital, ... (SA) has to rely on export earnings to pay for imports. At growth rates below the ceiling, the value of imports remains less than the value of exports, but at real growth rate in the

¹² Charles Simkins, "The South African Economy: Problems and Prospects", in J.E. Spence (ed), Change in South Africa (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 65-82.

vicinity of 3 percent per year, the value of imports threatens to overtake the value of exports ... This is an absolute restriction on growth. ... (Since) imports comprise intermediate and physical capital goods ... (which) are relatively price inelastic, a higher real growth rate is simply not sustainable. ... (When) the value of imports equals the value of exports, real growth, which implies more imports, cannot increase further, because we shall not be able to pay for the accompanying imports.¹³

A study by the Standard Bank (South Africa) indicates that economic growth of 8.8% a year for a decade, is needed to eliminate the spiraling unemployment patterns and meaningfully address the poverty burden. The study concludes that "It is inconceivable that anything close to this level of economic growth can be achieved without significant investment from abroad."¹⁴ For its part, the IMF remains skeptical about South Africa's chances of posting roughly half of the growth rate the above study calls for. The IMF blames the drought conditions in South Africa as a major contributor to continued poor growth rates. In addition the IMF identifies three other impediments to growth:

¹³ G.L. de Wet, "The RDP and a Structural Problem in the South African Economy", The South African Journal of Economics, Vol.62, No.4, (December 1994), p.1-2.

¹⁴ The Citizen (Johannesburg), April 28, 1995, p.30.

1. Instability induced by political uncertainty, leading to investors adopting a wait-and-see attitude;
2. Inadequate domestic savings performance, and the need to service foreign debt with low capital inflows;
3. High Labor costs in the tradeable goods sector.¹⁵

These reservations continue to inhibit investor confidence in South Africa. The reality is that the end of legal apartheid has not been met by increased foreign investment or interest in South Africa's market potential.¹⁶ This trend remains firmly in place despite President Mandela's high profile efforts to lure structural capital to South Africa. A five page review of postapartheid South Africa's investment potential in the Financial Times, points to the "perceived political instability and the illiquidity of the market ... (as) standing in the way of increased investment activity."¹⁷ The review also indicates that US corporate investment, for example, remains well below that

¹⁵ Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), May 12-18, 1995, p.b2.

¹⁶ See also: S. Terreblanche and N. Nattrass, "A Periodization of the Political Economy from 1910", in Terreblanche and Nattrass (eds.) The Political Economy of South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990), 18. The authors contend that it would be unreasonable to expect inflows of capital and entrepreneurship after decades of economic isolation. Companies that left South Africa under conditions of reduced profitability and sanctions, are also not very likely to be eager to reinvest.

¹⁷ The Citizen, (Johannesburg), April 28, 1995, p. 30.

of the pre-sanction years.

There are also indications that investment in South Africa is severely hindered by the unprecedented increase in the level of general crime throughout the country. Since the general election of 1994, political violence has dramatically decreased except in the province of Natal where an intense political rivalry between ANC and Inkatha supporters continues to rage. Elsewhere in the country, the drop in political violence has been met with a staggering increase in general and violent crime.¹⁸ One study has boldly linked this trend to the strains of the political transition.¹⁹

As South Africa tries to persuade foreign investors to do business in the country, crime and the fear of criminal violence is cementing a common international perception that the country is virtually in a state of siege. It does not help that recent statistics indicate that the postapartheid state has the highest crime rate in the world.²⁰ South

¹⁸ The Citizen (Johannesburg), March 20, 1995, p.1-2.

¹⁹ See also: Mark Shaw, 'Partners in Crime': Crime, Political Transition and Changing Forms of Policing Control. (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1995). This study links the escalation in crime to the political transition.

²⁰ The Star (Johannesburg), August 4, 1995, p.14. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that for every one hundred thousand South Africans, fifty three are murdered each year.

Africa also owns the dubious distinction of being the murder capital of the world and the most violent country outside of a war context.²¹ For these reasons, President Mandela and his cabinet have faced repeated questions related to South Africa's crime rate on state visits abroad. During an official state visit to Japan in 1995, a leery business sector raised concerns about crime.²² One year later, Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, faced a similar line of questioning during a visit to the United States (US). In his address to the Business Development Committee, of the US/SA Binational Commission, the Deputy President had to defend his administration's investment pitch against the threat crime poses to the South African market's profitability and stability.

Try as hard as the GNU may, South Africa's crime rate is severely undermining an already fragile economy.²³ Not only is crime sapping investor confidence, it also poses a threat to South Africa's lucrative tourism industry. In

²¹ The Citizen (Johannesburg), March 25, 1995, p.5. The data is being compiled at the University of South Africa.

²² The Star (Johannesburg), July 4, 1995, p.1.

²³ The Citizen (Johannesburg), May 23, 1996, pp.1-2. The GNU launched the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) as a means to combat crime and still the jitters of foreign investors, tourists, the South African business community, and the public.

early June 1995, then Tourism Minister Dawie de Villiers, indicated that between four hundred and five hundred tourists are mugged or attacked each year.²⁴ Surveys done by South African Tourism Board, show that more than thirty percent of tourists rate personal safety in South Africa below average.²⁵

In reaction to the high crime rate and stagnant economy, skilled South Africans are opting to emigrate in startling numbers. The GNU, as can be expected, is not very comfortable with the ongoing 'brain-drain' phenomenon. Table indicates that for January through July 1996, the number of economically active skilled persons immigrating increased steadily over the corresponding period in 1995. In July 1996 alone, 438 skilled professionals, managers and technicians opted to leave South Africa (See Table 3).

Collectively, the loss of skilled professionals attaches an additional burden to developmental planning. In particular, South African hospitals have been hard hit by migrating doctors and other medical related personnel. In 1996, the GNU had to recruit doctors from Cuba to fill vacancies at hospitals throughout the country. To stem the flow of medical graduates to foreign shores, the Minister of

²⁴ The Star (Johannesburg), June 20, 1995, p.6.

²⁵ Ibid., p.6.

Table 5

Total Migration Figures for July 1996

Immigrants (IM) and Emigrants (EM)	July		January - July		Year
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995
Total IM (Legal)	414	373	3 034	2 882	5 064
Total EM(i)	743	832	5 297	6 459	8 725
Total Skilled EM that were economically active(ii)	380	438	2 782	3 416	4 426
Total EM not economically active(iii)	363	394	2 515	3 043	4 199
Net Gain/Loss	-329	-459	-2 263	-3 577	-3 661

Source: The Central Statistical Service (CSS), Tourism and Migration July 1996.

Notes:

- (i) Emigrants were counted at South Africa's three international airports on the basis of official declaration.
- (ii) Skilled immigrant group includes professional, technical, managerial, administrative, and farming occupations.
- (iii) Emigrants not economically active include pensioners, students, children, and house-keepers.

Health, N. Zuma, is proposing legislation that will make it mandatory for all South African trained doctors to complete a two year state service before entering into private practice. These graduates will essentially be deployed into primary health clinics run by the state. However, the minister's proposal is still being hotly debated in parliament and there is no real indication that such measures will in effect ever be legislated.

In the absence of a national strategy to retain skilled South Africans, the 'brain-drain' continues to increase as South Africa's developmental challenges continue to grow. The most serious development challenge facing the GNU is mass poverty. Improving the poverty conditions of the poor masses living in the overcrowded townships, squatter camps, and desolate rural areas, is undoubtedly the GNU's foremost priority. Meeting the challenge of poverty will not be an expeditious or facile matter for the GNU.

President Mandela, in a report to the United Nations World Summit on Social Development, characterized postapartheid South Africa as a land of gross inequality.²⁶ The President estimates that the poverty gap in South Africa is a staggering \$4.5 billion. This figure is thought to be the amount of wealth that would have to be redistributed in

²⁶ Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), March 17-23, 1995, p.8.

order to raise the general living conditions of impoverished South Africans to the poverty line.²⁷

Though South Africa compares favorably to other African countries in terms of natural resource reserves, infrastructure, health, and education, among others; South Africa has the dubious distinction of having one of the most unequal income distributions in the world.²⁸ A study by the Human Sciences Research Council (HRSC) at the University of Natal, found that in 1993 the total personal income of all South Africans amounted to R279.8 (billion rand).²⁹ Even though blacks make up seventy five percent of the population, they earned less than one third of the net personal income in 1993. The situation is a classic example of income inequality as measured through the international standard known as the Gini Coefficient.³⁰ The researchers indicate that in 1993 the poverty gap was about R15 billion, which is only 5% of South Africa's GDP, however, they conclude that:

While the poverty problem is small in relation to the size of the economy, the

²⁷ Ibid., p9.

²⁸ F. Wilson and M. Ramphela (eds.), Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989, p.18.

²⁹ Ibid., p.11.

³⁰ Ibid., p.11.

enormous number of people involved makes its eradication a huge task. The challenge facing economic planners is to raise the economy on to a higher growth path and ensure that the greater share of the proceeds of growth accrue to the poorer sector of society. ³¹

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) annual Human Development Report in June 1996, found that South Africa's poverty burden has increased since the new government took office. The report's 1996 Human Development Index (HDI) places South Africa 100th out of 174 countries, whereas, in 1995, the report ranked South Africa 95th.³² Corroborating the HRSC's data, the UN report finds a large discrepancy between rich and poor South Africans. Table 4 indicates that forty percent of households in South Africa earn a mere nine percent of the country's income, compared with for example, Zambia's fifteen percent. Furthermore, the richest twenty percent earn nineteen times more than the poorest twenty percent. This gross discrepancy indicates that South Africa is like two countries in one. A minuscule minority of South Africans enjoy a lifestyle that compares favorably with the developed West. However, the vast majority essentially live in impoverished conditions.

³¹ Ibid., p.12.

³² United Nations Development Program, 1996 Human Development Report, p.119.

Table 6

South Africa in the 1996 Human Development Report

Country	Income Share: Lowest 40% of households (1981-93)	Income Shares: Ratio of highest 20% to Lowest 20% (1981-93)
High Human Development		
Korea	19.7	5.7
Singapore	15.0	9.6
Thailand	15.5	8.3
Malaysia	12.9	11.7
Medium Human Development		
South Africa	9.1	19.2
Low Human Development		
Kenya	10.1	18.2
Zambia	15.2	8.9

Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 1996.

Politically, the GNU is held hostage by the worthy expectations of the impoverished masses. Their reality is far removed from the nuances of regional politics. Failure to provide relief and development for these impoverished masses could spell doom for South Africa's fragile democracy. In this treacherous economic context, the GNU is forced to attach much less of a priority to regional relations as it relates to the allocation of state resources. In the next section we consider the GNU's attempt to link domestic and regional policies. However, even with the best of regional intentions, South Africa simply cannot afford an overly ambitious economic engagement of southern Africa. The state of the economy and grinding mass poverty prohibits any such pretense. Nevertheless, southern Africa remains important to South Africa for more than just the role the region played in resisting apartheid. South Africa cannot ignore the revenue it secures from trade with the region. In this context, the GNU is seeking to combine regional efforts to spurt development for the entire region.

LINKING DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL PRIORITIES

To appear accountable to the electorate, the ANC government is prioritizing its domestic policy to address

the concerns of the impoverished black masses. The government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) directs considerable attention toward planning domestic reconstruction projects that provide basic services and thereby alleviate mass poverty. The GNU promotes the RDP as the 'blueprint' for social and economic change in postapartheid South Africa. The RDP aims to provide basic services to all South Africans via an invigorated and restructured economy. Basic services are listed generally as employment opportunities, land reform, housing, water and sanitation, energy and electrification, telecommunications, transport, environment, nutrition, health care, social security and social welfare.³³ In total, the RDP envisions a new economic policy that is defined by the need to provide basic services and create employment.³⁴ The economic strategy requires fiscal discipline that directs state expenditure towards RDP projects. Private sector growth is thought to stem from the expanded opportunities RDP projects provide.

³³ The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework. see Contents page.

³⁴ For a concise description of the evolution of ANC economic policy since its unbanning in 1990, see: Nicoli Natrass, "Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Planning", African Affairs, 95, 1994, 343-359. Natrass points out that ANC economic policy includes industrial, fiscal, financial and monetary policy. Land reform is not included in economic policy.

As the centerpiece of the GNU's domestic policy, the RDP is primarily drawn from two policy documents. The first document, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework,³⁵ constitutes the program as developed by the ANC/SACP/COSATU (Council of South African Trade Unions) alliance, NGO's, and research organizations in South Africa. The ANC alliance defines the RDP in this way:

The RDP is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to mobilise all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future.³⁶

The second RDP document is drawn up under the official auspices of the GNU. Sanctioned by parliament, this government document is known as the RDP White Paper Discussion Document.³⁷ The White Paper outlines the government's strategy for implementing the RDP. It envisions a new economic policy that is defined by the need to create employment. Building on the first RDP document, the White Paper creates an RDP-fund to assist in directing all government funds, including international aid,

³⁵ African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework (Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994).

³⁶ Ibid, p.1.

³⁷ Republic of South Africa, RDP White Paper: Discussion Document (Cape Town: CTP Book Printers, 1994).

towards investment and development.

The RDP is certainly an ambitious set of domestic priorities. Categorically, it constructs an admirable domestic policy paradigm. However, the RDP also provides a significant link between domestic and regional policies. In so doing, the GNU underscores the importance of southern African region to South Africa. The RDP approaches regional policy in this way:

In the long run, sustainable reconstruction and development in South Africa requires sustainable reconstruction and development in Southern Africa as a whole. Otherwise, the region will face continued high unemployment and underemployment, leading to labour migration and brain drain to the more industrialized areas. The democratic government must negotiate with neighbouring countries to forge an equitable and mutually beneficial programme of increasing cooperation, coordination and integration appropriate to the conditions of the region.³⁸

This brief excerpt on regional policy strikingly extends the reconstruction framework of the domestic RDP to southern Africa. Regional policy as slated in the RDP seeks common cooperation in the areas of regional water resources, electricity and energy, telecommunications, transport, agriculture and food production. This positioning in effect approximates the basic services drive of the domestic RDP.

³⁸ The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework. pp.116-117.

The GNU obviously accepts that the vestiges of colonialism and apartheid has relegated southern Africa to a similar underdeveloped state. Where apartheid destabilization is specifically concerned, the RDP recognizes the economic disparities that characterize regional relationships. This is especially relevant to regional trade:

... the current trade pattern between South Africa and the sub-continent is unbalanced, as regional imports from South Africa exceed exports to South Africa by five to one. A democratic government must develop policies in consultation with our neighbours to ensure more balanced trade.³⁹

In prescribing its domestic priorities the GNU is trying to be sensitive to the developmental needs of the region. The vision forwarded in the RDP relates fundamentally to the ANC's regional posturing discussed in Chapter One. Of particular note is President Mandela's emphasis on human rights as the basis of foreign policy. This insistence finds expression in the RDP's position that the rights of all regional workers must be protected by one coherent standard:

One element of regional policy ... is that minimum standards with regards to the rights of workers to organise be established across the region as a whole. This will allow a process of greater integration to become one of levelling up rights and conditions of

³⁹ Ibid., 117.

workers, rather than of levelling them down to the lowest prevailing standard.⁴⁰

The RDP presents the first official occasion in the history of South Africa where a non-confrontational and cooperative regional policy is linked to the domestic priorities of the state. This is significant because it officially puts an end to the confrontational and destabilization regional policy of the former apartheid regime. In effect, the RDP recognizes that the region shares development challenges such as poverty that must be addressed collectively. The GNU's attempt to highlight a strategy to address regional poverty seems to have flown by the World Bank.⁴¹ That South Africa has chosen to highlight its commitment towards a regionally defined strategy to end poverty is very encouraging. The GNU's commitment will be very influential in bringing states together in a regional consensus on poverty and other developmental issues.

Given the optimism and regional resolve the RDP projects, it is particularly distressing that the program is faltering under heaps of bureaucracy. After more than two

⁴⁰ Ibid., 118.

⁴¹ Katherine Marshall, the Director of the World Bank's southern African department, argues that growing poverty is the central threat facing the region. She is skeptical of the region's commitment to address poverty. See: The Citizen (Pretoria), February 21, 1996, p.6.

and a half years of postapartheid rule, the RDP seems to be limping along without the vigor that accompanied its unveiling. Ironically, the RDP's vision has succumbed to the very economy it proposes to invigorate. In general, the RDP never really got off the ground. In addition to bureaucratic tie-ups, the RDP failed because it is long on vision and short on method. Unfortunately, the ANC-led government overlooked the importance of including a detailed delivery mechanism to operationalize the RDP. In so doing, the GNU ignored the critical debate that surrounded the 1990 Harare Document. This ANC-alliance document, stressed the need to include a workable mechanism for redistribution in postapartheid economic planning.⁴²

The GNU's failure to release a scheduled second White Paper by March 1995 to evaluate the progress of the RDP perhaps heralded the decline of the RDP.⁴³ On March 28, 1996, the GNU permanently closed the offices of the RDP and placed the program under the control of the Department of Finance. Senior officials in the ANC-led GNU claimed the closure as a mere administrative measure meant to speed the delivery of social services. However, in the wake of

⁴² For a discussion of the Harare Document, see: Ronaldo Munck, "South Africa: The Great Economic Debate", Third World Quarterly, Vol., 15, No. 2, 1994, 205-208.

⁴³ Ibid., 53.

threats by the Department of Finance to cut the RDP Fund, the growing perception is that the program has all but disappeared. This perception is buoyed by the fact that South Africa released a Macro Economic Framework in June 1996 that hardly mentions the RDP. The new Macro Economic Framework all but ensures that South Africa is nearing the post-RDP era. In a report discussing the "death of the RDP", Hein Marais, suggests that the present utility of the program is now essentially doctrinal:

Perhaps its (RDP) real potency lies more at the ideological level. Invested with near-sacrosanctity, the RDP is being deployed as the Freedom Charter of the 1990s - an emotive, galvanising tool that can mobilise and harness conflicting social forces behind a common venture, the ANC government's grandest project: that of building a nation.⁴⁴

In the post-ideological age of the New World Order (NWO) perhaps the RDP has found its functional place as Marais suggests. However, the government is not ready to assign the RDP to the governmental closet. According to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, the RDP is on course to fill its twenty five year vision as South Africa's socio-economic framework. The Deputy President fails to explain where the RDP fits into the dizzying maze of other complimentary and non-complimentary socio-economic strategies that now litter

⁴⁴ The Mail and Guardian, (Johannesburg), July 12-16, 1996, p.VIII.

domestic policy. Among these strategies are the National Growth and Development Strategy (NGDS), Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEARS) and the Macro Economic Framework (MEF). The ANC-led GNU has elevated each of these strategies as official and primary policy at various stages in its short life-span. Exactly how all these new strategies relate to the RDP is unclear and mostly a matter of speculation.

A DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

As of this writing, there are no specifically organized southern African interests groups roaming the halls of parliament in Cape Town. This reality may soon change as more than 204 000 SADC citizens apply for permanent residence in South Africa.⁴⁵ Under an amnesty program, the GNU has decided to legalize the status of SADC aliens who have been in the country since July 1, 1991.⁴⁶ Legal status provides immigrants from SADC countries with the platform to openly organize without the fear of being detected and deported.

⁴⁵ Figure quoted by the Department of Home Affairs in September 1996.

⁴⁶ Applicants must prove that they are formally or informally employed and have no criminal record. November 29, 1996, is the deadline for all applications.

The amnesty program comes as South Africa is caught in the middle of a contentious national dialogue on migration. According to the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the GNU deported 157 000 illegal aliens in 1995, more than 70 000 over the previous year.⁴⁷ The majority of these deportations (98%) are to SADC countries.⁴⁸ However, mass deportations have not curbed the flow of illegal aliens from the region into South Africa. More illegal immigrants remain in the country than are deported. Estimates of the number of illegal migrants in South Africa range from two to eight million. Almost daily, press reports sketch a rising tide of xenophobic intolerance toward illegal migrants from southern Africa. Violent attacks against migrants in sprawling townships such as Soweto and Alexandria are very common. An obsession with the invasion of South Africa by the 'amakwerekwere' (southern Africans) is becoming a popular obsession in impoverished areas. Poor South Africans fear that illegal aliens are stealing their jobs and robbing them of the opportunity to improve their lives.

Hussein Solomon, a researcher with the Institute for Defense Policy, has argued that the GNU should seek bilateral agreements with southern African states to

⁴⁷ Quoted in: The Star (Johannesburg), august 18, 1996, pp.11-12.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.11.

directly curb illegal immigration.⁴⁹ He advocates the use of border patrols, floodlights and motion detectors like those used by the United States along the Rio Grande border with Mexico. Hussein also favors a national labor registration system that would penalize employers who use cheap illegal immigrant labor. The merit of Hussein's article is in his insistence that southern African states look at the reasons for mass migrations.

In southern Africa, the root cause of mass migrations are intimately tied to both human rights abuses and economic necessity. Migrants from the region come to South Africa in search of a better and secure life. Garth le Pere, the director of the Non Governmental Organization, Foundation for Global Dialogue, passionately implores the GNU to open its collective arms to illegal migrants from the region. He writes that:

(C)ontinued untrammelled migration and displacement of people in the region is a legacy of South Africa's negative historic relations with neighbouring countries. We will for some time to come reap the effects of political, social and economic insecurity caused by our past adversarial and confrontational attitude towards the surrounding region. (T)he hard-nosed realism of refoulement is hardly a reliable policy compass for treating the complexities of the migration problem. South Africa should stop treating the "tired, poor and huddled masses" who come here as feudal serfs prevented from

⁴⁹ The Star (Johannesburg), August 8, 1996, p.10.

sharing in the bounty of the baron's
resources because of an accident of
birth" ⁵⁰

The ANC, as the majority party in the GNU, senses the reasoning behind Le Pere's argument. In so doing, the ANC is the most ardent South African crusader for regional development and like Hussein is aware that border patrols and floodlights are a temporary measure to stop illegal migration. Undoubtedly, the expanded solution to the problem lies in measures which draw the region together in a consensus about human rights and economic development. Encouragingly, this is the approach the GNU is taking. Much of this vision can be attributed to the ANC who consistently joins regional policy to domestic initiatives in an attempt to distribute benefits throughout the region. This approach is again highlighted in the most recent discussion document on state transformation.⁵¹

The ANC contends that improved life conditions for all southern Africans depends on increased development. Improving the life conditions in the region, removes the push-factors which force mass migrations. As indicated above, the ANC has consistently advocated this position

⁵⁰ The Star (Johannesburg), July 7, 1996, p.10.

⁵¹ The African National Congress. Discussion Document: The State and Social Transformation (Johannesburg: ANC, November 1996).

throughout its RDP and trade policy. The most recent ANC discussion document continues to advocate:

If the efforts aimed at defeating underdevelopment in South Africa are to succeed, they must of necessity be accompanied by the struggle to try and defeat underdevelopment in Southern Africa as a whole.⁵²

In the coming years the structure of the interests who share the ANC's vision will become more identifiable to researchers. However, from private to public trade interests, trade and workers unions, the business sector, NGO's, and of course immigrant groups, the rise of a sizeable domestic constituency for southern Africa is burgeoning within South Africa. As the constituency grows and takes form, the region is bound to remain vital to South Africa's national interests. A growing constituency will hold the GNU to its commitment to deal fairly and openly with the region. Unlike apartheid policies that maintained decades of atavistic regional domination, postapartheid regional policy will be held domestically accountable for promoting peace, cooperation, and greater unity in southern Africa.

⁵² Ibid., s.9.1.

CHAPTER SIX

SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA TOWARD 2000

South Africa under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela is making significant progress in forwarding a new framework for southern African relations. In little more than two and a half years, the Government of National Unity (GNU) has moved decisively to realign South Africa's relations with southern Africa. In the aftermath of apartheid destabilization, the postapartheid era is being characterized by the GNU's amicable posturing that projects peaceful cooperation as the foundation for regional relations.

Toward promoting and fostering political and economic cooperation, South Africa has joined the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) with the intention of placing the organization as the forum for regional development. This move breathed new organizational life and credibility into SADC. Moreover, the move to join SADC was instrumental in forging a coherent identity for southern Africa. The world has taken note of SADC's regional ascendancy and southern Africa is rapidly being recognized as a bloc of SADC states. This recognition is attracting the attention

of donor states, Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's) and the trading regimes of the North. Already, there are clear indications that the United States and the European Union (EU) favors regional investment via SADC as opposed to state based investment.¹ Southern Africa's new bloc identity also found notable expression in the recent signing of the SADC Protocol on Free Trade. The Protocol is thought to be the first of its kind to be established under the regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Despite early South African regional policy successes, southern Africa remains trapped in the North-South economic divide. In the inhospitable economic climate of the New World Order (NWO), southern Africa is battling to improve its economic advantages. Being one of the poorest and least developed regions in the world, the motivation that unites the region is the desperate need for development. In this context, it is an encouraging indication that South Africa has joined the region in a consensus toward mutual development. The combined approach is to lock the region in a collective effort toward effective and sustainable development.

¹ The Clinton administration's "Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy" for Africa singles out SADC as the forum for regional investment. See report in: The Star (Johannesburg), April 11, 1996, p.18.

As South Africa engages the region, its national preoccupation is to meaningfully address its socio-economic backlogs while simultaneously revitalizing its own economy. However, the GNU is not so domestically preoccupied as to ignore its regional interests. South Africa consistently links the region to its domestic agenda. For example, the GNU is adamant that a revitalization of South Africa's economy will lead to tangible economic benefits for the region. Since the region is intricately tied to South Africa's business and investment climate, the benefits could presumably extend to the region. The GNU has suggested that the staggering developmental experience of the East-Asian 'tigers' be used as a possible model for southern African development. This suggestion may very well prove instructive for South Africa. The proximity of Japan to the East-Asian states, approximates to some extent, the position of South Africa in southern African.²

Whatever the inspiration South Africa and the region draw on, there are a host of destabilizing factors that threaten the bonds that seek cooperative development. Swatuk appropriately isolates the following factors:

- (1) the historical incorporation of the region into the global capitalist system and South

² Erich Leistner, "Prospects of Increasing Regional Cooperation: A South African Perspective", Africa Insight, Vol.24, No.4, 60.

- Africa's dominant place therein;
- (2) South African military aggression and its post-apartheid residuals in the region;
 - (3) South(ern) Africa's increasing marginalisation in the new international divisions of labour and power, best symbolised by debt and structural adjustment.³

These factors may in essence aggravate attempts at cooperation and, thereby, weaken the region's resolve to work together peacefully and constructively. These factors may even sustain neocolonial relations of production rather than reduce regional inequality and economic underdevelopment.⁴ At stake are the postapartheid ambitions that brings the region and South Africa to its new cooperative consensus.

However, the story is still unfolding and the region is far away from being blacked-out by marginalization from the global market. The European Union (EU), is presently locked in negotiations with the GNU over a possible free trade agreement. For its part, South Africa insists that any agreement with the EU must be linked to the SADC Free Trade Protocol. Though a trade agreement with the EU would provide South Africa with considerable advantages, South Africa is not willing to concede advantages over the SADC

³ Larry Swatuk, "Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa", Journal of the Third World Spectrum, Vol.1, No.2, (Fall 1994), 34-35.

⁴ Ibid., p.35.

Free Trade Protocol. Trade and Industry Minister, recently indicated that "it would be detrimental to regional development ... to improve EU access to our markets at a rate more rapid than the improved SADC access.⁵ South Africa is going a long way to ensure that its regional ties are accorded precedence over its other global interests. This position is a major departure from the apartheid era mentality and it indicates that the new government views regional development as central to its national interests.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN RELATIONS IN A NEW GLOBAL ORDER

The GNU faces the formidable task of democratic consolidation in a reordered international environment that imposes profound challenges for both domestic and regional stability, prosperity, and development. The unceremonious dissolution of the East-West ideological bipolarity significantly influenced the delicate political and economic fortunes of the southern African region. The disintegration of the Soviet Bloc introduced a 'New World Order' (NWO), where overextended, domestically constrained superpowers, are actively curtailing their global reach.

Though the end of the Cold War shifted the balance of

⁵ The Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), November 8, 1996, p.6.

power of post-1945 international relations, the immutable division between the rich states of the North, and the poor states of the South remains intact. The post-Cold War era, despite optimistic neoliberal rhetoric of democratic pluralism and deregulated markets, is far from introducing a global environment where holistic development is universally attainable.⁶ The fierce international environment within which developing states compete for access to the structural capital and technology of the North, is an enduring remnant of the ideologically obsessive post-1945 international structure.

In the NWO, the gap between rich and poor states is set to widen as the developed North cements the ongoing division of international labor within a contained regime of trading blocs. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the East Asian Economic Sphere, and the European Economic Community (EC), present an economic triad of competing blocs that confine southern Africa, like the rest of Africa, to a marginal economic presence in the global economy.⁷ The tendency in the post-Cold War era is toward a top-down

⁶ For a discussion of neoliberal presuppositions in the NWO, see: Manfred Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism," Third World Quarterly, Vol 15, No. 1, (1994), 31-39.

⁷ See: Timothy M. Shaw, Reformism and Revisionism in Africa's Political Economy in the 1990's: Beyond Structural Adjustment (London: Macmillan, 1993).

marginalization which exacts a more rigorous asymmetric globalization than ever before. Thomas Ohlson, attributes this marginalization tendency to the following:

- (1) Africa is of limited importance to the world economy. It represents an almost insignificant (less than 2 percent) share of world trade. Operating costs are high and the rate of return on investments is low compared to other parts of the world. Furthermore, technological advancements, such as methods of substitution or more economical ways of use, have made many of the goods and raw materials produced in southern Africa less necessary to the industrialized countries.
- (2) The end of the Cold War and the demise of east European-type socialism have made southern Africa less important from a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective. Politically and security-wise, east Europe (nuclear weapons, the national question and stable transitions) and the Middle East (the Islamic factor, oil, nuclear weapons proliferation) are today seen by western political leaders as the central concerns in terms of global security.
- (3) Pessimism has increased in the North about the possibilities for large parts of the third world, including southern Africa, to ever develop.⁸

This leaves southern Africa with a perilous bag of economic prospects in the deregulated global market. Accompanying the ongoing process of asymmetric globalization, is the threat of increased marginalization as debt, capital flight, low investment, unstable export earnings, and political

⁸ Thomas Ohlson, "The End of the Cold War and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa", in Rukshana A. Siddiqui, ed., Sub-Saharan Africa: A Sub-Continent in Transition (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), 241.

instability, become the cornerstones of the region's economy. In the NWO, southern Africa remains trapped in the old division of labor.

Concerted efforts toward meaningful long-term development is frustrated by the region's dependence on dwindling foreign capital.⁹ Where foreign funding is acquired from western donor states, the strict attachment of political conditionality introduces terms of democratic accountability that constrain the independence of the region's domestic political systems. The imposition of 'accountability' is prescribed along lines of J. A. Schumpeter's vision of state power as legitimized through contested multi-party systems.¹⁰ Christopher Clapham, contends that political conditionality exposes the myth of state sovereignty as sustained by the previous bi-polar world order. He argues further that in the NWO sovereignty can no longer be used to hide state repression.¹¹ Though there is some merit in this position, we cannot overlook the

⁹ For an analysis on the extent of the region's dependence on external capital, See: John S. Saul, "The End of the Cold War in Southern Africa," Review of African Political Economy, Vol.50, (March 1991), 145-157.

¹⁰ For a discussion of 'political conditionality' and the subordinate African state, see: C. Clapham, "Political Conditionality and the Structures of the African State", Africa Insight, Vol.25, No. 2, (1995), 91-97.

¹¹ Ibid., 96.

real possibility that aid-inspired democratization may reintroduce cycles of repression when donor-aid is frustrated or dries up and the vision it pushed evaporates. It is also too convenient to just gloss over the oppressive and even imperial dimensions that political conditionality forces on developing states. The case of Zambia is a recent example of the uneasy connection between political conditionality and developmental aid. The United States, Denmark, Norway, and Britain withdrew aid after failing to convince the Chiluba administration to amend Zambia's new constitution. The furor arose after the Chiluba government included a constitutional provision that would prohibit former President Kenneth Kuanda, or other non-native Zambian, from entering the October 1996 presidential election. The donor-states protest signaled to the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and the region in general, the exact parameters of their political conditionality. In addition to withdrawing aid estimated to be about three quarters of Zambia's National budget, the ruling MMD now faces strong opposition from donor-states on the further restructuring of its \$6.2 billion foreign debt.¹² South Africa and Botswana joined the chorus and expressed concern over what is now commonly referred to as

¹² The Citizen (Johannesburg), May 15, 1996, p.6.

'Zambia's constitutional crisis'.¹³ SADC remained officially distant from the 'crisis' as if not to offend the donor-states.

The inherent contradiction of imposing political conditions on weak state and economic structures in the region places the move toward democratization in a precarious balance. It is doubtful that donor-states can provide, or even be willing to provide, the kind of long-term support that will enhance the prospects for sustainable growth. This makes it almost impossible for the dependent economies of the region to break the cycle of state poverty and political instability. Ironically, this is exactly what donor-states want to avert.

As the investment role of Northern states in the development of the southern African region declines, the influence of Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, is increasing. Faced with waning resources, cash strapped states are scrambling to procure much needed capital through the various loan and debt restructuring programs offered by the World Bank and IMF. However, access to the resources of these two NGO's is no panacea for the problems facing these states. These loan and debt restructuring programs are

¹³ The Star (Johannesburg) August 8, 1996, p.13.

regulated by strict structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which attach additional political conditions to the provision of loans. At best, these programs provide a temporary breathing space for the region's cash strapped states. The daunting reality is that these programs often trap states in a revolving door of debt. Despite the prescriptions of these programs, there has not been a significant amount of structural adjustment in southern Africa. Douglas Rimmer points out that part of the blame lies on exogenous factors.¹⁴ The poor success of SAPs can be traced to the inherent dilemma of placing reform prescriptions in the arena of the very political elite whose power and privileges are at stake.¹⁵ As long as the states in the region are burdened by debt obligations which they have no hope of paying, the possibility for growth and redistribution remains severely incapacitated. This reduces the possibility of significant foreign investment because of the fear that regime instability will increase in deteriorating economies to the point where profits are negligible and the repatriation of capital is threatened. In the long term, insurmountable debt threatens to entrench regional instability even further as states struggle to meet

¹⁴ Douglas Rimmer, "Development in Africa: Changing Perceptions", Africa Insight, Vol.25, No.2 (1995), 126.

¹⁵ Ibid., 126.

the basic socio-economic needs of their citizens.

Jeffrey Herbst, commented at an academic conference convened by the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), that South Africa should concentrate on global rather than regional trade.¹⁶ His contention is that the region is too small to provide for the expanded trade South Africa's economy needs to grow. If South Africa's aggressive penetration of the global market is anything to go by, then the GNU seems to agree with Herbst. Though South Africa is a willing partner in the broad development ambitions of the region, the GNU is actively seeking more lucrative markets. Outside of the previously discussed attempts to enter the EU, and the increased economic interaction with Southeast Asia, South Africa has aggressively entered the rest of Africa with an eye on cornering the base metal, mechanical appliances, electric appliances, aircraft, and motor vehicle markets, among others. Critics argue that South African trade policy and practice is balkanizing the African continent.¹⁷ South Africa is accused of providing subsidies for its export industries, while at the same time protecting its own markets with prohibitive trade tariffs. The arguments are

¹⁶ Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), July 12-18 1996, p.b2.

¹⁷ The Star (Johannesburg), April 22, 1996, p.8.

familiar and so are the huge trade imbalances between South Africa and African states outside of southern Africa.

South Africa is wasting no time in extending its African markets beyond the southern Africa. However, South Africa's cooperative position on development in southern Africa is not compromised by its move to wider markets. The challenging political and economic contexts of the NWO almost force the GNU to penetrate more lucrative markets. This is not a merely a matter of the GNU realizing its fortunes lie beyond southern Africa, though it could be cynically interpreted as such. The Mandela administration is adamant that it will not turn its back on the region. We have already seen that he GNU advocates moving beyond the limitations of the state-centric development toward a new regionalism that embraces novel forms of sectoral cooperation. The SADC Protocol on Free Trade is the most significant and encouraging step in this direction to date. Also, the proposed Maputo Development Corridor that will connect the province of Gauteng to the Mozambican port of Maputo, is another indication that South Africa is working with the region. Already, the Department of Trade and Industry has earmarked private sector projects worth \$5 billion to be associated with the Corridor.¹⁸

¹⁸ The Star (Johannesburg), August 14, 1996, p.1.

The Corridor promises to improve transport links between the Mozambican coast and South Africa's economic heartland. This will no doubt be a boon for investment and employment in southern Africa. Though the GNU is expanding its efforts to access global markets, South Africa is not neglecting or abandoning its economic interests in southern Africa. What is needed now is for the GNU to add structure to its regional policy and identify its objectives within the broader framework of its overall foreign policy.

A DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY

President Mandela and the GNU have achieved a monumental success in moving South Africa from its former pariah status to the position of international admiration and respect it now holds. In the global limelight, and within the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), South Africa is found dealing openly with the brutality of its apartheid past. South Africans from all walks of life are beginning to participate in the business of government. In this vibrant political context, the Mandela administration is seeking to generate a national debate on foreign policy. The aim is to bring foreign policy making closer to the public domain.

The first decisive step toward an inclusive foreign

policy debate was made in mid-1996 when the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) released a discussion document, or blue paper, on foreign policy.¹⁹ The discussion document is positioned as preliminary step to the much anticipated, and long overdue White Paper (formal policy). Though the document aims at a broad inclusion, it is also specifically aimed at vocal skeptics who ridicule the GNU for the lack of foreign policy direction.

Though the document is a valiant attempt at public inclusion, the common perception in the media is that South Africa is flailing about in the dark without a foreign policy. Media critics are looking for illuminating answers, or even clues, to the many questions of foreign policy direction. Though to be fair, the blue paper is meant to enable a discussion of issues related to South Africa's foreign policy interests. Toward this end, the document compiles minutiae for consideration in the foreign policy debate.

The approach that the document takes in soliciting discussion should not be construed as an indication that South Africa is having difficulty defining its vital national interests in the global arena. Clearly foreign

¹⁹ Republic of South Africa, South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document (Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs: 1996).

policy cannot be neatly packaged into concise statements.

The discussion document instructively makes this point:

Foreign policy is a multidimensional set of policies, objectives, principles, strategies and plans which cannot easily be packaged into a neatly described "formula". It is also not always practical to distinguish between aspirations, general objectives and underlying philosophy.²⁰

This insight serves as a warning to any observer who expects to find answers to the myriad of foreign policy issues that face South Africa. What the document adequately does is to restate positions drawn from speeches made by President Mandela, Deputy President Mbeki, Foreign Minister Nzo, and Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad. From these speeches a list of 'crucial elements' are compiled. Sensibly, these 'crucial elements' are stacked under the caution that "South Africa's policy initiatives should be modest and not overly ambitious."²¹ The list reads as follows:

- South Africa must consistently endeavour to pursue a coherent foreign policy, which includes economic, security and political components.
- Preventive diplomacy and pro-active initiatives should be the approach, rather than reaction to events. A monitoring network with African partners is essential.
- South Africa should assume a leadership role in Africa in all those areas where a constructive contribution could be made

²⁰ Ibid., 15.

²¹ Ibid., 4.

- without politically antagonizing the country's African partners.
- The government should continue to pursue a non-aligned approach, with due regard for South Africa's SADC, OAU, NAM and other membership commitments.
 - A diplomacy of bridge-building between the "North" and "South" should be pursued.
 - In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to promote its interests in regard to the major global issues such as respect for human rights, democracy, global peace, security and the protection of the environment.
 - South Africa should constantly endeavour to positively influence and change the direction of events and developments internationally, to the extent that they affect South Africa.
 - Diplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means to an end, namely to promote the well-being of the country and its citizens.²²

These principles are what the GNU believes to be the broad framework upon which South Africa should build its foreign policy. The document also lists a formidable agenda that should direct foreign policy objectives. In the spirit of discussion, this list is meant to draw together a basic foreign policy agenda which includes:

- The adoption of a more pro-active and assertive foreign policy posture.
- Adhering to a policy of non-alignment and friendly constructive relations with all nations.
- Supporting the global free trade system.
- Promoting North-South and South-South cooperation.
- Seeking mutual benefits and mutual respect in bilateral relations.

²² Ibid., 37.

- Dealing with African partners as equals and avoiding all hegemonic ambitions.
- Being instrumental in the shaping and defining of the NWO.
- Coming to the assistance of refugees and children in Africa and elsewhere.
- Assisting in the construction of an African continent that will help create a common world of peace and prosperity.
- Playing a leadership role in the OAU, SADC and NAM.
- Furthering worldwide peace and democracy, sustainable development, protection of the environment, promoting disarmament and preventing genocide.
- Becoming a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional arms fields.²³

This is clearly not a 'modest' foreign policy agenda. But then again, South Africa is not a modest country. After decades of being locked way behind the curse of apartheid, the Mandela administration is bravely stepping back into the global arena.

The discussion document should be seen as a point of departure for the all important process of defining South Africa's foreign policy process. Notably, the GNU must be credited with bringing the process closer to the voting republic. Unlike the apartheid era, foreign policy is no longer hidden behind boardroom doors of privilege. We can expect that the GNU will embark on further attempts to more coherently define South Africa's foreign policy. As of this

²³ Ibid., 14-20.

writing, there is no definite indication of when an official White Paper will be released.

That South Africa is caught up in the throes of defining its overall foreign policy objectives goes without saying. On one well highlighted occasion, the GNU seemed to be stumbling over an inconsistent foreign policy. The recent crisis in Nigeria found the Mandela administration at odds with itself when its 'quiet diplomacy' strategy failed to stop the executions of the Ogoni dissidents. When the failure became evident, President Mandela immediately repudiated the Abacha regime and called for international sanctions. All the while, the President and his cabinet failed to take into account the implications a call for sanctions would have on relations with the OAU and SADC.

The rationale for jumping on the sanctions bandwagon is justified on the principles of human rights President Mandela likes to refer to when he broaches the subject of foreign policy. However, there are nagging questions as to the role human rights interests play in driving foreign policy decisions. Curiously, South Africa continues to pursue its 'quiet diplomacy' strategy with states that are documented to have appalling human rights records. This raises the additional question as to foreign policy objectives the GNU hopes to achieve with states like the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Indonesia? Clearly, these

states are not major markets for South African trade. Ironically, President Mandela's ANC is known to have repudiated states who argued in favor of 'engaging' apartheid South Africa over international sanctions.

South Africa has also chosen to back Libya's call to have the Lockerbie suspects tried at a neutral venue. The decision came when Foreign Minister Nzo visited Libya in early 1996. The haphazard way in which the backing was delivered conveyed a sense that the Minister had not considered South Africa's relations with Britain and the United States in his decision.²⁴ The fallout over the appropriateness and timing of the Minister's action, however, has not stopped South Africa from flagrantly ignoring its significant British and American interests. Recently, President Mandela chastised the United States for its action in Iraq after hosting an official reception for Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Pretoria. Clearly the President has the right not to support an action even America's closest allies are criticizing. The President's criticism would not have been so odd had it not taken place in the context of an official reception for the Iranian President. President Mandela sent the wrong message

²⁴ See: The Star (Johannesburg), May 17, 1996, p.12. The Heritage Foundation reports South Africa sided against the US in 53% of votes at the UN despite being the sixth largest (\$132 378 million) recipient of US aid in 1995.

to the Clinton administration at a time when Deputy President Mbeki was officially visiting the United States in an effort to drum up investment for South Africa.

As South Africa moves toward the new millennium, it will have to make tough choices about key international relations issues. This means that the GNU cannot be sympathetic to the United States and Cuba at the same time; be sympathetic to Britain and Libya at the same time; be both for and against states with questionable human rights records; and engage both China and Taiwan diplomatically. South Africa must guard against the perception that its international interaction is incoherent, undefined and even sometimes whimsical. To bridge the considerable developmental challenges that make its transition to democracy very precarious, its foreign policy must project consistency and stability. This is especially important for South Africa's significant trade and investment interests with the United States, Britain, France and Germany. Though South Africa has been consistent in its southern African relations, the GNU must move decisively to expand its policy toward a more comprehensive interpretation of the region. This aspect is considered next.

STRUCTURING REGIONAL POLICY

South Africa's regional interaction has been much more consistent than the generally unrefined state of its foreign policy would suggest. Early on in the new President's tenure, the GNU set to convince the region that South Africa's "first priority was to create such relations that are acceptable relations of friendship, cooperation, and good neighbourliness."²⁵ Any observer, of the unfolding regional relationship will testify that the southern Africa is moving to unexpected heights of cooperation. Though South Africa faces daunting domestic challenges, the giant has not become inwardly preoccupied to the detriment of its regional relations. However, the GNU needs to expand and fine tune its approach toward a more comprehensive regional policy.

The GNU did not use the discussion document to further its thinking on regional policy. However, it is clear that the Mandela administration centers the region as the arena for South Africa's foreign policy focus. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the GNU, for the foreseeable future, plans to promote the region's fortunes and agenda in the NWO. South Africa has the unprecedented opportunity to do so since its Trade and Industry Minister, Alec Erwin, is

²⁵ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), June 2 1996, p.16.

the newly elected President of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The discussion document outlines the structure of regional policy. The general outline has not changed since the President's groundbreaking article that laid the foundation for regional engagement.²⁶ The President's familiar cooperative stance toward SADC states is again restated in the document:

- Relations with SADC member countries are of primary importance and each embassy/High Commission must handle SADC issues in an integrated manner, as a matter of priority.
- The South African RDP should be regionalised to promote development projects in the whole Sub-continent. Investment in neighbouring Countries should be encouraged.
- Mission objectives should focus on coordinating mechanisms, promotion of trade investment, regional development and interaction with South African province bordering SADC states.²⁷

This outline conveniently captures the broad themes of South Africa's engagement of the region. However, the time is ripe for the GNU to seek a more integrated approach to regional policy. Where trade and investment is concerned, the GNU must provide a comprehensive plan that will combat the region's insignificant presence in the global economy. South Africa's National Economic Development and Labour

²⁶ Mandela, "South Africa' Future Foreign Policy", 91.

²⁷ Ibid., 27.

Council's (NEDLAC), can assist in finding a flexible strategy to coordinate regional policy with the inter-related issues of trade, finance, technology, investment, market access, and sustainable development. Such a strategy will have to indicate how the GNU proposes to direct multilateral relations with the WTO, EU, SADC and SACU. Above all, the strategy must create a viable channel to promote viable and competitive regional enterprises if the region is to find a foothold in the global economy.

Though the inter-related issues of economic development are fundamental to regional development, South Africa must design a regional policy beyond the narrow focus of issues related to trade and investment only. Regional policy much extend a means to deal with a range of security threats that impact overall stability of the region. This means that the GNU must approach the issue of a regional security complex with an eye on crisis prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution. As the chair of SADC's Political, Defense and Security organ, the GNU is appropriately situated to develop regional security policy. This would entail widening the present focus on economic security to include awareness and management of the combinations of political, social, military and environmental threats that are pervasive in the region.²⁸ Ohlson identifies the

'general clusters' of regional security threats that exist:

- (1) conflicts associated with war termination and reconciliation, including the technical difficulties of arranging and enforcing ceasefires, peace accords, demobilising armies and reintegrating former enemies into a single national army;
- (2) conflicts of participation caused by the monopolisation of political power by a dominant party or racial group;
- (3) class conflict, exacerbated by economic decline and the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs);
- (4) conflicts over identity whereby ethnic and other sub-national loyalties clash with the demands of the central state;
- (5) overlay conflicts where previously dominant forms of regional conflict are displaced or transformed into 'new' ones;
- (6) diffusion conflicts where conflicts within one nation 'spill over' to neighbours;
- (7) asymmetrical conflict where the inequitable distribution of military and economic resources between nations generates insecurity.²⁹

The range of threat to the region is immense and South Africa cannot just ignore the reality. The newly created SADC Political, Defence and Security organ will no doubt be instrumental in the formation of regional initiatives aimed

²⁸ For a discussion of regional threats, see: Thomas Ohlson quoted in Xavier Carim Strategic Perspectives for Southern African Security in the 1990's: Theoretical and Practical Considerations. Southern African Perspectives, No.23, (Cape Town: Centre for Southern African Studies, August 1993) 13.

²⁹ Thomas Ohlson quoted in Xavier Carim "Strategic Perspectives for Southern African Security in the 1990's", 13.

at crisis management.³⁰ SADC's security organ's main aim is conflict management and resolution through fostering consultation and monitoring crises. At the organs first summit meeting (October 1996), the crises in Angola was tabled though the body is still abiding by the UN's mandate to reach a consensus in the war torn country.

It is encouraging that southern Africa is moving steadily to manage regional crises. For its part, the GNU is positioning the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) to exude a non-threatening posture. The SANDF is being recast to play a more constructive role in ensuring regional stability rather than the instability it fostered under the apartheid regime. The SANDF reformulated role is indicative of South Africa's new regional disposition. The role is also brought on by the region's needs as the SANDF recently indicated:

The increasing demands for our participation in peace support missions, regional requests for humanitarian assistance and calls to assist our neighbours in a range of security matters, from mine clearance to the protection of their marine resource.³¹

The new positioning of the SANDF is also meant to send a message to foreign investors and businesses that their

³⁰ SADC's Political, Defence and Security organ was formed in June 1996.

³¹ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), July 21, 1996, p.23.

assets are safe in the region.³² The GNU is, however, adamant that the SADC states must work together in securing the region. For this reason, the SANDF is, as of this writing, engaged in high level talks with the Namibian Defence Force. South Africa of course wants to avoid being cast in a regional superpower role and will therefore seek any working agreement within the 'common security approach.'³³

It is still unclear how the GNU intends to use its 'common security approach' when it comes to the pressing issue of peacekeeping. The Mandela administration has previously rejected any suggestion that it is willing to involve the SANDF in regional, or even continental, peacekeeping. This position was outlined in mid-July 1995, at a conference organized by the Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Defense Policy (IDP). Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, relayed the GNU's commitment not to involve the armed forces in peacekeeping operations beyond the borders of South Africa. An assessment of the considerable financial burden attached to peacekeeping, rather than a lack of commitment, seemingly

³² Ibid., p.23.

³³ Government of National Unity. Defence in a Democracy: Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (Pretoria: Ministry of Defence, 1995), 19.

informed the GNU's position. The Minister confined South Africa's peacekeeping by saying that "South Africa's best contribution is the moral authority of its own transition ... a unique example of preventative diplomacy."³⁴ However, in roughly more than a year, the GNU seems to be changing its stance on peacekeeping missions. This is partly in response to the Burundi crisis. That the Mandela administration has changed its position is not certain is therefore another area for regional policy to clarify. With the situation in Angola being far from resolved and the threat of renewed hostilities always present, the GNU will have to develop regional policy to be specific on the issue of regional peacekeeping. If the UN's efforts fail to restore the Lusaka accords in Angola, it is very possible that South Africa may move to broker a new peace agreement that involves the SADC's Political, Defense and Security Council. Though the outcome of the Angolan crisis is far from over, it does seem that the region is fairly confident that it could broker a new peace agreement if all else fails.

As the crisis in Angola continues to wage, the region is again confronted with the problem of refugees. The GNU is yet to develop its position on refugees in the region.

³⁴ Sunday Times (Johannesburg), July 16, 1995, p.18.

South Africa's dilemma is that it cannot remain too distant from the streams of refugees who have been displaced in decades of regional conflict. The predicament is illustrated in a recent report by the Internal Tracing Unit (ITU), which estimates that approximately eight million illegal refugees have filtered into South Africa and that the number is growing daily.³⁵ In this sense, South Africa is captive to the refugee crisis and has no option but to collaborate regionally on efforts to contain the flow of refugees. An appropriate place for collaboration is alongside SADC's newly created Regional Refugee Committee and of course the Political, Defence and Security organ.³⁶ It is possible that successful collaboration here may reproduce further collaboration on other crisis areas, and thereby, provide a novel twist to Mitrany's ramification theory. Other crisis areas that require policy direction within SADC collaboration are: regional population growth, desertification and soil erosion, AIDS and other health epidemics, interstate gun and drug trafficking, interstate stock theft, interstate vehicle theft, to name a prominent few.

South Africa will no doubt continue to shape the

³⁵ The Citizen (Johannesburg), June 29, 1995, p.11.

³⁶ Diamond Fields Advertiser (Kimberley), May 16, 1995, P.5.

political and economic development of the region. As Deutsch would argue, South Africa's strengths are central to regional development, security and peace.³⁷ That South Africa has the political will to continue the strong bonds of cooperation, peace and friendship is being demonstrated in the postapartheid era. Postapartheid regional policy is certainly directed toward development, security and peace. South Africa's reentry into the region has achieved many successes in the short period since Nelson Mandela assumed the presidency.

The most visible success is that of the reinforced and unified identity that South Africa has brought to the region. There is a new found purpose that defies the critics that claim the region is fast disappearing into the marginalization abyss. This pride and unity is evident throughout the region. In Zimbabwe, for example, visitors are greeted at the Harare airport by a counter marked "SADC Residents". This symbolism indicates that the region is bracing for even greater unity as it moves toward functioning as a community. Already the first steps have also been taken towards establishing a southern African parliament along the lines of the European parliament. In

³⁷ Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 130-139.

July 1996, the speakers of the region's twelve parliaments signed the Windhoek Protocol with the intention of establishing a Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum. The parliamentary forum will act as a consultative body for the immediate future but is expected to evolve into legislative body as SADC develops further. The regional parliament is a forceful indication of the resolve that is uniting southern Africa in the postapartheid era.

As southern Africa approaches a new millennium, or what South Africans also sentimentally refer to as the post-Mandela era, regional policy will no doubt raise up to the challenges of a fast paced world that expects relatively little from southern Africa. We can expect South Africa to develop its regional policy to address the issues of migrant labor, industrial policy, agricultural cooperation, transport, and telecommunications. In the area of transport, the GNU has already proposed to SADC that the region's road infrastructure be upgraded and extended into the rest of the continent. The benefits to free trade from an improved transport system will no doubt be invaluable for the entire region. Clearly, South Africa is focused on moving the region toward sustainable development. Most importantly, the Mandela administration has laid to rest the

apartheid era by forging a new regional consensus based on peaceful cooperation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study has traced the emerging regional policy of postapartheid South Africa's first democratic government. The overall finding is that the Mandela administration has significantly redefined South Africa's regional role from that of the apartheid era. Postapartheid South Africa, has adopted a non-confrontational and cooperative regional policy that outrightly rejects the former obsession with domination through destabilization. Through a broad diplomatic engagement strategy, the Government of National Unity (GNU) is forging strong regional relations steeped in peace, friendship, and cooperation.

President Mandela has been instrumental in redirecting South Africa's southern African relations. Immediately following his inauguration in April 1994, the President launched into vigorous diplomatic engagement that set the pace for South Africa's reentry into southern Africa. With carefully chosen words and gestures the President paid tribute to the role the region played in resisting apartheid domination. The defeat of apartheid was characterized as a moral victory for southern Africa and also for human rights

throughout the world. With the political stage set, the President began to preach a political gospel of democratic governance that extolled the virtues of peaceful cooperation over confrontation and conflict. As the President made his way through southern Africa, meeting with governmental leaders and their opposition, it became clear that an entirely new framework for regional policy was emerging.

That South Africa intended to center its foreign policy focus on the region became clear when President Mandela prominently scheduled his first official state visit to neighboring Mozambique. The visit to Mozambique also established the Government of National Unity's (GNU) argument that regional conflict should be addressed through negotiation that aimed at peacefully reconciling interests in freely contested elections. Pledging logistical support, South Africa urged Mozambique to pursue its chosen path toward democratic reconciliation. The President met with both the FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) government and the opposition RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance Movement). The strategy bore significant results. Merely months after the state visit, Mozambique held its first democratic election since FRELIMO seized power in the mid-1970's.

This diplomatic strategy was duplicated in Tanzania, Lesotho, Angola and most recently in Swaziland, though

comparatively, the immediate results have been less spectacular than in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the main thrust of the diplomatic engagement policy remained consistent with the objectives of ending conflict through negotiation and promoting stable democratic government. During the constitutional crisis in Lesotho, South Africa demonstrated the seriousness with which it viewed the democratization of the region. South Africa was adamant that it would not tolerate the erosion of the regional trend toward democratization. Democracy the government argued, is the best way to stabilize the region.

A consensus about the need to address political instability in the region emerged during efforts to mediate the Angolan civil war in early 1994. When the Lesotho crisis emerged later that year, the region responded in united efforts convince the monarch to restore Lesotho's democracy. Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, in particular, worked closely together in the Lesotho crisis. This consensus is currently being extended to Swaziland where a beleaguered King Mswati III is trying to stave off the democratic forces that threaten the Tinkhudla traditional government. Though very little is known about the unfolding Swaziland crises at this stage, President Mandela has assumed the peaceful negotiator role that seeks

an end to the conflict through mediation and democratization.¹ Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana have joined South Africa in seeking a democratic solution to Swaziland's crisis. The region seems to agree with President Mandela's assertion that only democracy can provide durable "solutions to the problems of humankind."²

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the steady stream of southern African countries rushing toward the trough of the NWO's democracy paradigm approximates trends elsewhere in the developing world. In southern Africa, the democratizing trend is buoyed by South Africa's own experience. It is this experience that places democracy and human rights as a central characteristic of postapartheid foreign policy. However, the idealistic emphasis on human rights has not been without criticism. This is especially relevant in the context of South Africa's close association with so called 'pariah states' (Libya, Zaire, Indonesia, etc). Though the GNU has been more vocal about its human rights objectives in regional policy, the same does not hold

¹ King Mswati III has defined a two year period for the drawing up of a democratic constitution that would address the wide labor concerns that crippled the country in September 1996.

² Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, (November-December 1993), 87.

true for its relations with the pariah states. This situation runs the risk of signaling that regional relations are judged on a more rigid human rights standard than those with the pariah states. South Africa must act to convince the world that its foreign policy positions are coherent and stable. Perhaps it is time for the Mandela administration to abandon its parading of human rights ideals as being central to foreign policy. This would leave the GNU free to pursue realpolitik objectives without having to justify its international relations in terms of a moral agenda. It is however unlikely that South Africa will drop the emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy articulations. What is needed now is for the government to clarify its position on the role human rights plays in directing the manner in which relations are conducted. This is especially relevant in light of the embarrassing failure of foreign policy toward Nigeria.

A second trend that distinguishes postapartheid regional policy from the former National Party (NP) regime is the centering of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as the primary vehicle for South-southern African political and economic cooperation. When South Africa joined the SADC it breathed new life and purpose into the organization that was founded to combat the previous apartheid regime's economic domination of the region. The

GNU's presence has raised the international credibility of SADC to a previously unknown level. Trading on its new found notoriety and status, the SADC is playing a pioneering role in laying the foundation for regional economic development. In this way, the SADC is proving to be instrumental in channeling South Africa's economic vision for the region. This vision includes favoring mutual economic development through the multilateral approach of SADC. At this early stage, the GNU favors sectoral regionalism over full and formal integration. Full regional integration that formally combines markets is a distant goal. The most prominent move toward sectoral cooperation came with signing of a SADC Protocol on Free Trade (August 1996) that sets the region on course to tariff free trade in about a decade. The agreement comes at a time when South Africa faced harsh criticisms for continuing to block regional imports through its ridged tariffs regime. The agreement was meant to still the nerves of those who thought South Africa would not liberalize its regional trade practices. Zimbabwe found relief for its strong reservations on South African trade practices when it signed a bilateral agreement that is tied into the Protocol on Free Trade.

The SADC still faces competition from the South African Customs Union (SACU) in the area of trade. Since not all

regional states are members of the SACU, the suggestion that the organization be integrated into the SADC is still being bandied about. Zambia, for example, is a vocal critic of the trading privileges that SACU states have with South Africa. As of this writing, the fate of the SACU is undetermined but it is not expected that the GNU will scrap its revenue raising organization very easily. What is certain is that South Africa has turned its back on the other regional organization, the COMESA (Common Market of Eastern and Southern African States). The GNU prefers the more manageable size of the SADC over the relative mammoth COMESA which covers two African regions. The COMESA has not taken South Africa's decision lightly. It seems to be positioning itself as a direct rival of the SADC. The case is complicated by the fact that all SADC states except South Africa and Mauritius are members of the COMESA. Given South Africa's economic dominance in the region, the COMESA will not likely derail the SADC's regional position.

Behind South Africa's new engagement of southern Africa is the sincere belief that the region shares a common destiny. South Africa is demonstrating the political will to address the regions development and political concerns. However, South Africa wisely shies away from any pretense that it can act as an engine for regional development. The GNU is cognizant that regional underdevelopment is a

reflection of longstanding historical processes that had its genesis in the colonial division of labor and cannot be fixed overnight. Though South Africa's dominant economy has entrenched the peripheral nature of the surrounding economies, it is unlikely that a regime change alone will be sufficient to reverse regional fortunes. This has not stopped the GNU from insisting that the region is economically interdependent. The region may be interdependent but is also similarly constrained by downward economic forces that find states frantically competing for structural capital that relates solely to narrowly defined national interests.

This study imposes the reality of South Africa's domestic condition as the overriding variable which will influence the kind of commitment the GNU makes to the region. The short of the matter is that South Africa faces a formidable catalogue of socio-economic challenges that prohibit it from peddling an overly ambitious regional policy. South Africa is gripped by a poverty crisis that threatens the well being of its recent political transition. Therefore, South Africa must necessarily continue its present lopsided trade relationship with the region because it needs the considerable revenue it generates to address domestic development. Though the SADC Protocol on Free Trade indicates that the GNU does not seek indefinite trade

protection, nothing in the agreement guarantees that in a decade the economies of the region will be more equal. In fact, free trade may benefit South Africa more than its neighbors especially if the relevance of tariff revenue is taken into consideration. South Africa's dominant manufacturing market stands to benefit from removing the additional costs of tariffs on its products. This essentially means greater market penetration for South African goods into an already overly dependent region.

In these harsh contexts, South Africa's regional policy reflects not only domestic concerns but also larger global trends that focus on market mechanisms, political stability, free trade, export-led growth, and mobile capital. This recognition assumes the anchored domination of Western interests in global affairs. The diplomatic engagement strategy therefore has states necessarily looking inward for a base to develop a consensus on political and economic direction that reflect the interests of dominant forces in the NWO. The emphasis on multi-party democracy, human rights, free trade, is meant to make the region more attractive to donor-states and other global investors. Whether the strategy will bring the desired results is still a matter of conjecture. What is certain is that southern Africa is still captive a captive market for South Africa. This is so despite the changing political contexts of the

overall relationship.

Southern Africa states are grossly underdeveloped and lack the means to shake the shackles that bind them to South Africa. For the foreseeable future, the dominant economic relationship in southern Africa is unlikely to change. However, that relationship now can be tempered by a new political relationship with South Africa and also within SADC. The new rulers of South Africa have proven themselves open to developing new relations gradually. The oppressive military domination that backed up apartheid South Africa's economic dominance is no longer a threat to the region's stability.

For at least the next three years President Mandela will continue to inspire the hope that sees the region springing free from its development crisis. The president's decision not to stand re-election in 1999 may tug at the region's heart strings but it introduces very little regional fear that the present course of engagement will be derailed. Already, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is being groomed to take the place of President Mandela. Though almost unavoidable, and even racist by implication, the departure of Mandela from southern Africa is being met with increased skepticism from Western investors. The wait and see attitude that prevented many major investors from entering South Africa after the elections is now extended to

a skepticism over the fortunes of a post-Mandela era. That South Africa and southern Africa must wade through the Afro-pessimism of the NWO is a reality that only combined regional efforts can address. For this reason, the significance of the withdrawal of President Mandela from the formal regional context and its impact on the further development of regional policy is a relevant and timely area for continuing research. Also engaging, will be an assessment of the dislocations of political and economic restructuring and its effect on regional policy.

Whatever the direction of new research, South Africa is well on its way to recreating its regional relations. Though South Africa's economic domination of the region is not likely to change very soon, it is the new non-confrontational and cooperative posture that the GNU is developing that euphorically marks the dawning of a new and constructive age of regional relations in southern Africa.

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